The opinion of the court was delivered by: SCULLIN
Presently before the Court is a motion brought by the Petitioners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) seeking remand of this action to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Oswego County. In addition, Petitioners seek attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements incurred as a result of removal, also pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Petitioners initiated this action in New York Supreme Court on October 15, 1997 against Respondent COST, Inc. and its officers seeking (1) a declaration under New York Election Law § 14-100 that COST, Inc. is a political committee as defined by that law, and that COST violated campaign disclosure requirements, and (2) an order directing COST, Inc. to file all finance disclosure statements for 1996 and 1997 as required by New York Election Law. In their Answer, Respondents assert, inter alia, a defense asserting that New York Election Law violates their core First Amendment rights, and a counterclaim seeking a declaration of the same.
On November 2, 1997, two days before election day, and the day before the hearing on the merits of the action, the Respondents served a notice of removal to federal court, thereby staying the state court action. The sole basis for removal in the notice was the assertion that Respondents' counterclaim is one in which the federal courts would have original jurisdiction which justifies removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In their opposition papers to Petitioners' motion to remand, Respondents advance two new grounds for removal premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
Generally, the party attempting to remove a case against a motion to remand bears the burden of establishing the statutory and jurisdictional basis for removal. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 66 L. Ed. 144, 42 S. Ct. 35 (1921); Pan Atlantic Group, Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Further, federal courts are required to construe the removal statute narrowly, with any doubts being resolved against removal. See Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enterprises, Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108, 85 L. Ed. 1214, 61 S. Ct. 868 (1941)). To determine whether an action is removable, the court must look to the plaintiff's pleadings, as originally filed, to determine whether the appropriate jurisdictional basis is present. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1978)); Luebbe v. Presbyterian Hosp. in City of New York at Columbia-Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 526 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Pursuant to this standard, the Court will examine each of the Respondents' grounds for removal seriatim.
Respondents argue that even though Petitioners' complaint is based solely on New York law, their asserted counterclaim which challenges the constitutionality of the New York Election Law under the First Amendment creates a federal question which confers jurisdiction on the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Section 1441(a) of the removal statute sets forth:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1997). Thus, § 1441(a) permits removal of only those actions which could have originally been filed in federal district court. With limited exception, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is improper unless a federal claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1986). It is well established that a defendant cannot remove based on grounds raised in its answer. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers. Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420, 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 81 L. Ed. 70, 57 S. Ct. 96 (1936). This principle applies with equal force to defenses, see Travelers, 794 F.2d at 762; Reed v. Cohen, 876 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Carr v. Axelrod, 798 F. Supp. 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Warner Cable Communication Co. of Brooklyn v. Weiner, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16836, No. CV-88-794, 1987 WL 9675 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), as well as counterclaims. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986); Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d ...