The opinion of the court was delivered by: PARKER
The United States of America brings this action (1) to reduce to judgment a federal tax lien filed against defendant Park Drive Manor Partnership ("Park Drive" or "the partnership") and its partners; (2) to set aside the conveyance of Park Drive partner Martin Carlin's interest in real property located at 175 Crary Avenue, Mount Vernon, New York ("Mount Vernon realty") to defendant Barbara Carlin; and (3) for an order declaring that the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") lien on the Mount Vernon realty has priority over the interests of defendants Barbara Carlin, LRSE Realty Corporation ("LRSE"), Free Lunch, Inc., and Gold Hawk Joint Venture ("Gold Hawk"). Before the Court is the Government's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth, the Government's motion is granted.
Recognizing that on a motion for summary judgment all factual ambiguities and reasonable inferences are drawn in the nonmoving party's favor, see Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1980), the following unopposed facts are properly before the Court for purposes of this motion.
In 1985, Martin Carlin, along with two brothers, Vlad Stevens and Steve Stevens, purchased a building complex known as the Park Drive Manor apartments, located at 600 West Harvey Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A 1985 federal partnership tax return identified Martin Carlin and both Stevens brothers, by name and social security number, as partners of the Park Drive Manor Partnership and lists the partnership's address as 600 West Harvey Street, Philadelphia.
On February 23, 1987, the IRS assessed a tax deficiency against Park Drive in the amount of $ 22,351.55 for unpaid tax obligations under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6671-6672. On March 30, 1987, the IRS issued another assessment against Park Drive in the amount of $ 20,088.98. The assessments against Park Drive and its partners arose out of the partnership's unpaid payroll tax obligations for the taxable quarters ending September 30, 1986 and December 31, 1986. On July 14, 1987, the IRS filed its notice of federal tax lien against Park Drive in the Westchester County Clerk's office.
Approximately six weeks later, on August 26, 1987, Martin Carlin conveyed his interest in the Mount Vernon realty to his wife, Barbara Carlin, a transfer for which he received no consideration. On March 28, 1988, Barbara Carlin, in turn, transferred that interest to an entity appropriately named Free Lunch, of which she was the sole officer. She received no consideration for the transfer. Later that year, Free Lunch conveyed its interest in the property to LRSE, an entity whose sole officer was Martin Carlin's cousin, Michael Jaffe. That conveyance was made for inadequate consideration.
Despite notice and due demand, Park Drive and the partners of Park Drive have neglected to pay in full the outstanding assessed liability and accrued statutory interest.
Meanwhile, in May 1987, Gold Hawk obtained a judgment against Martin Carlin in Texas in the amount of $ 7,928,519.41. Gold Hawk filed a transcript of judgment in the Southern District of New York on July 14, 1987 and recorded its judgment in the Westchester County Clerk's office on July 23, 1987. On or about July 23, 1987, Gold Hawk delivered its judgment against Martin Carlin for execution to the Westchester County Sheriff, who scheduled and issued a notice of nonjudicial sale of the Mount Vernon realty. No notice of the sale was provided to the IRS. On July 18, 1988, Gold Hawk purchased the Mount Vernon realty by a Sheriff's deed which was recorded in the Westchester County Clerk's office on July 29, 1988.
As of December 22, 1995, the taxpayer liability on the assessments issued against Park Drive, including accrued interest and accrued lien costs, totaled $ 114,798.58. On November 24, 1992, the Government instituted this action against defendants and, on February 2, 1996, moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the underlying tax liability of Park Drive or the priority of its interests in the Mount Vernon realty over those of the defendants.
A. Standard For Summary Judgment
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a motion for summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must initially satisfy a burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); see also Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with "specific facts, showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), by a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to the party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. The Court cannot try issues of fact, but can only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1987). When making that determination, the Court is to inquire whether there is "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for the party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "the court is required to draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989). A genuine issue, however, "is not created by a mere allegation in the pleadings . . ., nor by surmise or conjecture on the part of the litigants." United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 94 L. Ed. 2d 762, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987). Indeed, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that affidavits opposing summary judgment "be made on personal knowledge." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, unsupported denial, upon information and belief, is insufficient to raise any issue of fact so as to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assoc., 72 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 1995); Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff, 638 F. Supp. 714, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Under Rule 3(g) of the Civil Rules for the United States District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York ("Rule 3(g)"), upon any motion for summary judgment, the moving party must submit a statement of the material facts as to which that party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. The nonmoving party, in response to the movant's statement of facts not in dispute, must submit a counter-statement of facts in dispute. Those facts not disputed are deemed admitted unless ...