The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rakoff, District Judge.
In ten-count amended complaint, plaintiffs Kirsten Ericson and Dacia
Kornechuk, two former members of the Syracuse University women's tennis
team, together with their parents, allege that their former coach,
defendant Jesse Dwire, sexually harassed them over approximately a
three-year period beginning in the Fall of 1994. They further allege that
after they lodged formal complaint with Syracuse University in January
1997, the University and its agents concocted a "sham" investigatory
proceeding to conceal the extent of Dwire's misconduct, which plaintiffs
allege goes back more than 20 years Plaintiffs allege that because of
these and other activities, Dwire, the University, and various University
employees and agents violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"); the Violenece Against
42 U.S.C. § 13981 ("VAWA"); Section 1985(3) of Title 42, U.S.C.
("Section 1985(3)"); and various New York State laws.
On October 5, 1998, defendants moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) for the
entry in their favor of judgment on the pleadings with respect to: "(1)
those portions of Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Amended Complaint that address
the University's investigation and hearing of Plaintiffs' claims because
Title IX does not provide a private right of action for improper or
insufficient hearing procedures; (2) Count 4 because Defendants, as
employees of the University, cannot act together to commit a conspiracy
under Section 1985; . . . (3) Count 5 because all claims under the VAWA
are barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, . . . [and
(4)] Count 8 in favor of Defendants Strodel, Pickett, Bench, Mudrick and
Walker (collectively, the Post-Charge Defendants) because the allegations
in the Amended Complaint regarding the steps those Defendants took
pursuant to the terms of the Policy to investigate and resolve Kirsten's
and Dacia's charges of sexual harassment cannot rise to the level of
intentional infliction of emotional distress [and] further [because]
Plaintiffs cannot use the common-law theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to circumvent Title IX, when Congress did not create a
private right of action for such claims." Defs.' Mem. of Law at 3-4.
Confirming its prior talephonic advice to counsel, the Court hereby
denies the first prong of defendants' motion, grants the second prong,
denies the third prong in most respects, and, as to the fourth prong,
grants the motion as to defendants Pickett, Bench, Mudrick, and Walker,
and denies the motion as to defendant Strodel.
(1) As to the first prong of the motion, the parties agree that, under
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District, 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998), a
student who has been the victim of sexual harassment by an employee of an
institution subject to Title IX may not bring a private damages claim
against the institution "unless an official of the [institution] who at a
minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the
[institution's] behalf has actual, notice of, and is deliberately
indifferent to, the [employee's] misconduct." Id. at 1992. On its face,
the complaint appears to satisfy this standard because it alleges, inter
alia, that some or all of those who investigated and heard the charges
against Dwire not only had actual notice that Dwire had been harassing
female student-athletes for a period of 20 years but also conspired to
conduct a "sham" investigation and hearing in order to conceal the full
extent of Dwire' s misconduct. See First Amended Complaint at ¶¶
50-54, 56-60, 348-533.
Defendants nonetheless contend that these allegations fail to state a
cognizable Title IX claim because of the Supreme Court's statement in
Gebser that an institution's "failure to promulgate a grievance procedure
does not itself constitute discrimination under Title IX," Gebser, 524
U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2000. Defendants argue that "If the failure to
have policies and procedures is not privately actionable under Title IX,
then, a fortiori, the types of claims set forth in Counts 1, 2 and 3 of
the Amended Complaint challenging the adequacy of the remedial action
taken by the University and its agents (e.g., hearing panel members and
the director of human' resources) pursuant to its published policy, are
not subject to a private right of action." Defts.' Mem. of Law at 6.
Defendants' conclusion, however, is not an instance of "a fortiori" but
rather of non sequitur. The mere failure of an institution to promulgate
a grievance procedure for dealing with discrimination does not
necessarily imply its knowledge of any given instance of discrimination.
By contrast, the purposeful failure of an official with actual knowledge
of an employee's discrimination and the authority to remedy the
misconduct to adequately respond is tantamount to "an official decision
by the [institution] not to remedy the violation," Gebser, 524 U.S. at
____ 118 S.Ct. at 1999, and therefore actionable. Id. See also, e.g.,
Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kortright Central School District,
163 F.3d 749, 759 (2d Cir. 1998) (high school student can recover from
school district under Title IX if the district had actual notice of and
was deliberately indifferent to teacher's discrimination); Morse v.
Regents of the University of Colorado, 154 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir.
1998) (allegation that university "knew of harassment . . . and did not
respond adequately" is sufficient to state claim under Title IX and
Gebser). Accordingly, the first prong of defendants' motion must be
(2) With respect to the second prong of defendants' motion, defendants
argue that the fourth count of the complaint, in which plaintiffs allege
that the defendants conspired together to violate plaintiffs' civil
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), is barred by the familiar
doctrine that a corporation cannot conspire with itself — or, more
precisely, that since a corporation or other institution (like Syracuse
University) can only act through its agents, a claim that the agents
collectively agreed to take some unlawful action in the name and on
behalf of the corporation is simply another way of saying that the
corporation acted unlawfully and therefore does not satisfy the basic
requirements of a conspiracy. See Girard v. 94th Street and Fifth Avenue
Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1976) (dismissing on this basis a §
1985(3) claim alleging conspiracy to discriminate).
Plaintiffs respond that this intracorporate conspiracy bar is
inapplicable here because two of the alleged conspirators — Louis
DiLorenzo (an attorney) and Stephanie Osborne (a student) — were
not employees of the University. However, the allegations against
DiLorenzo and Osborne, so far as the Section 1985(3) count is concerned,
relate not to actions they took in their individual capacities but rather
to actions they allegedly took in their positions as persons given
official power to help formulate or implement University policy.
Specifically, the charge against DiLorenzo is that he used his position as
an attorney retained by the University to assist the panel hearing the
charges against Dwire to further the University's alleged scheme to
conceal the truth of Dwire's misconduct. See First Amended Complaint at
¶¶ 436-466. Similarly, Osborne is charged with having used her
position as a student member of that hearing panel to assist the same
cover-up on behalf of the University. See First Amended Complaint at
¶¶ 415-416, 417-484. Thus, they are charged with misconduct taken in
their temporary roles as agents of the University.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies as much to individuals
acting as the corporation's temporary agents as it does to full-time
employees. See, e.g., Agugliaro v. Brooks Brothers, Inc.,
802 F. Supp. 956, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Carter v. City of Hartford, 1998
WL 823044, at *4 (D.Conn. 1998). Nor is there any allegation in the
complaint to suggest that any of the alleged co-conspirators were acting
outside the scope of this temporary agency in furthering what the
complaint alleges was a University-directed cover-up. See First Amended
Complaint at ¶ 59.*fn1 Accordingly, plaintiffs' Section 1985(3)
claim must be dismissed.
(3) the third prong of the instant motion seeks to dismiss as
time-barred plaintiffs' fifth count, which accuses Dwire of inflicting
physical injury on plaintiffs Kirsten Ericson and Dacia Kornechuk in
violation of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"),
42 U.S.C. § 13981, during the years 1994 through 1996. VAWA provides
a civil cause of action to victims of gender-motivated crimes of
violence. However, the text of VAWA itself contains no express statute of
limitations: "a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law."
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d
440(1980). Accordingly, the Court must look to the "most appropriate or
analogous state statute of limitations." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656, 660, 107 S.Ct. 2617 96 L.Ed.2d 572(1987).
Defendants suggest that VAWA claims are most analagous to state law
causes of action for assault or battery. But the text of VAWA, its
legislative history, and its place in the context of other federal laws
all make clear that Congress did not enact VAWA as a supplement to state
laws prohibiting violent crime. Instead, Congress' stated purpose
was to "protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence
. . . by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action."
42 U.S.C. § 13981(a). Accordingly, a VAWA cause of action is most
analogous to a personal injury claim. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572(1987) (state
statute of limitations for personal injury actions supplies the
appropriate limitations period for racial discrimination claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Morse v. university of Vermont, 973, F.2d
122, 126-127 (2d Cir. 1992) (following Goodman in applying state
personal injury statute of limitations to disability discrimination claims
brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
Under New York law, that limitations period is three years,
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214. The instant lawsuit was filed on May 14, 1998.
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the VAWA claim is denied
except as to any portion of that claim premised on acts of violence
occurring prior to May 14, 1995, as to which the motion is granted.
(4) Finally, the Court grants in part and denies in part the fourth
prong of defendant's motion seeking judgment in favor of the "Post-Charge
Defendants" (Strodel, Pickett, Bench, Murdrick and Walker) on plaintiffs'
eighth count, which accuses all defendants of intentional infliciton of
emotional distress in violation of New York State law.
Under New York law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350,
353, 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting Murphy v. American home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236, 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1993).
However, even though this high standard ultimately places a heavy burden
on plaintiffs, at the pleading state such claims may not be dismissed
unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of fact
that would ...