liable, plaintiff must show it "either (1) provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or (2) knew of the harassment but did nothing about it." Locastro, 830 F. Supp. at 138 (citation omitted).
Defendants claim that plaintiff only has alleged four instances related to her hostile work environment claim: (1) unknown defendants left the potato and carrot in her locker, Compl. P 50; (2) defendant Fenton improperly investigated the carrot incident, Compl. P 50; (3) defendant Fenton made comments about Alfano eating seductively, Compl. P 50; and (4) defendant Fenton accused Alfano of having an affair with a co-worker. Compl. P 54. See Def. Mem., Dkt. No. 18, at 21-22. Defendants argue that Alfano's other claims of harassment are untimely because she does not supply dates, and that these allegations do not comprise a hostile work environment.
Because I must draw all inferences in favor of plaintiff, I assume that any allegation for which Alfano has failed to provide a date is timely. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to prove the specific circumstances, including dates, of the incidents. See Blesedell, 708 F. Supp. at 1419 n.12. Moreover, I disagree with defendants' characterization of Alfano's allegations as "occasional or trivial." Def. Mem., Dkt. No. 18, at 22. In addition to the above four instances, plaintiff alleged in her complaint that defendants called her names such as "black widow" and "a fatal attraction" and made comments that she was "deadly and dangerous" and had "a bad reputation," Compl. P 49; that defendants permitted others to write obscenities on her locker and place pornography in her locker, Compl. P 53; and that defendants accused her of having a sexual affair with a co-worker and ridiculed her about the affair, Compl. P 54. All of these incidents were of a sexual nature. Importantly, Alfano alleges these incidents to have occurred throughout her 14 years of employment, so the incidents were not limited or isolated. Compl. P 51. Furthermore, Alfano specifically alleged that she did not welcome the harassment, that it was based on her gender, and that it made her work environment intolerable and unbearable. Compl. P 52. Taken together, these allegations sufficiently state a prima facie claim for a hostile work environment.
VII. Individual defendant liability
Defendants also argued for dismissal of the complaint against the individual defendants. After the parties filed their motion papers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Title VII does not permit individual liability for the agents of employers. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995). Thus, plaintiff's Title VII claims against defendants in their individual capacities are dismissed. On the other hand, Alfano's claims pursuant to New York Human Rights Law, which are contained in her second cause of action, against the individual defendants are retained. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317.
VIII. State law claims
Finally, defendants argue that because plaintiff's federal discrimination claims are improper, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Alfano's numerous state law claims. As noted above, many of Alfano's discrimination claims survive defendants' challenges. The causes of action under state law concern substantially the same facts as Alfano's federal discrimination claims. Therefore, I appropriately will consider the state law claims pursuant to the district court's supplemental jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
In summary, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(c) is granted in part and denied in part.
(1) The court has jurisdiction over individual defendants Brown, Countryman, Costello, Fenton and Deering. The court lacks jurisdiction over individual defendants Connell, Wells, Raymond, Buttimer, Carlsen, Coughlin, Coombs, Thompson, and Goord.
(2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 55, 56, 57, and 66. These claims thus are dismissed. Plainfiff's claims in Paragraph 43(c) regarding the job evaluation and Paragraphs 45 and 65 are retained.
(3) The statute of limitations bars plaintiff's allegations in Paragraph 43(c) regarding the denial of an office and Paragraph 46. These claims are dismissed.
(4) The allegations in Paragraph 60 fail to state a claim for sexual discrimination and are dismissed.
(5) All Title VII claims against remaining individual defendants that seek to hold them liable in their individual capacities are dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 15 1996
Syracuse, New York
ROSEMARY S. POOLER
United States District Judge