Letter of Mark W. Mauer, M.D., dated June 17, 1996. In the most recent medical evidence presented to the Court, Dr. Mauer indicated that Kirkendall is able to lift and handle 30 pound packages, maneuver up to 67 pound packages from desk and chair height to the floor, and maneuver packages up to 70 pounds from above the shoulders to the floor. Letter of Mark Mauer, M.D., December 1996. Further, Dr. Mauer stated that Kirkendall "could bend and stoop frequently, squat continuously, crawl and climb stairs continuously, crouch frequently, kneel and balance continuously." Id.
Based on the evidence before me, I must conclude that Kirkendall's physical impairment does not cause him to be substantially limited in any major life activity, including the ability to work. Kirkendall's primary limitations are his inability to lift items in excess of 30 pounds, to sit for periods longer than 3 hours at a time, and to engage in certain leisure activities.
Courts have held, as a matter of law, that a weight limitation such as Kirkendall's, particularly when compared to an average person's abilities, "does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity." Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (25 pound lifting limitation); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (25 pound lifting restriction). Kirkendall's inability to sit for more than 3 hours at a time also does not constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14835, 1995 WL 598973, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1995) (Individual's medical restriction of "no prolonged sitting" did not render her disabled under the ADA, as it did not substantially limit any major life activity, including her ability to work.), aff'd, 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996). Courts also have recognized that the inability to engage in leisure activities and sports, which require a great deal of physical vigor, does not equate with the inability to engage in normal everyday activities or job-related duties. O'Dell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15218, 1995 WL 611341, *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 1995). I also find that plaintiff's restrictions, in combination, do not substantially limit him in any major life activity.
Further, Kirkendall has not produced any evidence that he is significantly restricted in his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Kirkendall, who has an associates degree in Business Administration, has been disqualified only from the narrow range of jobs involving heavy lifting and prolonged sitting. See Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 396 (N.D. Iowa 1995). Kirkendall himself essentially admits this. In a letter, dated September 25, 1995, to Carol Schmaus, UPS Division Manager, Kirkendall states: "I am writing to let you know that my back condition, and permanent partial disability, have not left me incapable of performing jobs in a different capacity. Therefore, I would like to know what types of positions with UPS may be available that would accommodate my situation."
Additionally, Kirkendall has submitted no evidence of his vocational training, geographic area to which he has access, or the number and types of jobs demanding similar training from which he would be disqualified. Some courts have held that a plaintiff's failure to come forward with such evidence warrants granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994); Kindle v. Mid-Central/Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2662, 1996 WL 99766, at *7 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 1996); Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 922, 928-29 (E.D. Wis. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 13 (7th Cir. 1997).
Because Kirkendall has failed to demonstrate that he is substantially limited in a major life activity and, therefore, disabled within the meaning of the ADA, summary judgment must be granted to the defendant.
This case is unfortunate. Kirkendall had a decent job with UPS--one which he is no longer able to perform. However, that does not mean that there has been a violation of the ADA. The ADA was not intended to be a job insurance policy. Clearly, Kirkendall has significant quarrels--some of which may be legitimate--with UPS and its current policies and practices. Nevertheless, they are not cognizable under the ADA.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. LARIMER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: Rochester, New York
May 20, 1997.