The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mukasey, District Judge.
These cases present broad attacks on the current system of governance
for, and administration of, New York City's public schools. In 97 Civ.
7027, plaintiffs (the "Warden plaintiffs") bring a class action against
various state officials (the "State Defendants") and municipal officials
(the "Municipal Defendants"), alleging that the method of selecting
members for the city Board of Education (the "city board"), recent
amendments to N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590 and actions of defendant New York
City Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew violate numerous statutes and
constitutional provisions. In 98 Civ. 2879, plaintiff pro se Louisa M.
Chan raises nearly identical claims against substantially the same
defendants, also as a class action.
In an earlier opinion, familiarity with which is assumed, a three-judge
panel granted summary judgment for the Municipal Defendants with respect
to the Warden plaintiffs' claim that the method for selecting members of
the city board violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971
et seq. See Warden v. Pataki, 12 F. Supp.2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(three-judge panel).*fn1 The Municipal Defendants now move, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, for summary judgment in both cases, on all remaining
claims. In addition, the State Defendants move, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), to dismiss both actions for failure to state a claim. Because
Chan is a named plaintiff in both actions, and the two cases raise
substantially the same issues, the parties have agreed that all papers
submitted should be considered in reference to both cases wherever
relevant.
For the reasons stated below, defendants' motions are granted in their
entirety, and the complaints in both cases are dismissed.
The New York City public school system is unique within the State of
New York. Established pursuant to Article 52-A of the New York Education
Law, the system is divided into 32 community school districts, each of
which is governed by a community school district board ("community
board"). See N Y Educ. Law § 2590-b (McKinney 1995 & 1999 Supp.).
Each community board is composed of nine members, elected for three-year
terms. See id. § 2590-c. Overseeing all 32 community boards is the
city board, which is composed of seven members, a member appointed by
each of the five elected borough presidents and two members appointed by
the mayor. See id. § 2590-b.1(a). Finally, the city board appoints a
Chancellor, who serves for a term not to exceed by more than one year the
term of the city board which appointed him. See id. § 2590-h. The
respective duties and powers of the city board, the community boards and
the Chancellor are set forth in detail in New York Education Law Article
52-A.
In these cases, plaintiffs challenge several aspects of the system
established by New York Education Law Article 52-A. One category of
claims, part of which was disposed of by the three-judge panel, relates
to the composition of the city board. Insofar as plaintiffs challenge the
statute on its face, their remaining claims all relate to amendments
passed by the state legislature and signed by defendant Governor George
Pataki in 1996. See 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 720. The 1996 amendments, which
became effective in 1997, altered the relationship between the city
board, the community boards and the Chancellor, for the most part by
enhancing the powers of the city board and Chancellor at the expense of
the community boards. (E.g., Chan Compl. Ex. 1) To the extent relevant to
plaintiffs' claims, the 1996 amendments limited the role of community
board members over the hiring and firing of school personnel; created a
mandatory training requirement for all new community board members; and
enhanced the Chancellor's powers to suspend or remove community board
members for misfeasance or nonfeasance.*fn2
As noted, plaintiffs challenge also certain actions of defendant
Chancellor Crew. In 1996 and 1997, acting pursuant to his powers to
suspend or remove community board members, the Chancellor suspended
and/or removed some or all of community boards 5, 7, 9, and 12, in each
case citing some combination of misconduct, institutional paralysis or
academic failure traceable to the community school district. (Mun. Def.
Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 6-38) All four community boards were composed
primarily of racial or ethnic minorities. (Warden Compl. ¶ 59) In each
case, the Chancellor's actions were ultimately approved by the United
States Department of Justice pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. (Mun. Def. Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 11, 13,
18, 31, 38) of the four community boards at issue, at least two remained
in the control of racial or ethnic minorities after the Chancellor's
interventions. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 29)
To begin, the State Defendants' motion to dismiss both cases pursuant
to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim must be granted.
The principal basis for plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendants
is the State Defendants' role in enacting the legislation at issue. (See
Warden Compl. ¶ 26; Chan Compl. ¶ 37) The well-settled doctrine
of absolute legislative immunity, however, bars actions against
legislators or governors — and, a fortiori, legislatures — on
the basis of their roles in enacting or signing legislation. See Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376-79, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951); see also Lajoie
v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 837 F. Supp. 34, 40
(D.Conn. 1993) (Cabranes, C.J.). The cases cited by the Warden
plaintiffs
in their complaint — Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 110
S.Ct. 625, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990), and Bush v. Orleans Parish School
Board, 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.
1957), (see Warden Compl. ¶ 65) — do not hold otherwise: Bush
involved a suit against state agencies, not legislators, and in
Spallone, the Supreme Court reversed a contempt order entered against
members of a municipal council without even having to reach the question
of immunity. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 266, 110 S.Ct. 625; see also id.
at 633 (citing, and thereby reaffirming, Tenney and Supreme Court of
Virginia).
The Warden plaintiffs base their claims against Governor Pataki on an
additional basis: namely, on the Governor's duty under the New York
Constitution to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed." N Y
Const. art. 4, § 3. Although there is some authority to support
plaintiffs' position, see, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. Carey,
482 F. Supp. 1358, 1363 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), the vast majority of courts to
consider the issue have held — correctly, in my view — that a
state official's duty to execute the laws is not enough by itself to make
that official a proper party in a suit challenging a state statute. See,
e.g., 1st Westco Corp. v. School Dist., 6 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1993)
("General authority to enforce the laws of the state is not sufficient to
make government officials the proper parties to litigation challenging
the law.") (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir.
1988)); Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The
mere fact that a governor is under a general duty to enforce state laws
does not make him a proper defendant in every action attacking the
constitutionality of a state statute."); see also Gras v. Stevens,
415 F. Supp. 1148, 1151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. Mendez v. Heller,
530 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the state attorney
general's duty to support the constitutionality of challenged state
statutes and his duty to defend actions in which the state is interested
do not constitute enforcement of the statute in question). Accordingly,
plaintiffs' claims with respect to the State Defendants are dismissed.
As noted, the Municipal Defendants move for summary judgment in both
cases. Summary judgment is mandated when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment
motion, "the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Azrielli v. Cohen Law
Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, Rule 56
jurisprudence is clear in "provid[ing] that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party, therefore, "must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the ...