period, Mandelsberg and Lawrence G. Novick ("Novick") each spent .5 hours working on this claim. Id. Finally, in October 1994, the last compensable time spent by BTC's attorneys. From October 17 through 27, 1994, Vogel spent 1.2 hours on the Allied/Federated payment.
Adding these compensable hours together, this Court finds that Vogel may be compensated for a total of 12.675 hours. This time, however, accumulated over several years, during which time Vogel billed at various hourly rates: 1.5 hours of Vogel's time is calculable at $ 235 per hour; 1.875 hours at $ 255 per hour; 8.1 hours at $ 275 per hour; and 1.2 hours at $ 290 per hour. All told, the amount which Bonnie & Co. is liable for Vogel's time in this matter is $ 3,406.13.
Mandelsberg may be compensated by Bonnie & Co. for a total of one hour in this case. Half of that time was billable at $ 275 per hour, and half at $ 295 per hour. As a result, Bonnie & Co. is liable for $ 285 for Mandelsberg's time.
Kam spent 1.5 compensable hours on this case at $ 80 per hour. Bonnie & Co. is thus liable for $ 120 for Kam's time. Novick spent just half an hour of compensable time on this case at $ 375 per hour. Bonnie & Co. is therefore responsible for $ 187.50 for Novick's time.
In light of the foregoing calculations, BTC may retain $ 3,998.63 of Boerer's collateral as compensation for the collection efforts of Hahn & Hessen. In addition, this Court will employ the same method as above to calculating the compensable portion of Hahn & Hessen's disbursements in this case. Hahn & Hessen's $ 3,998.63 of compensable time constitutes 3.64% of the $ 110,019.25 of total time they claim to have spent on this case. Accordingly, they may be compensated for 3.64% of the 7,180.99 in total disbursements expended during the course of this litigation, or $ 261.39. As a result of the foregoing, the total amount which BTC may withhold from Boerer's collateral to fulfill Bonnie & Co.'s liability for Hahn & Hessen's expenses of collection is $ 4,260.02 Together, this Court finds that the amount which BTC may withhold from Boerer's collateral as payment for the expenses of collection incurred by Moses & Singer and Hahn & Hessen is $ 20,723.87.
II. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION
As noted above, the Marshals Service transmitted to BTC a Writ of Execution "levying on all right, title interest which . . . Bonnie & Co. Fashion Inc., d/b/a Bonnie & Company . . . has in any funds, property or assets you may be holding in your possession in the amount of $ 194,092.60." (Marshals Letter.) This amount is comprised of a $ 194,048.88 judgment entered against Bonnie & Co. in a separate litigation and $ 43.72 in Marshals fees. Id. This Court must now consider whether this Writ of Execution hinders the return of Boerer's $ 1,000,000 collateral.
This Court finds that it does not. The Writ of Execution states that "in an action between eMTe Corp., plaintiff and Bonnie & Co. Fashion Inc d/b/a Bonnie & Company, d/b/a Bonnie Boerer Unlimited, a New York Corp. defendant," a judgment of $ 194,048.88 was entered "in favor of said eMTe Corp." (Execution Against Property, eMTe Corp. v. Bonnie & Co. Fashion, Inc., 18-MS-0302 ("Writ of Execution") (May 22, 1997).) This Writ, however, does not name Boerer as an individual defendant in that action. The $ 1,000,000 collateral presently held by BTC in an account at the United Counties Trust Company in Linden, New Jersey is Boerer's own money which she personally pledged as security for Bonnie & Co.'s factor account with BTC. See Bonnie & Co., 955 F. Supp. at 210. Because eMTe's lawsuit did not name Boerer as an individual defendant, eMTe has no claim to any of Boerer's personal assets, including her $ 1,000,000 collateral. As a result, this Court finds that the release of Boerer's collateral is not affected by the Writ of Execution.
III. BTC'S REQUESTS FOR AN ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(B) AND FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL
BTC contends that, even after this Court's determines the BTC's expenses of collection, "the balance of [Boerer's] collateral [should] be held in the United Counties Trust account until the conclusion of this action (including any appeals." (BTC Memo at 2.) Additionally, BTC asserts that "if this Court concludes that the remaining collateral should be released prior to the conclusion of the entire action, then [BTC] respectfully submits that upon entry of a judgment on Count IV, this Court should: (i) make the express determinations required under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule")] 54(b) so as to permit [BTC] to appeal therefrom immediately; and (ii) stay such judgment during the pendency of the appeal." Id.
As should be expected, plaintiffs vehemently oppose BTC's position. Plaintiffs contend that BTC "failed to make any of the requisite showings for such relief," and that there are "simply no grounds for a stay here." (Pltf. Reply Memo at 12.) In addition, plaintiffs point out that because this Court's previous rulings in this litigation are "soundly based on recent New York Court of Appeals and Second Circuit precedent, . . . there is almost no chance for reversal," and that even in the event of a reversal, "BTC is adequately protected because Boerer owns a $ 2 million house that is unencumbered by a mortgage." Id.
Rule 54(b) in relevant part provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) recognizes that "the classic paradigm of a lawsuit--one plaintiff suing one defendant over a single legal wrong--in something of a rarity in modern federal practice." 10 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 54.21, at 54-35 (3d ed. 1997). Accordingly, the Rule injects "some flexibility into the doctrine that no appeal is permitted until all of the claims in [an] action have been finally adjudicated." Id. § 54.21, at 54-37. The entry of a Rule 54(b) determination is within the district court's discretion, and is made only upon an affirmative showing of the hardship or injustice that would result is judgment is not entered. See Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1012 (3d Cir. 1992); Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1337 (4th Cir. 1993); 10 Moore § 54.23[b], at 54-69. As stated by the Supreme Court:
To meet the demonstrated need for flexibility . . . the District Court may, by the exercise of its discretion in the interest of sound judicial administration, release for appeal final decisions upon one or more, but less than all, claims in multiple claims actions. The timing of such release is, with good reason, vested by the rule primarily in the discretion of the District Court as the one most likely to be familiar with the and any justifiable reasons for delay.