Leisure, District Judge :
Plaintiffs, pro se, brought this action alleging seven separate claims: (1) trespass, (2) infliction of emotional distress, (3) deprivation of the reasonable value of the use of their home during the period of their alleged ouster, plus treble damages, (4) conversion of plaintiffs' personal property, (5) invasion of privacy, and (6) and (7) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Court referred this matter to the Honorable Andrew J. Peck, United States Magistrate Judge, for general pretrial supervision and the handling of defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.'s ("FHLMC") and defendant Source One Mortgage Services Corp.'s ("Source One") motion for summary judgment.
On June 16, 1997, Judge Peck issued a Report and Recommendation (the "Report") advising this Court to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment but to deny their request for sanctions and attorneys' fees. Judge Peck sua sponte recommended granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Five Brothers Mortgage Company Services and Securing, Inc. ("Five Brothers"), which also would moot Five Brothers' claim against third-party defendants.
Plaintiffs have submitted objections to the Report. The Court has reviewed Judge Peck's Report and made a de novo determination, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), that the Report's conclusions are legally correct and proper. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424, 100 S. Ct. 2406 (1980) ("[Section 636(b)(1)] permit[s] whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, [chooses] to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.") In addition, the Court has considered plaintiffs' objections and finds them to be without merit. The Court therefore adopts the Report, subject to the clarifications offered infra.
As the relevant facts of the instant case and the appropriate standard for summary judgment are set forth at length in the Report, the Court need not present them here. The Court notes that it grants summary judgment on plaintiffs' trespass claim not because plaintiffs are estopped from bringing the trespass claim, as the Report advised, but because they are unable to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action.
Under New York law, which indisputably applies to the instant case:
Trespass is the interference with a person's right to possession of real property either by an unlawful act or by a lawful act performed in an unlawful manner. The act must be intentional and the damages a direct consequence of the defendant's act.