The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEXLER
Plaintiff Rosa Lee Borah brings this action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") based upon injuries suffered when she slipped and fell at the United States Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, New York (the "Academy") on September 12, 1994. Plaintiff works for Classico Contractors ("Classico") performing cleaning and maintenance activities. The alleged slip and fall took place while plaintiff was performing her duties for Classico at the Academy which is under contract to perform cleaning and maintenance services for the Academy. Prior to commencing this action, plaintiff sought and received worker's compensation benefits from Classico for her injuries. Defendant now brings a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure claiming that plaintiff's exclusive remedy for this work related injury was her workers compensation benefits. However, the Court will treat the motion as one for summary judgement pursuant to Rule 56 since matters outside of the pleadings have been submitted by both parties. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion is denied.
On September 12, 1994 plaintiff was working at the United States Merchant Marine Academy performing cleaning and maintenance services for her employer Classico. Pursuant to a contract dated September 28, 1990 (the "Contract"), Classico is responsible for the cleaning and maintenance services at the Academy. Plaintiff has been employed by Classico to perform services at the Academy since 1990.
According to the Contract, Classico's responsibilities include: furnishing the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, services and facilities to perform its work; providing an on-site superintendent or supervisor; providing a supervisor necessary for management of Classico's operations; provide proper training and direction to Classico's workers in their individual tasks; maintaining and controlling Classico's employees' work and operation, including controlling the quality of the employees' work; overseeing its employee's competency, conduct and integrity, and if necessary, taking necessary disciplinary action that Classico in its discretion deemed necessary. In addition, the Contract required Classico to secure, pay for and keep in force Workers compensation insurance as required by law of the state.
According to James Amoroso, the Head of the Department of Administrative Services for the Academy, the Academy retained the authority to oversee and control the quality of Plaintiff's work. According to Amoroso, Bess Blumenfeld, an Academy employee, would regularly review Plaintiff's work and report any unsatisfactory work to Borah's immediate supervisor. He states that Blumenfeld had the authority to relocate and or terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff was required to abide by the rules and regulations of the academy.
A party seeking summary judgement must demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The nonmoving party may defeat the summary judgment motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. Of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1987). However, "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
It is axiomatic under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government cannot be sued unless it waives its right to immunity. The FTCA waives the government's sovereign immunity to suit for common law torts committed by employees of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. However, the waiver only extends to torts committed by government employees "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [tortious] act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
The plain meaning of section 1346(b) is that the United States cannot be held liable when there is no comparable cause of action against a private citizen. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 2674 restates the threshold limitation on the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity: 'The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. . . .'
C.P. Chemical Company, Inc. V. United States, 810 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). The test of whether the government has waived its immunity under the FTCA is referred to as the like circumstances test.
The government argues that whenever a government contract requires a contractor to provide workers compensation insurance to its employees that are working on government property, that application of the like circumstances test of the FTCA prohibits recovery from the United States for workplace injuries. The government reasons that if it were acting as a private employer in like circumstances to its contracting for its services, it would have provided workers compensation insurance, as evidenced by the requirement in the Contract that Classico provide such insurance. The government also asserts that it has indirectly provided plaintiff with its workers ...