on employment after retirement. (Soja Aff. Ex. 2.) The plaintiffs claim that they never received this notice. (Samuel Slavsky Aff. PP 5, 7; Edward Slavsky Reply Aff. PP 5, 7.) However, they do not dispute endorsing the checks, and the checks and the City Charter alone provide sufficient notice to satisfy requirements of due process.
Due process also guarantees the right to be heard prior to the deprivation of a protected interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333. In this case, however, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a formal pre-deprivation hearing. Due process does not require a formal hearing prior to deprivation when there are no questions of fact to be determined. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92, 97 S. Ct. 882 (1977) ("But if the hearing mandated by the Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some factual dispute between an employer and a discharged employee which has some significant bearing on the employee's reputation."); Brown, 107 A.D.2d at 108, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76 ("We agree with Special Term that no factual dispute exists and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing."); see also Sandin v. R.D. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2310, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995) (Breyer, J. dissenting) ("Just as courts do not hold hearings when there is no 'genuine' and 'material' issue of fact in dispute between the parties, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (summary judgment), so the Due Process Clause does not entitle an inmate to additional disciplinary hearing procedure (such as the calling of a witness) unless there is a factual dispute (relevant to guilt) that the additional procedure might help to resolve.") (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 627). Here, the plaintiffs do not dispute the facts -- their only claim is that the statute itself is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims are dismissed.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that section 1117 arbitrarily denies former public employees of their right to receive pension benefits and therefore violates their right to substantive due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Where, as here, an economic regulation is challenged, which does not impinge upon fundamental rights, the same rational basis test used to analyze claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the analysis of substantive due process claims. See New York City Friends of Ferrets v. City of New York, 876 F. Supp. 529, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 1995). As explained above, section 1117 is a rational legislative enactment to protect the public treasury.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims are dismissed.
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment dismissing the complaint and closing the case.
Dated: New York, New York
June 16, 1997
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge