Dormitory retaliated against her by placing her in a smaller office, denying her promotions to both Administrative Assistant and Communications Assistant, and terminating her.
Neither the second nor third "reasonably related" categories under Butts apply. The paragraphs at issue do not allege retaliation by defendants under category two, nor do they fall within category three reasonably related situations, covering "incidents of discrimination carried out in precisely the same manner alleged in the EEOC charge." See Butts, 990 F.2d at 1402; Choi v Chemical Bank, 939 F. Supp. 304, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
That leaves us only with category one--whether the above allegations "would fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Butts, 990 F.2d at 1402 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). With respect to paragraphs 91-92, the Court finds these paragraphs are reasonably related to the administrative charge insofar as they allege plaintiff was denied job reclassifications, promotional opportunities and opportunities for advancement due to her race.
With respect to the remaining allegations in paragraphs 91-92 and paragraphs 78-82, 85, 88, the Court finds these allegations are not reasonably related to the administrative charges. See Samimy v. Cornell Univ., 961 F. Supp. 489, 492 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Sprott v. Franco, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1935, 1997 WL 79813, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1997); Baker v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18275, 1994 WL 714279, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1994), reconsideration denied, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10435, 1997 WL 53237 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1997); Dukes v. Steinman, Boynton, Gronquist & Birdsall, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10394, 1994 WL 406090, *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1994). Although courts have generally construed this Butts category liberally to effectuate the remedial purposes of Title VII, Walker v. Columbia Univ., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19194, 1997 WL 749391, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1997) (citations omitted), these paragraphs are not within the fair ambit of plaintiff's administrative charges.
In Butts, the Second Circuit found that an administrative charge "of exclusion from department reorganization meetings likely would have included an inquiry into her exclusion from the meetings set forth in her complaint." Butts, 990 F.2d at 1403. Here, by contrast, the allegations are not sufficiently related to plaintiff's administrative charges to satisfy the notice and conciliation purposes of Title VII. Stated differently, plaintiff's administrative claims regarding promotional opportunities, office space and termination do not serve as jurisdictional hooks for claims of discriminatory training, mentoring, work assignments, employee evaluations and staff meetings. To hold otherwise would allow the reasonably related exceptions to swallow the rule of administrative exhaustion. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the allegations contained in these paragraphs.
In sum, the Court dismisses, in their entirety, paragraphs 33-34, 39-45, 47-49, 64, 78-82, 85 and 88 of the Complaint. Paragraphs 91-92 are dismissed to the extent stated above.
IV. Plaintiff's Claims under State Law
Plaintiff's second cause of action asserts that defendants engaged in unlawful discriminatory employment practices in violation of the New York Human Rights Law ("HRL"). Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot maintain this action in this Court under the HRL to the extent she has elected a New York State administrative remedy.
Section 297 of the HRL, the so-called election of remedies provision, provides that:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of appropriate jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate, unless such person has filed a complaint hereunder or with any local commission on human rights.