The opinion of the court was delivered by: SWEET
Defendant N. Massand, P.E., L.S.P.C. ("Massand") has moved pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 to reargue the Court's opinion dated June (the "Opinion"). For the reasons set forth below, S&B's motion is denied.
The Gravatts are New Jersey residents and had been married for 15 years at the time of the events at issue. Mr. Gravatt was 37 years old and was employed by S&B as a dock builder and pile driver. He was seriously injured on the job on January 31, 1996.
S&B is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Cranford, New Jersey.
Prior Proceedings And Facts
The facts and prior proceedings in this action are set forth in the prior opinions of the Court, and will not be repeated here. See Gravatt v. The City Of New York, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9481, No. 97 Civ. 0354, 1998 WL 341941 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1998) (the "Reargument Opinion"); Gravatt v. The City Of New York, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4886, No. 97 Civ. 0354, 1998 WL 171491 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1998) (the "Summary Judgment Opinion").
Massand filed the instant motion on July 6, 1998, which was deemed fully submitted without argument on July 29, 1998.
Local Rule 6.3 provides in pertinent part: "There shall be served with the notice of motion a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." Thus, to be entitled to reargument, the movant must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion. See Ameritrust Co. Nat'l Ass'n v. Dew, 151 F.R.D. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Fulani v. Brady, 149 F.R.D. 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) aff'd sub nom. Fulani v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1994).
Local Rule 6.3 is to be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court. Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 624 F. Supp. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Nor may a party "advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the court." Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 768 F. Supp. 115, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Massand's second motion to reargue contends that the Court did not address its argument in the first motion to reargue that the Court overlooked the fact that Simpson & Brown, Inc. ("S&B"), a co-defendant, is a dual capacity employer and thus is subject to Massand's cross-claim for contribution. Specifically, the first motion to reargue contended that "in dismissing Massand's cross-claim for contribution the Court overlooked the fact that Simpson & Brown is acting as a dual capacity employer in this case." (emphasis added).
In the Summary Judgement Opinion, the Court held that "S&B is entitled to dismissal of Massand's implied indemnity cross-claims." (emphasis added). The court did not grant dismissal of Massand's contribution cross-claim.
To clarify this point, in the Reargument Opinion the Court vacated the paragraph in the Summary Judgement Opinion referring to the LHWCA bar against tort-based contribution. The Court carefully considered all of the ...