but chose not to do so." (Defs.' Mem. at 4-5). Where such state remedies are available, the Second Circuit has unequivocally found that federal intervention is inappropriate. See Powell, 436 F.2d at 86. Hence, I find that because neither election was pervasively unfair and because there were adequate state law remedies for the violations complained of, plaintiff has not established a due process violation.
B. Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff has not demonstrated an intentional effort on the part of any state actor to discriminate against write-in voters or write-in candidates as he is required to prove to sustain an equal protection claim. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1012, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 64 L. Ed. 2d 47, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980). The letters and memoranda from New York State Board of Elections Deputy Counsel Stanley Zalen upon which plaintiff relies in support of his claim at best demonstrate that errors in the election occurred; they do not in any way demonstrate that such errors were intentional. On the contrary, they show an effort by the Board of Elections to correct mistakes that were made. (Pl.'s Mem. Exs. B, C, D). In addition, it is illogical to infer that an entity intentionally seeks to undermine write-in candidates when it makes an effort to train their poll workers on write-in voting procedures and to include a description of such procedures in their training manuals. (Defs.' Mem Exs. 1,2). From what has been provided to this Court, plaintiff has shown no evidence of intentional discrimination and I therefore find in favor of the defendants on plaintiff's equal protection claim.
In sum, the election process errors about which plaintiff complains are the sort of minutiae that the Second Circuit in Powell cautioned the federal courts from overseeing in elections. Granting plaintiff's request for a federal remedy would be the epitome of what the Second Circuit characterized as being "thrust into the details of virtually every election, tinkering with the state's election machinery, reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote tallies, and certificates of election for all manner of error and insufficiency under state and federal law." Powell, 436 F.2d at 86.
Such micro -management is not within the power or province of this Court. Accordingly, I do not find that a federal constitutional violation has occurred.
II. Pendent State Law Violations
I also find that I should relinquish jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims to the appropriate state forum.
Having found that there is no federal constitutional violation and therefore no basis for federal intervention in this case, I follow the practice recommended by the Supreme Court in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988), that "in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966) (providing that "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."). This practice has been repeatedly affirmed in the Second Circuit. See Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 1994) (where after dismissal of federal claims there remained "a complete 'hegemony of state law claims,' . . .. relinquishment of federal court jurisdiction [was] warranted."); DiLaura v. Power Authority, 982 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over supplemental state negligence claim after federal claims were dismissed.); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that after federal claims upon which jurisdiction rested were dismissed, "it may be an abuse of district court's discretion to take pendent jurisdiction of a claim that depends on novel questions of state law."); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 34 (2d Cir, 1986) (providing that a district court's discretion to accept pendent jurisdiction is more "limited, however by the consideration that 'needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.'") (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130--28 (1966)); Cornett v. Sheldon 894 F. Supp. 715, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (court should refrain from exercising pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when it dismissed federal equal protection and due process claims); see also Eccles v. Gargiulo, 497 F. Supp. 419, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (providing that "the court cannot but feel sympathy for plaintiffs in this case [but]. . . their complaint raises questions of purely State law to be determined by the State courts.").
With respect to the federal claims at issue, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's summary judgment motion is DENIED and defendants' summary judgment motion is GRANTED. Because the Court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment dismissing this action in accordance with this Opinion and Order.
Dated: New York, New York
December 2, 1996