that an official policy, custom or practice of the New York City Department of Correction caused the alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights, or that [Sielaff or DeRosa] were personally involved in the incidents from which plaintiff's claims arose." (Dfts. Memo at 4.) They contend that "[a] [Section] 1983 Complaint which contains no allegations that a defendant violated the law may be dismissed as to that defendant." Id. In addition, the moving defendants assert that, as supervisory personnel Sielaff and DeRosa may be liable for an alleged constitutional violation "only where there is an affirmative link between the alleged violation and the adoption of a plan or policy, whether express or otherwise, showing their authorization or approval of the misconduct at issue." Id. at 5-6. Similarly, the moving defendants maintain that "a lawsuit against Sielaff [the former Commissioner of the DOC] may be an action against the City of New York . . . [and, as such,] a plaintiff must plead and prove that the actions complained of were the result of an official policy, custom or practice of the [city] agency[,] that the official policy, custom or practice caused or was the moving force behind the plaintiff's alleged injuries, and that the injuries amounted to a constitutional violation." Id. at 4-5. As previously noted, plaintiff did not respond to Sielaff and DeRosa's motion, and thus, these arguments are unchallenged.
In order to prevail on a claim under Section 1983 against an individual, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) acted under color of state law (2) in a manner that deprived the plaintiff of "any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 876 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 53, 133 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1995). Section 1983 imposes liability for "conduct which 'subjects or causes to be subjected' the [plaintiff] to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 96 S. Ct. 598, 604, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976). Accordingly, "personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983." Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 55 L. Ed. 2d 792, 98 S. Ct. 1282 (1978).
Liability under Section 1983 often arises due to an official's personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S. Ct. 462, 38 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1973) (prison guard liable for beating inmate); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S. Ct. 719, 30 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1972) (prison warden liable for ordering an inmate's placement in solitary confinement). Supervisory personnel, however, may be liable under Section 1983 even where their involvement is more remote, such as failing to remedy a continuing constitutional violation after learning of it. United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 589 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming liability of former Commissioner of the New York state's correctional facilities and former warden of Attica for failing to correct a prisoner's unlawful segregated confinement). In addition, a supervisory official "may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue." Williams, 781 F.2d at 323. "An individual official's acts can rise to the level of 'policy' when 'senior personnel' knowingly 'acquiesce' in their subordinates' behavior." Krulik v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 781 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, an individual holding supervisory authority may be personally liable for "gross negligence" in managing subordinates who participated in a constitutional deprivation. 781 F.2d at 323-24; Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 135 (2d Cir. 1972).
Irrespective of whether a Section 1983 defendant occupies a supervisory or low-level position, however, "it is well-settled that 'where the complaint names a defendant in the caption, but no allegations indicating how the defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted.'" Thomas v. Beth Israel Hosp., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 935, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Morabito v. Blum, 528 F. Supp. 252, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); see also Kirkland v. Bianco, 595 F. Supp. 797, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Moreover, the Second Circuit requires that a complaint alleging the violation of civil rights "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient," Thomas, 710 F. Supp. at 942 (citing Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987), even where the plaintiff is a pro se litigant. See id. ; Wade v. Carey, 503 F. Supp. 25, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Raitport v. Chemical Bank, 74 F.R.D. 128, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
For purposes of resolving the instant motion, this Court assumes that the allegations set forth in plaintiff's Complaint are true, draws all inferences in favor of plaintiff, and construes plaintiff's pro se Complaint liberally. Such measures, however, do not alter the fact that the only reference in the Complaint to the moving defendants is the following:
B. It is based upon [plaintiff's] information and belief, that at the time of the alleged incident, Allyn Sielaff was employed as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correctional Services.