present which would support the Plaintiff's claim of impotence.
Rule 56(c) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. provides that summary judgment shall be granted when it appears that there is no genuine issue as to a judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-252, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Thus, "a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by demonstrating there is no evidence supporting an issue upon which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof and which is essential to its case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). If the moving party makes such a showing the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. 477 U.S. at 247-248. A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District, 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d. Cir. 1992).
Issues actually litigated in a state court proceeding are entitled to the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal § 1983 suit as they would enjoy in the courts of the state where the judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 83, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56, 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984). This rule also applies where the prior state court proceedings are criminal. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 76 L. Ed. 2d 595, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983). Under New York law a party is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue in a second proceeding if the issues in both proceedings are identical, and the facts were necessarily litigated in the prior proceeding upon a full and fair hearing. Capital Telephone Co. v. Pattersonville Telephone Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 436 N.E.2d 461 (1982).
Our Court of Appeals addressed the preclusive effect of a prior criminal conviction for resisting arrest on a subsequent claim of excessive force in the case of Pastre v. Weber, 907 F.2d 144 (2d. Cir. 1990). In Pastre, the Plaintiff resisted arrest by kicking a trooper, who was only able to subdue and arrest him by applying force. Plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest, but later sued the trooper for excessive force.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the excessive force claim could not be sustained because it had necessarily been litigated in the prior criminal proceeding. Id. at 104. Therefore, the resisting arrest conviction had issue preclusive effect upon the excessive force claim during the period during which Plaintiff resisted arrest, and the force was presumptively reasonable. Id. at 104. The Court held that the matter had been necessarily litigated because in order to convict Plaintiff of resisting arrest the People would have to prove that force had been necessary to effectuate the arrest. Id. at 104; See, People v. Harper, 37 N.Y.2d 96, 99-100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 467, 332 N.E.2d 336 (1975). Accordingly, because the Plaintiff's criminal trial adjudicated that the Plaintiff resisted arrest, the force used to apprehend the Plaintiff is presumptively valid, and his claim here is barred and precluded.
Moreover, the Plaintiff's claim that he was subjected to excessive force during his detention in the station house is also without merit. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that any claims for excessive force that arise in the course of making an arrest or seizure should be analyzed under "an objective reasonableness" standard. Id. at 395. To determine whether force is reasonable, a Court must examine (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of Officers and others; (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1984). In the present case, the force used on the Plaintiff was reasonable both in effectuating Plaintiff's arrest and subduing the Plaintiff during his detention in the station house. Plaintiff repeatedly attacked the trooper, appeared to be on drugs, ingested more drugs upon arriving at the station, struck the Trooper in the face with metal handcuffs, and hurled racial invective at the arresting officer throughout the whole incident. It is obvious that the Plaintiff posed an enormous threat to the safety of the Troopers both during his arrest and during his detention and that the Defendants had no recourse but to subdue the Plaintiff in the fashion they did. Their conduct was objectively reasonable in all respects, and indeed Trooper Forte displayed commendable calm in the face of outrageous abuse from a one-man crime wave. No reasonable juror could find that excessive force was used at the station, an issue not necessarily resolved by Plaintiff's conviction. In any event, the conduct of each Defendant is protected by good faith immunity.
Finally, Plaintiff has proved no facts which substantiate his conspiracy, due process, or equal protection claims. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in all respects.
The Clerk shall file a final judgment.
Dated: White Plains, New York
May 27, 1997
Charles L. Brieant, U.S.D.J.
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