The opinion of the court was delivered by: PARKER
By Notice of Motion filed January 16, 1998, plaintiff Kenneth White moves to reargue this Court's November 24, 1997 Order granting summary judgment to defendant ABCO Engineering Corp. ("ABCO"). Plaintiff's motion to reargue is granted, and this Court's November 24, 1997 Order is amended as follows:
By Notice of Motion dated October 20, 1997, defendant ABCO Engineering Corp. ("ABCO") moves to reargue an Opinion of this Court dated July 7, 1997 that denied ABCO's motion for summary judgment. Familiarity with that decision is assumed. Opinion incorrectly focused on the manner in which the accident could theoretically have happened, as opposed to the manner in which the undisputed testimony showed the accident in question actually happened. Specifically, ABCO argues that it is entitled to summary judgment since the proximate cause of the accident, as a matter of law, was the material alteration of the equipment in question by someone other than ABCO, a four-inch hole cut with a blowtorch through the side guard of the conveyor. See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (1980). Upon reconsideration, this Court has determined that ABCO is correct.
In its denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment, this Court relied upon an affidavit of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Jeffrey Ketchman of Inter-City Testing & Consulting Corporation. In his affidavit, Dr. Ketchman stated:
However, of much greater significance is the fact the subject conveyor was absent side barrier guarding, thus allowing access for both conveyed materials and workers' hands in the nip area inside the conveyor belt in front of the tail-end pulley.
ABCO, however, points out that this conclusion is a theoretical one, one that is not consistent with how the accident actually happened.
White has admitted that the accident occurred when he reached through the four-inch hole cut into the side guard. It is not disputed that an employee of Hamm's Sanitation, Inc. installed side guards on the conveyor. After the side guard was installed, someone other than ABCO used a blow torch to cut the four-inch hole through which plaintiff reached and was injured. The accident was thus caused not by a design defect in the components suppled by ABCO, or through any negligence on the part of ABCO, but through substantial, material alterations by someone other than ABCO to defeat a safety component installed on the conveyor by cutting a hole through it. These concessions render inapposite Breidenstein v. Zurn, 155 A.D.2d 876, 547 N.Y.S.2d 484 (4th Dept. 1989); Hierro v. E.W. Bliss Co., Inc., 145 A.D.2d 731, 535 N.Y.S.2d 264 (3d Dept. 1988); and McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85 (3d Dept. 1986) because here there is no question that the subsequent modifications, in which ABCO was not involved, substantially altered the machine and proximately caused an accident that would not otherwise have occurred.
Therefore on reconsideration, the Court concludes that cutting of a hole into the side guard by someone other than ABCO was a substantial modification that was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury and consequently that no claimed act or omission by ABCO raises a triable issue of fact. As the Court held in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721, in language fully applicable here:
The manufacturer's duty, however, does not extend to designing a product that is impossible to abuse or one whose safety features may not be circumvented. A manufacturer need not incorporate safety features into its product so as to guarantee that no harm will come to every user no matter how careless or even reckless (cf. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Loveland Gas & Elec. Co., 369 F.2d 648 (6th Cir.); Drazen v. Otis Elevator Co., 96 R.I. 114, 189 A.2d 693). Nor must he trace his product through every link in the chain of distribution to insure that users will not adapt the product to suit their own unique purposes. The duty of a manufacturer, therefore, is not an open-ended one. It extends to the design and manufacture of a finished product which is safe at the time of sale. Material alterations at the hands of a third party which work a substantial change in the condition in which the product was sold by destroying the functional utility of a key safety feature, however foreseeable that modification may have been, are not within the ambit of a manufacturer's responsibility. Acceptance of plaintiff's concept of duty would expand the scope of a manufacturer's duty beyond all reasonable bounds and would be tantamount to imposing absolute liability on manufacturers for all product-related injuries (see Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Col.L.Rev. 1531).
Unfortunately, as this case bears out, it may often be that an injured party, because of the exclusivity of workers' compensation, is barred from commencing an action against the one who exposes him to unreasonable peril by affirmatively rendering a safe product dangerous. However, that an employee may have no remedy in tort against his employer gives the courts no license to thrust upon a third-party manufacturer a duty to insure that its product will not be abused or that its safety features will be callously altered by a purchaser (cf. McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 71-72, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 413-414, 181 N.E.2d 430, 435). Where the product is marketed in a condition safe for the purposes for which it is intended or could reasonably be intended, the manufacturer has satisfied its duty.
Under New York law, ABCO's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
Plaintiff argues that this Court should apply New Jersey law to the question of ABCO's liability to the plaintiff. Assuming without deciding that plaintiff is correct, New Jersey law would also mandate a grant of summary judgment for ABCO. Plaintiff points to Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1240 (N.J. 1984) in support of the proposition that a manufacturer cannot escape strict liability for misuse or abnormal use "if the actual use proximate to the injury was objectively foreseeable." Plaintiff, however, overlooks a second issue in Brown, one that applies here and lends considerable support to ABCO's position.
In Brown, the plaintiff sued the defendant for burns he suffered when excess propane gas from a space heater ignited and set plaintiff's clothes on fire. 484 A.2d at 1237-38. About fifteen years prior to the accident, plaintiff's employer had substantially altered the heater by removing the pilot light tube, thermocouple valve, and gas safety shut-off valve. As a result, at the time of the accident, the flow of gas to the heater was unregulated and was set at a pressure approximately 100 times greater than that for which the heater was designed. Id. at 1237. At trial, plaintiff's expert witness testified that the heater was defective because its design rendered it susceptible to the reasonably foreseeable alterations that were made. Id. at 1238. Plaintiff's expert testimony notwithstanding, the trial court ruled that the alterations to the heater were not reasonably foreseeable, the removal by plaintiff's employer of all safety devices was ...