Regan inescapably leads to the conclusion that it views the pretrial restraint of substitute assets as permissible." United States v. Bellomo, No. 96 Cr. 430 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1996).
I read Regan more circumspectly. In my view Regan, to the limited extent it addresses substitute assets, is concerned only with the equitable obligations of a court to minimize hardships to third parties impacted by a RICO restraining order.
The primary question before the Court of Appeals in Regan was whether RICO authorized pre-trial restraint of traceable assets in the hands of third parties. Regan, 858 F.2d at 116-17. Upholding such restraints, the Court went on to note that "orders directed at third parties are strong medicine and should not be used where measures that are adequate and less burdensome on the third parties are available." Id. at 121. The Court found that the burden on the third parties in Regan could be eased by allowing them voluntarily to substitute other assets of equal value for the traceable assets restrained. As the Court explained, following any conviction such substitute assets would, by virtue of § 1963(m), be forfeitable to the extent that traceable assets were unavailable. Id. at 120. Consequently, there could be no harm to any party in permitting the third parties to voluntarily substitute such other assets for the restrained traceable assets prior to trial.
The Court of Appeals thus held "that where the nature of the defendants' forfeitable property makes the imposition of a restraining order burdensome on third parties, the district court should, as an alternative, restrain assets of the defendant equal in value to that of the unrestrained forfeitable property." Id. Unlike Judge Kaplan, I read this simply as an instruction to district courts as to how to exercise their "inherent equitable jurisdiction." United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619, 95 L. Ed. 582, 71 S. Ct. 524 (1951). See also, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 90 L. Ed. 1332, 66 S. Ct. 1086 (1946) ("Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction").
Regan, then, says nothing about the power of a court to compel the forcible pre-trial restraint of substitute assets over the asset-holder's objection. Nor, indeed, had any Circuit Court reached that issue at the time Regan was decided in 1988.
Subsequently, however, no fewer than five Circuits decided the issue, and all but one held that substitute assets could not be involuntarily restrained prior to trial. See United States v. Field, 62 F.3d 246 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); but see In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
Support for the majority conclusion is manifest in both the applicable statutory language and the pertinent legislative history. The RICO provision authorizing pre-trial restraints, § 1963(d)(1), states simply that "upon application of the United States, the Court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section" (emphasis added). Subsection (a), as previously noted, describes "traceable" property, i.e., assets having some specified relation to the underlying RICO violation. By contrast, subsection (d)(1) contains no reference whatever to subsection (m), the section describing "substitute" assets. It follows that subsection (d)(1) only authorizes the pre-trial restraint of traceable assets.
The legislative history is equally clear. The report of the Senate Committee that drafted the pertinent provisions of what ultimately became subsection (d)(1) states that "the [pre-trial] restraining order provision applies only to [traceable] property. It may not be applied with respect to other assets that may ultimately be ordered forfeited under the substitute assets provision." Senate Report No. 97-520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.18 (1982).
This Court concludes that under RICO substitute assets may not be involuntarily restrained prior to trial and that nothing in Regan holds to the contrary. But Regan does make clear that a district court has inherent equitable power to mitigate hardships by permitting a party to voluntarily substitute non-traceable assets of equivalent value for restrained traceable assets. A roughly similar exercise of equitable discretion is what the parties here propose in requesting that the Court approve the voluntary restraint of $ 100 million of the defendants' property without undertaking to determine whether or not the assets are traceable under § 1963(a). There appears no reason why a court that otherwise has jurisdiction over a case under RICO's broad mantle should be prohibited from exercising its inherent equitable powers to authorize a consensual agreement of this kind.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the parties' application for the Stipulated Post-Indictment Restraining Order is granted.
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
Dated: White Plains, New York
December 3, 1996.