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FASTEN v. ZAGER

May 20, 1999

PINCUS FASTEN, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MICHAEL L. ZAGER, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gershon, District Judge.

    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Pincus Fasten brings this action against defendant law firm Michael L. Zager, P.C., alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA" or "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), (g) and (k). Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the amount of $1000, plus attorneys' fees and costs. Both parties move for summary judgment.

FACTS

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff owed a debt amounting to $115.30 to Ellenville Hospital. The debt was forwarded to the Law Offices of Michael L. Zager, P.C., for the purpose of collection. Defendant's office sent a collection letter to plaintiff on January 15, 1997 regarding this debt. The letter plaintiff received from defendant's office stated in relevant part:

  The above account has been referred to this law
  office by Ellenville Hospital O/P for collection.
  If your account remains unpaid it will be reported to
  a major credit bureau. Adverse credit information can
  be kept on your credit record for five (5) years.
  Unless you notify this office within 30 days after
  receiving this notice that you dispute the validity
  of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will
  assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office
  in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice,
  this office will: obtain verification of the debt or
  obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of
  such judgment or verification. If you request this
  office in writing within 30 days after receiving this
  notice, this office will provide you with the name
  and address of the original creditor, if different
  from the current creditor. This is an attempt to
  collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used
  for that purpose.
  After receiving this letter, plaintiff telephoned defendant on January 23, 1997, and spoke with one of the defendant's collection representatives, later identified as Isa Haqq, about the alleged debt. Plaintiff conveyed to Mr. Haqq that he had insurance and that the insurance company covers his medical bills in full. Mr. Haqq informed plaintiff that his insurance company had denied his claim and plaintiff requested a copy of this denial. Mr. Haqq instructed plaintiff to contact his insurance company directly to obtain a copy of the denial.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment should be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. See id. A material fact is one whose resolution would "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," and a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, the non-moving party may not "rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986). The party must produce specific facts sufficient to establish that there is genuine factual issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Plaintiff in this case alleges violations of Sections 1692g and 1692e(8) of the FDCPA. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute and, therefore, does not require a showing of intentional conduct on the part of a debt collector. See e.g., Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996). Further, a single violation of the FDCPA is sufficient to establish civil liability. Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993). In determining whether a debt collector has violated the FDCPA, courts use an objective standard, measured by how the "least sophisticated consumer" would interpret the notice received from the debt collector. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993). "The Act is aimed at protecting consumers in general from abusive debt collection practices and the test is how the least sophisticated consumer — one not having the astuteness of a `Philadelphia lawyer' or even the sophistication of the average, everyday, common consumer — understands the notice he or she receives." Russell, 74 F.3d at 33. With these guiding principles, I turn to plaintiff's claims.

Section 1692(g)(4)

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Haqq's direction to plaintiff over the telephone that plaintiff should seek verification himself from his insurance company violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g)(4) because it contradicted plaintiff's right, as explained in the collection letter, to dispute the debt. Section 1692g of the Act provides that, when an independent debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must — within five days of the initial communication — provide the consumer with a detailed validation notice. The notice must include the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor, a statement that the debt's validity will be assumed unless disputed by the consumer within 30 days, and, pursuant to Subsection 4 of Section 1692g, the validation notice must contain "a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector." "When a notice contains language that `overshadows or contradicts' other language informing a consumer of her rights, it violates the Act." Russell, 74 F.3d at 34 (citation omitted). A debt collection notice violates this principle if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights. Id. at 35.

There is no material dispute as to the contents of the conversation between plaintiff and defendant's representative, Mr. Haqq, which plaintiff alleges contradicted the validation notice of the collection letter that plaintiff received. The cases relied on by plaintiff to support his argument that the information provided in the telephone conversation between plaintiff and defendant's representative violated Section 1692(g) are inapposite. In those cases, the court found that a particular collection letter violated Section 1692(g) because the letter contained a contradictory message or overshadowed the validation notice. See, e.g., Russell, 74 F.3d at 33-36; Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. S. Oregon Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1991). That is not the case here. Applying the least sophisticated consumer standard, I conclude that defendant's debt collection letter, containing the validation notice, contains neither contradictory nor overshadowing language and, thus, does not ...


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