to resign."'" Id. at 361 (quoting Pena, 702 F.2d at 325).
Here, the evidence shows only that plaintiff was unhappy that
she was not selected for the new Vice President position, and
that she was less than satisfied with the alternatives offered to
her, because of her subjective belief that they would be a step
down from her prior position, solely by virtue of the fact that
she would not report directly to Hall. That does not meet the
stringent standard for demonstrating constructive discharge. See
Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992)
(employee's subjective interpretation that continued employment
would be uncomfortable and demeaning and would lead to demotion
or termination in the future does not constitute constructive
discharge); Dobson v. Unigraphic Color Corp., No. Civ. 92-1841,
1994 WL 906665 *3 (M.D.Pa. Sept.30, 1994) ("While plaintiff
viewed any reassignment as `stepping down,' this would not
qualify as an intolerable working condition"), aff'd,
66 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1995).
In addition, by her own admission plaintiff reached a point
where she simply wanted to leave TLP, regardless of any efforts
defendants might have made to placate her, and she was not
interested in investigating the nature of any other positions
they might have offered her. As stated, she admits that
Greenawalt in effect asked her to tell him what he could do that
would persuade her to stay, but she admitted at her deposition
that was "going to leave. [She] didn't want it [sic] wait to see
the fill-in for the job. [She] w[as] just going to leave . . .".
Rittinger Affidavit Ex. H at 241. Given this undisputed evidence,
plaintiff cannot establish a constructive discharge. See West v.
Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995) ("An
employee who quits without giving her employer a chance to work
out a problem is not constructively discharged"); Clowes v.
Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1161 (3d Cir.)
(reasonable employee will usually explore alternative avenues
thoroughly before coming to the conclusion that resignation is
the only option), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 964, 114 S.Ct. 441,
126 L.Ed.2d 374 (1993).
As for plaintiff's breach of contract claim relating to her
severance benefits, the parties agree that under the facts of
this case, plaintiff is not entitled to any severance benefits
unless she was constructively discharged, since her contract
required that she be "terminated for any reason other than
cause . . ." in order to receive such benefits. Since plaintiff
was not literally terminated in the commonly understood meaning
of that term, and since she cannot demonstrate that she was
constructively discharged, this claim must be dismissed as well.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Item 28) is granted,
and the complaint is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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