UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
July 29, 1998
N. ERIC NAFTCHI, Plaintiff, against NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, HOWARD RUSK INSTITUTE OF REHABILITATION MEDICINE, SAUL J. FARBER, DAVID S. SCOTCH and MATHEW H.M. LEE, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: KAPLAN
LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.
In this employment discrimination action, N. Eric Naftchi, Ph.D., a tenured professor of rehabilitation medicine at the New York University Medical Center ("NYUMC"), alleges that defendants, motivated by age animus, have deprived him of raises, laboratory space, office space, certain travel and office supply funds, and access to certain research funds, all in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA") and comparable state and local laws.
Dr. Naftchi argues also that some of these actions were taken in retaliation against him for filing a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and for filing this lawsuit. In addition to his disparate treatment and retaliation claims, Dr. Naftchi argues that defendants have a policy of conditioning certain benefits upon success in receiving research grants from the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") and that this policy has a disparate impact based on age. Finally, Dr. Naftchi asserts several state law claims including breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.
Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing Dr. Naftchi's claims. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Dr. Naftchi at all relevant times has been a faculty member in the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine ("DRM"), a part of the New York University School of Medicine (the "Medical School"). The defendants in this lawsuit are a number of institutions and individuals associated in various ways with the medical arm of defendant New York University ("NYU"), a private university chartered by the Regents of the State of New York and located in New York City. The NYUMC at all relevant times was an administrative unit of NYU,
and the Howard Rusk Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine ("Rusk Institute") was a subdivision of the NYUMC.
Among the researchers at the Rusk Institute were faculty members of the Medical School, another component of the NYUMC, including DRM members.
The three individual defendants each hold, or held, administrative positions within the Medical School. Saul J. Farber, M.D. is an 81-year old professor who served as Dean and Provost of the Medical School from 1986 until August 31, 1997.
David S. Scotch, M.D. is a 59-year old instructor who has served as Associate Dean of the Medical School since 1972.
Mathew H. M. Lee, M.D. is a 66-year old professor who has taught at the NYUMC since 1965 and served since 1986 as Acting Chairman for the DRM and as Medical Director of the Rusk Institute.
The plaintiff, Dr. Naftchi, is a 69- or 70-year old
man who joined the faculty of the DRM as an associate professor in 1968
and was made head of a "laboratory of biochemical pharmacology" engaged in the investigation of spinal cord injuries.
In the ensuing years, he gained access to and control over several additional lab rooms and storage areas. In 1979, however, two of his laboratory rooms were taken away,
and a third laboratory was reallocated to other uses in 1980 or 1981.
The first visible collision between Dr. Naftchi and the Medical School administration was precipitated by the August 1982 publication of an article in the journal Science by Dr. Naftchi describing his findings concerning the use of certain pharmaceuticals in the treatment of spinal trauma.
The article received considerable publicity and, apparently in response to that publicity, Dr. Farber
convened a panel of six members of the Medical School's faculty to evaluate the quality of Dr. Naftchi's research.
The panel's report, issued on October 12, 1982, concluded that "Dr. Naftchi's data do not support the conclusions reached in his paper in Science nor are they adequate to allow one to draw any conclusion whatsoever about the efficacy of clonidine in treatment of spinal trauma."
After considering Dr. Naftchi's response to the panel's report,
Dr. Farber informed Dr. Naftchi of his decision to appoint "an appropriate outside committee . . . to review this matter and to advise [him] with respect to the scientific and academic competence with which the research in question was conducted and any other matters upon which, after examination, the Committee feels obliged to comment."
Dr. Farber stated also that he would "instruct appropriate personnel that no further grant applications are to be approved for submission unless they are accompanied by a copy of the October 12th report, your response to it, and this letter."
It is not clear whether the outside consulting committee ever actually was formed,
and Dr. Farber's instructions regarding grant applications have not been in force since 1989.
In 1983, in the wake of the Science incident, Dr. Naftchi lost control of three additional laboratory rooms, a storage room, and a walk-in refrigerator/freezer.
An additional laboratory room was taken away in 1984.
Several years later, in response to severe space shortages across the Medical School, the Dean formed a Research Space Committee for the Medical School (the "Space Committee") to "identify the least productively used and funded research space at NYU, with the added objective of finding from 20,000 to 30,000 square feet that might be better used by the University for other endeavors."
The Space Committee met with each department chairman to discuss the research being conducted in each laboratory, measuring the significance of that research in terms of federal funding.
Among the Space Committee's recommendations was the suggestion that the 7th and 8th floors of the Rusk Institute, at the time occupied by the DRM, be given to another department.
The Space Committee concluded also that since not all faculty displaced by the shifting of resources among departments could be given alternative space, such space should be allocated to faculty with outside funding.
For faculty without outside funding, "the policy of the Medical School . . . was that if they obtained NIH or similar external grant funding for their research . . . their circumstances would be re-evaluated, the priorities set by the Space Committee reassessed, and appropriate additional space allocated for each researcher as soon as practicable."
In the midst of this space shortage, Dr. Naftchi found himself down to his final lab room. Despite this, in June 1991, Dr. Naftchi applied and was approved for an NIH grant.
In July 1991, however, Dr. Naftchi's final lab room was reallocated to another researcher whose research already had been funded.
Dr. Naftchi's NIH grant, although approved, never was funded.
Later in 1991, Dr. Naftchi unsuccessfully requested new laboratory space in a letter to Dr. Farber.
Dr. Naftchi then requested a Grievance Committee.
The Grievance Committee Report, issued June 17, 1992, recommended
"that Dr. Naftchi be given a laboratory and a limited sum, we suggest about $ 30,000, toward supplies and technical help for a period of 2 years. This would permit him to obtain preliminary results so important for grant applications and would be beneficial to both the grievant and the Medical Center. . . . Dr. Naftchi should be encouraged to apply very quickly for grants. His performance should be reviewed at the end of this 2-year period. The future availability of laboratory space should be contingent on his obtaining a grant or at least priority scores within reach of funding. Significant publications in refereed journals should also be taken into account."
In response to this recommendation, Dr. Scotch wrote to Dr. Naftchi, explaining that prior to providing him with scarce laboratory resources and internal funding, the Medical Center would require him to submit "a detailed proposal."
Dr. Naftchi submitted the requested proposal and budget in July 1992, but it was rejected on the ground that it "was essentially the same project Dr. Naftchi submitted previously to NIH and which subsequently was rejected by that agency.
The Events Underlying Dr. Naftchi's Remaining Allegations
Dr. Naftchi alleges that he was discriminated against on account of his age when he was denied salary increases for the years 1994 onward.
In addition, Dr. Naftchi complains of the loss or absence of various resources: In February of 1995, for example, Dr. Naftchi made verbal and written requests for the use of a vacant laboratory room, but these requests were not approved and he has remained without lab space at all times relevant to this suit.
In March 1995, Dr. Naftchi was transferred from his former office to a smaller one
and then, in October 1997, even this space was taken away.
In addition, Dr. Naftchi alleges that he has been denied "institutional support for professional travel, office supplies, and even a 'copy key' to use internal copying facilities."
Dr. Naftchi contends also that defendants denied him access to research funds on account of his age and in violation of his contract rights.
Specifically, he argues that he has been denied access to the so-called Guggenheim Funds
despite his claim that at some point he had been promised that these funds would be utilized solely to support the research in which he and Dr. Edward Lowman were engaged and that these funds had been used for that purpose from their inception.
According to Dr. Scotch, the Guggenheim Funds are considered discretionary funds in that actual disbursements from the accounts are within the discretion of the chairman of the DRM and, since 1993, the funds have been insufficient to pay for anything beyond Dr. Naftchi's salary and related overhead expenditures.
Dr. Naftchi's allegation of unlawful retaliation arises out of his June 26, 1995 charge of age and national origin discrimination with the EEOC, as well as the filing of this lawsuit in 1996.
The EEOC charge complained that "[Dr. Naftchi had] been denied raises, had [his] job performance criticized and on March 9, 1995, [he] was removed from [his] office and reassigned to a smaller office by the Acting Chairman of the Rehabilitation Medicine Department" and, further, that he did not have a lab.
In his affidavit accompanying the charge, Dr. Naftchi declared his belief that he was being discriminated against because of his age because his "employer would like to get rid of older people with high salaries."
On July 30, 1996, the EEOC rejected Dr. Naftchi's claims.
Specifically, the EEOC determined that "review of the evidence in your case . . . fails to indicate that a violation has occurred and it is not likely that additional information will result in our finding a violation."
The ADEA Claims
1. Disparate Treatment
a. Basic Principles
Under the ADEA, an employer may not discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment nor otherwise adversely affect the employee's job status on the basis of the employee's age.
The ADEA does not, however, prohibit employers from taking such actions where the decision is based on "reasonable factors other than age."
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,54 the Supreme Court set forth the "allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof' applicable to Title VII cases, and this formulation is applicable as well to cases under the ADEA and the comparable New York laws.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.
In the context of Dr. Naftchi's claims, this burden is satisfied if he can show (1) membership in the protected age group, (2) qualification for the benefits he sought, (3) and an adverse employment action concerning those benefits that (4) occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on the plaintiff's membership in the protected class.
The plaintiff's burden in establishing the prima facie case is "minimal."
Establishment of the prima face case generates a presumption that the employer engaged in unlawful discrimination.
The plaintiff at that point is entitled to proceed to the jury unless the defendant "comes forward with a non-discriminatory reason for the action complained of."
Articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason rebuts the presumption created by the prima facie showing, leaving only the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination.
In order to establish intentional discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason proffered by the defendant is pretextual, or false, and (2) the actual reason for the decision was age discrimination.
Notably, a finding of pretext does not necessarily require a finding of discrimination.
This is so because
"discrimination does not lurk behind every inaccurate statement. Individual decision-makers may intentionally dissemble in order to hide a reason that is non-discriminatory but unbecoming or small-minded, such as back-scratching, log-rolling, horse-trading, institutional politics, envy, nepotism, spite, or personal hostility."
The Court considers Dr. Naftchi's disparate treatment claim with these considerations in mind.
b. The Prima Facie Case
Dr. Naftchi is a member of the class protected by the ADEA, as he was over the age of forty at all times relevant to this dispute. He has established genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of adverse employment actions. The first and third prongs of his prima facie case therefore are satisfied.
In contrast, there is considerable dispute concerning the second and fourth prongs of Dr. Naftchi's prima face case: whether he was qualified for the benefits he sought and, if so, whether their denial occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. In determining whether Dr. Naftchi has satisfied these requirements, however, the Court must consider also whether the defendants' counterarguments are more properly addressed at the later stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
In Powell v. Syracuse University,65 the Second Circuit warned that courts must be careful not to "unnecessarily collapse the steps suggested by McDonnell Douglas by shifting considerations which are more appropriate to the employer's rebuttal phase to the earlier requirement that the employee demonstrate competence to perform the specified work."
Applying this rule, Powell specifically rejected the proposition that the qualification test, in the case of a plaintiff who had not been reappointed to a prior position, should "require the employee to prove not merely that he possesses the basic skills necessary for the job, but rather that he is the best-qualified candidate for the job, under the criteria suggested by the employer."
Instead, Powell found that the correct standard simply was whether the plaintiff had come forward with evidence of satisfactory job performance.
Powell 's strict enforcement of the boundaries between the stages of the McDonnell Douglas was called into question by the Second Circuit's subsequent decision in Lieberman v. Gant.69 Judge Friendly there held for the Court that the Powell standard of satisfactory performance was not an appropriate measure of the qualification requirement where the plaintiff complained not that he had lost his job, but that he was not given tenure.
Significantly, Judge Friendly explicitly relied on the employer's policy in concluding that there is a considerable difference in the qualifications for maintaining one's job and for obtaining the tenure, and that this difference should be reflected in a higher standard in the latter case.
Lieberman thus stands for the sensible propositions that there is no "one-size-fits-all" qualification standard and that the qualification standard instead must be tailored in some fashion to the nature of the employment action involved.
That Lieberman 's tailoring principle requires reference to the employer's criteria was made plain in Thornley v. Penton Publishing, Inc.,72 where the Circuit stated that
"a plaintiff complaining of discriminatory discharge shows 'qualification' by demonstrating satisfactory job performance, in accordance with the particular employer's criteria for satisfactory performance. We adhere to the position that a plaintiff must satisfy the employer's honestly-held expectations."
Both Lieberman and Thornley, however, are in some tension with Powell 's injunction against collapsing the stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Dr. Naftchi's case evokes this tension. Lieberman suggests, and Thornley confirms, that the Court should consider NYU's policies in regard to the benefits sought by Dr. Naftchi in determining whether he was qualified. The problem with doing this is that Dr. Naftchi claims that these criteria are pretextual and that the real criterion in each instance is youth. In other words, consideration of the qualification issue necessarily implicates the subsequent stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, in apparent contravention of Powell.
Resolution of this tension among Lieberman, Thornley, and Powell fortunately is unnecessary in this case. Defendants have articulated non-discriminatory explanations for their decisions.
By thus satisfying the burden applicable once a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is made out, they remove the presumption that would flow from the prima facie case and place upon Dr. Naftchi the burden of coming forward with evidence creating a triable issue of fact on the ultimate issue of discrimination. Seen in this light, and considering the de minimis nature of the showing required at the prima facie stage, the Court assumes that Dr. Naftchi has adduced sufficient evidence to make out each of the elements of his prima facie case for purposes of this motion. The Court therefore proceeds to determine whether Dr. Naftchi has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact on the ultimate issue of discrimination.
c. Allocation of Laboratory and Office Space
The Medical School administration's stated reason for refusing to give laboratory space to Dr. Naftchi and for first reducing and later eliminating his office space is that Dr. Naftchi does not have external and, in particular, federal funding and thus is not a productive member of the faculty.
Dr. Naftchi does not deny that he lacks federal funding.
Instead, he argues first that he is productive nonetheless by publishing articles and participating in conferences.
Whether he is or is not productive in that sense is not the Court's concern, however, as it is defendants' prerogative to establish the criteria by which this determination shall be made. The law is concerned not with whether the Medical School administration's criteria are wise, only whether they are non-discriminatory.
In his second, and more relevant, argument, Dr. Naftchi contends that the focus on federal funding is a pretext and that lab and office space actually is allocated on the basis of age animus. The Court's task is to determine whether there are triable issues of fact supporting these arguments. There are not.
Considerable emphasis is placed by plaintiff on the statement of Dr. Scotch that "in order to be competitive, [the Cancer Center, to which were allocated labs that had been used by the DRM,] needed to be able to recruit young, productive faculty members who had grants," and that such young faculty members "will be competitive in obtaining National Institutes of Health grants."
Dr. Naftchi suggests that this is a smoking gun revealing age animus in the space allocation process. Plaintiff, however, misconceives Dr. Scotch's statement. What it reveals is not a preference for youth, but a preference for external sources of funding. The clear import of the statement is that lab space is being allocated with the goal of increasing the amount of external research funding, a reasonable, non-age-related factor for a research institution to consider, particularly in times of scarce funding.
That Dr. Scotch's statement betrays an awareness that the awarding of federal grants may be correlated inversely with age may have some bearing on Dr. Naftchi's disparate impact claim, but it does not tend to prove that the real reason for lab allocation decisions at the NYUMC is age animus. The Supreme Court, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,80 "made clear that employment decisions driven by factors that are empirically intertwined with age are not discriminatory so long as they are motivated by 'some feature other than the employee's age.'"
Applying Hazen in the context of an airline's policy of not using a seniority system to hire pilots for a new shuttle system, the Second Circuit in Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.82 concluded that the policy did not violate the ADEA.
The Circuit reasoned that, despite several statements including references to age, it was apparent that the airline was motivated not by "ageist intent" or by "assumptions about employees' abilities based on their age" but rather by "a concern about the economics of hiring pilots who were approaching the mandatory retirement age."
Dr. Scotch's comments are similar to those made by Delta. It is undisputed that funding for research is scarce and that NIH grants have become one of if not the most important source of funds available. It is undisputed also that a research institution such as the NYUMC depends to a large extent on its access, via its individual faculty, to such funding. As in Criley, the comments of Dr. Scotch "express considerations of the business effects of the" federal grant award process and "not assumptions about [faculty members] based on their age."
Dr. Naftchi's other evidence is similarly unavailing. He contends, for example, that several of the laboratory spaces taken from him eventually were given to other, younger faculty.
There is no suggestion that such allocations were inconsistent with the policy of allocating space to the most productive faculty. Moreover, these incidents all took place in the 1980's;
relief for them is barred by the statute of limitations. At most, they add to the background against which the Court assesses defendants' actions within the limitations period.
The only incident within the limitations period to which Dr. Naftchi points is the denial of his 1995 request for lab room 720.
According to plaintiff, although this room was not in use, his request for access to it never was granted.
Assuming this to be true, however, there is no basis for a reasonable person to conclude that age played any role in the decision. The room had not been allocated to a younger doctor. Instead, lab room 720 was being held for use by Dr. Arthur Eberstein,
who is the same age as Dr. Naftchi.
In any event, the entire 7th floor of the Rusk Institute, including lab room 720, subsequently was allocated from the DRM to the Department of Cell Biology.
Finally, Dr. Naftchi contends that defendants' explanation is shown to be pretextual by the fact that Drs. Lee and Eberstein have not received any grant funding for the past ten and eight years, respectively, and yet have not had their labs taken away.
The problem is that these two doctors are each of similar age to Dr. Naftchi: Dr. Eberstein is Dr. Naftchi's age
while Dr. Lee is at most four years younger.
Thus, even if this evidence does tend to show pretext, it does not suggest that the actual motivation behind space allocation decisions is age animus. On the contrary, this evidence tends to rebut that argument.
Put another way, this evidence may create a triable issue of fact concerning whether defendants' explanation for its space allocation decisions is pretextual, but it does not follow that there is a triable issue of fact concerning the ultimate question of whether defendants were motivated by age discrimination. While a showing of pretext may contribute to a finding of discriminatory motivation,
this is not so where, as here, the sole evidentiary basis for questioning the veracity of defendants' explanation tends to show also that defendants were not motivated by discriminatory animus. The in banc Second Circuit recently explained:
"a defendant's false statements are nothing more than pieces of circumstantial evidence which may be employed, as in many other types of cases, to reveal the speaker's state of mind. To the extent that an actor in defendant's position is unlikely to have proffered a false explanation except to conceal a discriminatory motive, then the false explanation will be powerful evidence of discrimination. On the other hand, if the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent. And if, on examination of the circumstances, there are many possible reasons for the false explanation, stated or unstated, and illegal discrimination is no more likely a reason than others, then the pretext gives minimal support to plaintiff's claim of discrimination."
Remarkably, Dr. Naftchi's evidence of pretext, that Drs. Eberstein and Lee have not lost their labs despite lacking external funding, does not actually fall within any of the categories discussed in Fisher, but instead falls within a fourth category in which the plaintiff's evidence of pretext tends to disprove both the defendant's articulated reason and the plaintiff's allegation of age discrimination. Rare as cases of this type may be, it is incontrovertible that this type of pretext evidence provides no support for allegations of discriminatory motivation and hence no defense to summary judgment.
As plaintiff has failed to establish a triable issue of fact on the issue of the Medical School administration's discriminatory intent, summary judgment is granted as to the decisions not to give Dr. Naftchi lab space and to reduce and then eliminate his office space.
Dr. Naftchi contends that defendants' decisions to deny him raises since 1994 were motivated by age discrimination. Defendants respond that raises are based on merit alone, as determined by the relevant department chairman, and that Dr. Naftchi's level of productivity during the relevant period has not warranted a raise. The question for the Court is whether there are triable issues of fact concerning whether defendants' explanation is true and, if not, whether age discrimination was the actual motivation. Again, there are not.
According to defendants, "NYU does not have a 'standard' or 'automatic' or 'cost-of-living' increase at all for its tenured Medical Center faculty, and has not for some time."
Instead, raises are awarded on a merit basis, depending on factors such as "productivity, department and school contributions, and general performance . . . as judged by his or her department chairman."
The only limitation upon the chairman's discretion comes from the "Salary Increase Program" ("SIP") for NYUMC faculty, which is established annually by the Dean in consultation with other administrators.
The SIP provides department chairmen with discretion to determine raises, subject to the constraint that the aggregate raise for the department cannot exceed a stated percentage that has ranged over time from two to six percent.
The 1993 SIP, controlling raises for the year 1994, provided that no raises were to be given to employees who did "not meet minimum performance goals or job requirements."
Similar instructions were provided in the ensuing years.
Dr. Lee, as Acting Chairman of the DRM, had the discretion to determine the raises to be given, if any, to Dr. Naftchi during the relevant time period.
Dr. Lee states that he measured individual performance "primarily on whether the faculty member has external grants or other external funding for their research. Other factors are considered, including the number of publications put out by each faculty member during the prior year, the value of the research projects being undertaken, and the funding available to the faculty member relative to the amount of money in the Department's budget that I have at my disposal."
Dr. Naftchi begins by challenging the merit of using success in acquiring grants as a basis for awarding salary increases or otherwise assessing merit,
arguing that background, tenure, experience, length of service, scholarship, and past contributions should be considered.
As noted previously, however, it simply is not the Court's function to assess the wisdom of defendants' criteria.
Next, Dr. Naftchi attempts to demonstrate that defendants' explanation for their salary decisions is pretextual. He points to the statement of Dean Farber that individual faculty members' access to grant funds is not taken into account when formulating a given department's salary budget.
It does not follow, however, that an individual faculty member's access to grant funds plays no role in determining how the salary budget is distributed among individual faculty members within a department. Consistent with this point, Dean Farber went on to explain that the salary of an individual faculty member is determined by his or her department chairman alone.
Dr. Naftchi points also to the fact that Dr. Eberstein has received no grant funding since 1990 and yet received raises during that time period.
Dr. Eberstein is not simply another faculty member, however, but the DRM's Director of Research. In any event, as noted previously in the context of space allocation decisions, Dr. Eberstein is approximately Dr. Naftchi's age. Thus, any inference to be drawn from salary discrepancies between these two faculty members could have nothing to do with age animus.
Plaintiff argues next that the falsity of defendants' explanation is revealed by the fact that Dr. Lee has not had grant funding in recent years and yet has received raises. Once more, however, Dr. Naftchi's argument founders on the fact that Dr. Lee is of a similar age to Dr. Naftchi, eliminating any inference that age played a role in any disparate treatment that may have existed. Furthermore, Dr. Lee's position as Acting Dean and that position's corresponding administrative burdens provide an uncontested explanation for the variation in salary treatment.
Dr. Naftchi argues also that defendants' discriminatory intent is revealed by a comparison between his salary and the salaries of other professors at the Medical School of the same rank (full professor), final degree (Ph.D.), and gender (male), as revealed by a 1996 Medical School report.
Specifically, Dr. Naftchi points out that his salary of $ 82,705 was well below the average Medical School salary of $ 115,645.
There are several problems, however, with relying upon this statistical comparison. First and foremost, these statistics do not even purport to account for age. Second, the report does not account for length of service or any number of other potential causal factors. Third, the comparison of Dr. Naftchi to the entire faculty of the Medical School overlooks differences between departments. Finally, when age is taken into account, a comparison of Dr. Naftchi's salary to that of other Ph.D.'s in his own department for the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 does not provide any support for an inference of age discrimination:
Salaries of Ph.D. Faculty Members of Department of Rehabilitation Medicine
Identifi- Birth 1994 Raise vs. 1995 Raise vs. 1996 Raise vs.
cation Date Salary prior yr. Salary prior yr. Salary prior yr.
(%) (%) (%)
111 1919 $ 23,997 0 $ 23,997 0 $ 23,997 0
106 1924 $ 106,171 6 $ 106,171 0 $ 107,232 1
104 1928 $ 95,117 3 $ 95,117 0 $ 95,118 0
Naftchi 1928 $ 82,705 0 $ 82,705 0 $ 82,705 0
116 1932 $ 43,351 3 $ 43,350 0 $ 44,217 2
110 1933 $ 77,326 3 $ 77,326 0 $ 78,873 2
112 1943 $ 54,625 6 n/a n/a $ 55,717 n/a
113 1949 $ 54,590 10 $ 55,135 1 $ 56,239 2
105 1951 $ 57,711 0 $ 1,500 -97 $ 1,500 0
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