Thus, conditions at New York correctional facilities involve a significant amount of lockdown time even for inmates in the general population.
Further, the occasional imposition of conditions more restrictive than those typically encountered by the general prison population is an ordinary incident of prison life. For example, the Superintendent may confine an inmate "in a cell or room . . . for such period as may be necessary for maintenance of order and discipline." N.Y. Correct. Law § 137(6). The Superintendent also may detain inmates from the general prison population in their cells and suspend shower and exercise privileges at any time for the safety and security of the facility. 7 NYCRR § 320.3(d)(5). General population inmates' out-of-cell time also may be temporarily curtailed for non-disciplinary reasons, such as when: (1) inmates are in idle status because of the unavailability of programming or their refusal to program; (2) inmates are in the reception company at a new facility awaiting evaluation and assessment; and (3) inmates are unable to program for medical or mental health reasons. Annucci Aff. P 25. Therefore, based on a comparison between inmates housed in SHU and those in general population, the state's action in placing Husbands in SHU for 180 days did not work a major disruption in his environment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
Husbands has not challenged any specific aspect of SHU and has failed to allege any facts that would support a finding that the conditions in SHU were different in any material respect from the basic conditions of his confinement. Sims v. Artuz, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12669, 1997 WL 527882, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1997). In short, the regime to which Husbands was subjected as a result of his disciplinary hearings--both in duration and degree of restriction--was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of six years to life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.
For the foregoing reasons, Husbands' SHU confinement does not give rise to a liberty interest sufficient to support a due process claim. Accordingly, Husbands' motion to amend the previous judgment of this Court which dismissed his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is denied.
Likewise, Husbands' motion to amend this Court's previous judgment denying his motion to amend his complaint to add a retaliation claim is denied. As stated more fully in this Court's previous decision, there is no evidence that Husbands engaged in any activity protected by the First Amendment. Further, there is no evidence that defendant B. Lilac's actions did or could have prevented, inhibited, or impeded Husbands' right to petition for redress of his grievances. See Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 1994); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988).
For the foregoing reasons, Husbands' motion to amend this Court's March 26, 1997 judgment denying his motion to amend his complain, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. LARIMER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: Rochester, New York
January 13, 1998.