Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

MUNDO v. SANUS HEALTH PLAN OF GREATER NEW YORK

June 24, 1997

EVELYN A. MUNDO, Plaintiff, against SANUS HEALTH PLAN OF GREATER NEW YORK, Defendant.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: BLOCK

 BLOCK, District Judge:

 This action arises under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff Evelyn A. Mundo ("Mundo"), a former employee of defendant Sanus Health Plan of Greater New York ("Sanus"), was discharged from her position in 1993. Mundo alleges that her termination violated the ADA because Sanus perceived that she was unable to tolerate stress at the office, which she contends is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, i.e., her ability to work. Sanus moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the Court agrees with Sanus that job-related stress is not a disability for purposes of the ADA, Sanus' motion is granted and the complaint dismissed.

 BACKGROUND

 Mundo contends that she was fired because her supervisors believed that she was unable to tolerate the stress of her new position. During her absence from the office, Sanus employee Frank Seguro found materials in Mundo's office that she had not entered into Sanus' computer system. Mundo alleges that Sanus overestimated the extent of the backlog. She also alleges that her supervisors perceived that she had a poor tolerance for stress because she was unable to give coherent responses when they asked her about her job. Additionally, she notes that one of her supervisors testified at her Workers' Compensation hearing that he was not surprised to learn that there was a backlog of files to be entered into the computer.

 In 1994, Mundo filed a complaint seeking relief under the ADA based upon allegations that her appendicitis and gall bladder condition were disabilities under the statute. Sanus moved to dismiss this complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At proceedings held on June 3, 1996, the Court rejected Mundo's argument that her medical condition constituted an actual disability protected by the ADA and granted Sanus' motion to dismiss. However, the Court granted Mundo leave to amend her complaint to allege that Sanus perceived her as being disabled and that she was therefore entitled to protection under the ADA. Mundo filed her Second Amended Complaint in August of 1996. The instant motion to dismiss followed.

 DISCUSSION

 In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court's function "is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980); see Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1991). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974). Moreover, in evaluating whether a complaint will withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must assume the truth of plaintiff's "well-pleaded allegations." See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994). A complaint will not be dismissed unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to the relief requested. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957).

 The ADA prevents employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). The statute defines disability as

 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
 
(B) a record of such impairment; or
 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations implementing the ADA define "mental impairment" as "any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.