governed by English law). Dismissal of the action on forum non conveniens grounds will relieve this Court from having to "untangle . . . law foreign to itself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 588.
Finally, the remaining public factors militate toward dismissal. As in Piper, "the American interest in this [alleged defamation] is simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 261; see also Jauss v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18762, No. 94 Civ. 2921, 1995 WL 4023, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1995) (noting that the Southern District of New York is "unduly congested"). The Court and the jurors of this country ought not to be burdened with deciding a case with so little relation to the United States.
IV. Additional Discovery
Beekmans requests that, should the Court decide to dismiss the action, it make such a decision a "preliminary one," subject to reconsideration once discovery has been completed on the issue of publication and circulation of the Memorandum. Beekmans neither provides the Court any authority to support this proposal, nor does he explain how dismissal of the case would leave the Court with any action in which to conduct discovery. In any event, based on the overwhelming centrality of the Netherlands to this plaintiff and the claims alleged in his complaint, and for the reasons outlined above, the Court declines to make the present order merely preliminary.
In the alternative, Beekmans cross-moves for immediate discovery on the issue of publication and circulation of the Memorandum. Beekmans fails to suggest, however, how any such discovery could affect the outcome of this motion so rooted in his own complaint. Even assuming such discovery were to demonstrate that J.P. Morgan's decision to transmit the memorandum to ING Bank was made in New York, such a limited connection would not outweigh the centrality of the Netherlands in this action.
The fact that this motion is based on affidavits does not compel the conclusion that discovery should be granted. In this Circuit, "motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens may be decided on the basis of affidavits." Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). In fact, the use of affidavits in forum non conveniens motions is "well established practice in the Southern District of New York . . . ." Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890, 66 L. Ed. 2d 116, 101 S. Ct. 248 (1980). A motion to dimiss for forum non conveniens does not call for a detailed development of the entire case through discovery, Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 451 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975), because "requiring extensive investigation would defeat the purpose of [the] motion." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 258.
The core transmission is the one alleged in the complaint, namely that "in or about July 1995, ING's Management Board was approached by a member of defendant's Management Board who delivered to ING Meuli's memorandum . . . ." Complaint P 17. Discovery on peripheral facts regarding transmission would not change the central facts of this case, and would not alter the convenience of litigating this matter in the Netherlands.
For the reasons set forth above, J.P. Morgan's motion to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds is granted. Beekmans's cross-motions to make this order "preliminary" and for further discovery are denied.
SHIRLEY WOHL KRAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: New York, New York
November 19, 1996