the intent to commit an unlawful activity have consistently been upheld as within Congress' authority under the commerce clause.
For example, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which makes it a crime to use an interstate facility with the intent to "promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of any unlawful activity," has long been upheld as well within Congress' authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1147 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that the constitutionality of section 1952 has been repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L. Ed. 2d 541, 87 S. Ct. 703 (1967); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915, 14 L. Ed. 2d 435, 85 S. Ct. 1530 (1965); United States v. Goldberg, 928 F. Supp. 89, 94-98 (D. Mass. 1996); see also Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801, 92 L. Ed. 380, 68 S. Ct. 100 (1947) (upholding the Fugitive Felon Act, which made unlawful the travel in interstate commerce with the intent to avoid prosecution); United States v. Boone, 904 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 924(m), which prohibits an individual from "traveling from any State or foreign country into any other State" in an attempt to illegally deal in firearms, as a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause). Considering the plenary power afforded to Congress to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, section 2261 certainly falls within the categories of activity that Congress may properly regulate.
Section 2261 has the requisite relation to interstate commerce as defined under controlling law since it is triggered only if an individual crosses a state line with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate his or her spouse or intimate partner, and that travel actually results in the intentional commission a crime of violence that causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261. As was previously noted, it is a "well settled principle that Congress may impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels will not become the means of promoting or spreading evil, whether physical, moral, or economic in nature. North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705, 90 L. Ed. 945, 66 S. Ct. 785 (1946).
Gluzman's final argument attacks section 2261 as overbroad, pointing to the legislative history's myriad references to violence against women and the absence of any such references to problems associated with violence against men. She argues that to the extent that gender-based violence does have a genuine effect on interstate commerce, those findings are relevant only to 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which establishes a civil rights remedy for gender-based violence. Thus, according to the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, insofar as it applies to protect "spouses" and is gender neutral, reaches beyond the scope of congressional findings with regard to the effect of gender-based violence on interstate commerce.
Gluzman fails to recognize, however, that in order to succeed in a facial challenge to section 2261, she "must show that 'no set of circumstances exists under which the [section] would be valid.'" United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987); see Giusto v. I.N.S., 9 F.3d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus, even if this Court were to find that section 2261 is unconstitutional as so far as it fails to regulate nongender motivated activity, it would be "insufficient to render the [section] wholly invalid, since the [Supreme] Court has not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Sage, 92 F.3d at 106 (citing General Electric v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1456 (2d Cir. 1991).
Based on the above reasons, this Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 2261 is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the indictment is denied.
BARRINGTON D. PARKER, JR.
Dated: White Plains, New York
January 16, 1997