issues with the government before invoking the aid of the Court. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion also is denied for failure to comply with Rule 16.1. In any case, there would be no merit to the motion.
The district court will not require the government to provide a witness list in a criminal case "in the absence of 'a specific showing that disclosure [is] both material to the preparation of [the] defense and reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding [the] case.'"
No such showing has been made in this case.
Nor is a defendant entitled to revelation of the identities of confidential informants absent a showing that disclosure is "shown to be material to the defense."
The requisite showing, moreover, is not merely that disclosure would be helpful, but that it "would be significant with respect to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence."
Nor is it enough to show that the informant was a participant in and witness to the offense.
Rather, the defendant seeking disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant must make a specific showing of materiality. No such showing has been made here.
Motions to Suppress
The motions to suppress custodial statements and the fruits of an allegedly unlawful search both depend upon factual assertions, the former on the contention that no Miranda warning was given before the statements were made and the latter on the proposition that probable cause was lacking for defendant's arrest. These assertions are supported only by the affidavit of counsel, who manifestly lacks personal knowledge of the matters asserted.
A party seeking to raise a factual issue to be determined at a hearing must submit admissible evidence which, if credited, would make out a prima facie case on the issue. This in turn requires that the issue ordinarily be raised by an affidavit of a person with personal knowledge of the facts.
As there is no such evidence before the Court, there is no basis for holding an evidentiary hearing or suppressing the evidence.
As the foregoing demonstrates, this motion is utterly without merit. Moreover, the non-compliance with Rule 16.1 and the use of a boilerplate list of discovery demands bearing relatively little relationship to the specific nature of this case is particularly unfortunate. Every judge of this Court is responsible for hundreds of cases, each of which has a legitimate demand on the judge's attention. It is not too much to ask that counsel at least make an effort to resolve discovery matters among themselves before involving the Court. Nor is it too much to expect that counsel will consider what discovery really is required in each case rather than simply running their word processors to turn out form demands.
The motion is denied in all respects.
Dated: February 9, 1998
Lewis A. Kaplan
United States District Judge