The opinion of the court was delivered by: SWEET
Defendants in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") have moved, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion will be denied.
Plaintiff William Byrd ("Byrd") was, at the time of the incident which gave rise to this lawsuit, an inmate at the Anna M. Kross Correctional Facility ("AMKC") at Rikers Island.
Defendant Wade Hults ("C.O. Hults") is a Corrections Officer employed by the New York City Department of Correction. At the time of the incident which gave rise to this lawsuit, C.O. Hults was working as a correctional officer at AMKC.
Defendant Catherine M. Abate became the Commissioner of the N.Y.C. Department of Correction on April 27, 1992. Defendant David Dinkins was the Mayor of New York City at the time plaintiff was injured.
Byrd filed the complaint in this Section 1983 action on March 11, 1993. Byrd's municipal liability claims against Dinkins and Abate were bifurcated from Byrd's claims against C.O. Hults, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties which was so ordered by this Court on June 30, 1994. Pursuant to the order of bifurcation, no discovery has been taken regarding municipal liability.
By letter dated April 8, 1996, Assistant Corporation Counsel for defendants informed the Court that most of the training manual, and part of the institutional and post orders for 1991 had been located, but that the Department needed additional time to assemble the remaining documents, "if they can be located." On April 9, 1996, plaintiff's counsel wrote to this Court indicating that she had no objection to an extension of the defendants' time to produce said documents, but requesting immediate production of those portions of the documents already located. On April 23, 1996, defendants produced material pertaining to mental health training in 1991, and stated that the post and institutional orders in effect in 1991 for Lower 1 and 3 housing area could not be located.
Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on May 15, 1996. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to compel discovery and for sanctions for non-compliance with previous discovery orders of this Court. Oral argument on defendants' motion and plaintiff's cross-motion was heard on September 11, 1996, at which time the parties reached an agreement resolving plaintiff's discovery motion, and defendants' motion for summary judgment was considered fully submitted.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "as a general rule, all ambiguities and inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should be resolved against the moving party." Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1995); Chambers v. TRM ...