The opinion of the court was delivered by: SCHEINDLIN
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
The following facts are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. On or about March 6, 1996, Status, as owner of the M/V Esperanza, entered into a charter party with Cory Irmaos Ltda. ("Cory"), as charterer of the vessel (the "Cory Charter"). Complaint at P 6. Clause 23 of the Cory Charter states: "The Owners shall have a lien upon all cargoes and all sub-freights and/or sub-hire for any amounts due under this Charter Party, including general average contributions . . . ." See Affidavit of Jeremy Harwood, Attorney for Plaintiff ("Harwood Aff."), dated December 29, 1997, Ex. 1. Plaintiff duly performed its obligations under the Cory Charter. Complaint at P 7. However, during the course of its performance, Cory failed to pay hire in the amount of $ 150,987 and port expenses in the amount of $ 71,147. Id.
Dalry, a company wholly owned by Cory, sub-chartered the vessel to M&D/Global under a charter party dated May 6, 1996 (the "M&D Charter"). Id. at P 8. M&D/Global, in turn, further sub-chartered the vessel to Conagra as part of a contract of affreightment and charter party dated April 3, 1996 (the "Conagra Charter").
Id. at P 9. The Conagra Charter and the M&D Charter have substantially similar terms and conditions. Id. at P 10.
The following obligations remain unpaid. First, under the Conagra Charter, Conagra owes M&D/Global an amount exceeding $ 110,000. Id. at P 13. Second, under the M&D Charter, M&D/Global owes Dalry at least $ 173,000 in sub-charter freight and demurrage. Id. at P 14. Third, Cory owes Status at least $ 270,000 in demurrage and agency fees. Id. at P 15. Plaintiff contends that in light of provisions of the sub-charter agreements, the amount that Conagra owes M&D/Global, and that M&D/Global owes Dalry, are owed "up the charter party chain" to Status. See id. at P 12.
Status issued notices of lien to Cory, Dalry, M&D/Global, and Conagra, which state these unpaid amounts. Id. at P 11. Cory, Dalry, M&D/Global, and Conagra refused to honor those notices of lien. Id. On December 19, 1997, this Court granted Plaintiff's ex parte motion for the issuance of a maritime attachment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule B(1), of monies belonging to Defendants in three commercial banks located in Manhattan. See Status International S.A. v. M&D Maritime, 97 Civ. 9313 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1997) (order directing clerk to issue process of maritime attachment). On January 7, 1998, the Court denied M&D/Global's motion to vacate the attachment. See Transcript of Order to Show Cause Hearing at 18. M&D/Global now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim to enforce its lien.
II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Defendants do not dispute that an action to enforce a maritime lien is a maritime cause of action within the jurisdiction of this Court. Rather, Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint does not state sufficient facts to support the enforcement of a maritime lien.
Where a plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a claim for relief, the action should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), rather than under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction). See Health Cost Controls v. Skinner, 44 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 1995); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1280-1281 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1277 (6th Cir. 1991). Given Defendants' challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings, the complaint is reviewed under a 12(b)(6) standard.
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must limit itself to "facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference." Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). A court deciding such a motion must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1995). Furthermore, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss cannot be granted simply because recovery appears remote or unlikely on the face of a complaint, because "the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974)). Rather, dismissal can only be granted if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief." Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 321 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957)). However, "[a] complaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by factual assertions fails even the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6)." De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
III. Discussion of Motion to ...