governmental action. The remaining count asserted a contract claim under New York state law, which was expanded in the argument before us to include a claim of promissory estoppel.
The District Court accepted plaintiff's contention that Amtrak had been engaged in governmental action, and directed it to display plaintiff's creation on the Spectacular. It had no occasion to consider any New York state law claim. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 811 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The Court of Appeals, by a divided court, rejected the District Court's ruling that Amtrak was engaged in governmental conduct and thus vacated the grant of relief. Finding that elimination of all claims for constitutional relief had also eliminated jurisdiction to consider any state law claim, it remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, concluded by a divided court that Amtrak had engaged in governmental action, and remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the factual merits of plaintiff's First Amendment claims. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) (1995) 513 U.S. 374, 115 S. Ct. 961, 130 L. Ed. 2d 902.
On remand, the Court of Appeals, again by a divided court, found no factual merit in plaintiff's First Amendment claims and directed dismissal of the complaint so that any state claims could be asserted in a New York state court. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995). Upon plaintiff's motion for reargument, the Court adhered to its original ruling that there was no factual merit in plaintiff's constitutional claims. However, it reconsidered its decision that the state law claims should be dismissed, noting that "because...a full trial has been conducted on an expedited basis, upon written submissions, the interests of judicial economy and fairness to the parties counsel that this litigation be completed in federal court." Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 89 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
The Supreme Court having denied certiorari, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996), we are faced with the necessity of applying New York law to plaintiff's remaining claims. Each of the parties has made a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has asserted various legal contentions as to New York state law upon which he now bases his state claims. We note at the outset that, without ruling upon them, we accept as valid all of his legal contentions, and dispose of the motions before us purely on a factual basis.
Plaintiff is an artist and graphic designer. His works often contain political themes. TDI is a privately held out-of-home media company that sells advertising space on behalf of transit systems and transportation facilities. One of the transportation facilities for which TDI acts is Amtrak. Among the authorized locations for which TDI obtains advertising is New York's Pennsylvania Station, including the Spectacular. The Spectacular is a curved wrap-around back-lit structure in the main rotunda of the station measuring over ten feet in height and over 100 feet in width. It is situated in one of the principal entryways to the station, facing passengers who come down from the street level to the concourse below on staircases and escalators. Its prominent position, combined with the heavy pedestrian traffic through the station, make the Spectacular a much sought-after space for advertisers.
In August 1991, plaintiff first approached TDI about leasing the Spectacular. Then and throughout his negotiations with TDI he dealt with William B. Schwartz, an account executive for TDI. During these negotiations, Schwartz told plaintiff that the only policy restrictions on advertising for the Spectacular involved obscenity or violence. When Schwartz asked about the nature of his advertisement, plaintiff responded that in general his work was political, although it often looked like advertising, but that he preferred to keep confidential the specific content of the work he was creating for the Spectacular. Plaintiff and Scwartz ultimately reached an agreement whereby plaintiff would lease the Spectacular during January and February 1993 at a rate of $ 18,500 a month.
Plaintiff signed the formal agreement in August of 1992, and TDI affixed its signature on November 30. From the beginning of the negotiations through TDI's acceptance of the contract, plaintiff was never told that there was a policy against political advertising on the Spectacular. In fact, TDI had no such policy but Amtrak, unbeknownst to Schwartz, apparently did. The contract, however, which plaintiff had signed in August, specifically provided that all advertising copy was subject to approval of both TDI and Amtrak:
All advertising copy is subject to approval of TDI and the Transportation Facility concerned [Amtrak] as to character, text, illustration, design, and operation.
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