any evidence that this is merely a pretext for sex discrimination.
VI. Stromick's Claim
Plaintiff Stromick asserts a single claim of age discrimination. She began her employment at Prudential on December 6, 1993 as a relocation counselor. Prudential contends that throughout her employment there, her level of transferee satisfaction remained below the target rate of ninety-five percent. For example, a June 22, 1994 Monthly Management Update stated that her year-to-date satisfaction rate was seventy-eight percent. Defendant's Ex. R. That update also noted that transferees were "commenting on Anne and her lack of responsiveness and program knowledge." A September 22, 1994 Monthly Management Update stated that the satisfaction rate had risen to eighty-eight percent, but that was still below the target. Defendant's Ex. T.
On October 26, 1994, Stromick sent an e-mail message to Mains Garcia asking to meet with her regarding "2 surveys that brought [her satisfaction] average down." Defendant's Ex. U. She stated, "I used to get very complimentary letters and now I'm lucky if I get a decent (not excellent) survey."
Stromick's overall rating in her November 1994 performance appraisal was a three, which translated to "good." Defendant's Ex. Q. The appraisal noted that she "had some very difficult and demanding transferees," and that her transferee satisfaction rate was "steadily rising," but also stated that her "learning curve was slower than some of the others in the group," and that she "had a harder time relearning policies and procedures than some of the others who came over from Kodak." In the employee rankings prepared for the RIF, Stromick ranked twelfth out of the eighteen employees evaluated. Defendant's Ex. H. Stromick was terminated effective January 20, 1995.
Stromick offers no evidence in support of her claim of age discrimination other than the evidence that I have already found insufficient. In addition, when asked at her deposition if she was aware of any facts suggesting that age was a criterion in deciding who would be terminated, she responded that she "looked at the number that was laid off that were over 40, and [she] looked at the number that was left that were over 40, and it decreased significantly." Stromick Deposition at 140. When asked if she was aware of any other pertinent facts, she said, "No." Id.
As already stated, the mere fact that six out of eight persons over forty were terminated is statistically insignificant, considering that there were only nineteen employees in the center to begin with, and that the RIF brought that number down to ten. Without any additional evidence of age discrimination, this claim cannot stand.
Like all of plaintiffs' claims, then, this claim has no foundation in the record whatsoever. Plaintiffs may be frustrated at losing their jobs only a little over a year after they began working at Prudential, but that does not justify prosecuting "buckshot" claims of discrimination based on every protected class into which plaintiffs fall. The fact is, as plaintiffs concede, that some employees had to be laid off for economic reasons, and while plaintiffs are understandably unhappy that they were the ones chosen, their subjective beliefs that they were discriminated against are insufficient to support their discrimination claims.
Defendant's motions for summary judgment in Coleman v. Prudential Relocation, 95-CV-6430L (Item 18), Brown v. Prudential Relocation, 95-CV-6431L (Item 17), Bowen v. Prudential Relocation, 95-CV-6432L (Item 17), Balcer v. Prudential Relocation, 95-CV-6433L, (Item 17), and Stromick v. Prudential Relocation, 95-CV-6434L (Item 26), are granted, and the complaints are dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. LARIMER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: Rochester, New York
August 25, 1997.