The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sand, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Jeanette McNulty, brings this employment
discrimination action against New York City and two City
officials pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII"), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 621-634, the New York State Human Rights Law
("SHRL"), codified at N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301, and the New York
City Human Rights Law ("CHRL"), codified at N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§
8-101 to -131. Presently before the Court is the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion
is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff is a New York City resident who worked for the City
in various capacities from December 1978 until February 1995. In
July 1990, during the tenure of David Dinkins as Mayor of New
York City, Plaintiff began working for the City Sheriff, Philip
Crimaldi. Because Plaintiff was a provisional employee, her
employment was "at will" and could be terminated summarily.
In November 1993, Rudolph Giuliani was elected Mayor of the
City of New York and appointed Randy Mastro as his Chief of Staff
and Robert Avaltroni as Acting Sheriff. After several weeks, the
Mayor appointed Kerry Katsorhis to serve as the City Sheriff on a
permanent basis and Avaltroni continued working for the City as
First Deputy Commissioner.
In February 1995, Mayor's Office officials furnished Katsorhis
with a list of seven members of the Sheriff's Office to
terminate. Plaintiff, who was then fifty-nine years old, was
among those employees fired. Three of these individuals were
immediately rehired upon reconsideration and all of the remaining
individuals, other than Plaintiff, have since accepted other
employment with the City. Plaintiff's replacement in the
Sheriff's Office was a forty-seven year old woman named Ellen
Poliski.
In April 1995, Plaintiff interviewed for and was orally offered
the position of Director of Administration with the New York City
Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB). Plaintiff accepted the
position but the offer was later withdrawn after staff-members in
the Mayor's Office told COIB officials that the Vacancy Control
Board would not approve her appointment. In August 1995, COIB
hired a fifty-three year old woman, Ute O'Malley, to fill the
position.
On or about August 1, 1995, Plaintiff filed a charge of
employment discrimination based on age and gender with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the New York State
Division of Human Rights. On January 18, 1996, she received a
"right to sue letter" from the EEOC and commenced this action
within ninety days. Subject matter jurisdiction over the Title
VII and ADEA claims is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and any
jurisdiction the Court may have over Plaintiff's state law claims
depends on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the statute governing supplemental
jurisdiction.
In an Opinion dated October 24, 1996, the Court granted the
Defendants' Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the
Office of the Sheriff, the Office of the Mayor, and the
Department of Personnel, on the ground that those entities were
not suable. See McNulty v. New York City Department of Finance,
941 F. Supp. 452, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In all other respects, the
Court denied the Defendants' Motion and left Plaintiff's claims
intact. Id. at 457-62.
On December 16, 1998, after discovery was completed, the
Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
heard oral argument on January 14, 1999, and reserved decision.
The Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving
papers and affidavits submitted by the parties show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 56(c); see also Brown v. City of Oneonta,
106 F.3d 1125, 1130 (2d Cir. 1997). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead
required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary
judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Weyant v. Okst,
101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is a "drastic
procedural weapon because `its prophylactic function, when
exercised, cuts off a party's right to present his case to the
jury.'" Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 26
(2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F.2d 290, 291
(2d Cir. 1972)).
Plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA Claims Against the City
The Second Circuit has explained the framework for considering
claims of pretextual employment discrimination in light of the
familiar three-part burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Claims under the ADEA receive the same
analysis as those ...