The opinion of the court was delivered by: McAVOY, Chief Judge.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER
By Memorandum — Decision & Order dated March 24, 1999,
familiarity with which is assumed, this Court granted
plaintiffs' motion for a declaratory judgment and declared
Article II, Section 1 of the defendants' collective bargaining
agreement dated May 18, 1998 void and unenforceable.*fn1
Presently before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for attorney's
fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 and 26.
A. Attorney's Fees Under 15 U.S.C. § 15
Section 15 of Title 15 of the United States Code provides, in
This section makes it clear that an injury is required for an
award of attorney's fees. See United States Football League v.
National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1116, 107 L.Ed.2d 1022
(1990) ("USFL"); see also MCA Television Ltd. v. Public
Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1281 n. 21 (11th Cir. 1999);
Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield
Clinic, 152 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 804, 142 L.Ed.2d 665 (1999); Gulfstream
III Assocs. Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414,
418 (3d Cir. 1993); Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411,
415-16 (5th Cir. 1990).
Here, plaintiffs have not demonstrated any injury to their
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws. Indeed, plaintiffs essentially admit that they
suffered no injury when they state in their memorandum of law
that "plaintiffs seek recovery of attorney fees under
[15 U.S.C. § 15] based on the injury they sustained by having to
retain attorneys and commence a costly action against
defendants to enforce their right to freely conduct business."
Pl.Mem. of Law at 3. Although plaintiffs correctly state that
an award of attorney's fees is not tied to the amount of
damages recovered, see USFL, 887 F.2d at 411, a showing of an
injury is, however, required. See id. Moreover, legal fees
are not the type of damages contemplated by the antitrust
statutes. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L.
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130 n. 12 (9th Cir.) ("In antitrust
suits, allowance of attorneys' fees is limited to that
proportion of the fee attributable to a successful suit for
damages. If only equitable relief is sought or obtained,
counsel fees are generally not awarded to a successful
plaintiff."), cert. denied sub nom., Morgan v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 414 U.S. 1045, 94 S.Ct. 551, 38 L.Ed.2d 336
(1973); Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1054,
1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978)
("In calculating an award under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
only work devoted to the successful recovery of treble damages
may be compensated."); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes,
312 F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Because plaintiffs did
not successfully obtain an award of damages pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 15, they are not entitled to an award of attorney's
fees under that same section.
B. Attorney's Fees Under 15 U.S.C. § 26
Plaintiffs next seek attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26.
Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 26 provides that if a plaintiff
substantially prevails in obtaining injunctive relief for
threatened violations of the antitrust laws, then "the court
shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney
fee, to such plaintiff." Although this Court did not explicitly
grant plaintiffs the requested injunctive relief because the
Court declared the challenged provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement to be void and unenforceable, plaintiffs
substantially prevailed in their action seeking injunctive
relief. See City of Chanute, Kan. v. Williams Natural Gas
Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1047 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[A] party may be
awarded attorneys' fees where it has received `at least some
relief on the merits of [its] claim' by judicial
determination.") (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v.
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486,
103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1191, 115
S.Ct. 1254, 131 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995); Royal Crown Cola Co. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 887 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990).
The granting of the declaratory judgment declaring the relevant
provision of the collective bargaining agreement to be void and
unenforceable had the same
practical effect of restoring competition in the marketplace by
permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing that provision.
C. Determining Reasonable Attorney's Fees
The Court must now determine what amount of fees is reasonable
under the circumstances of this case. "The process of
determining a reasonable fee ordinarily begins with the court's
calculation of a so-called `loadstar' figure, which is arrived
at by multiplying `the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.'"
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763-64 (2d Cir.
1998) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103
S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); see also USFL, 887 F.2d at
413. The lodestar figure is to be based upon current,
prevailing market rates. See LeBlanc-Sternberg, 143 F.3d at
764. The amount figured into the lodestar includes "the number
of hours claimed by plaintiffs' attorneys that are supported by
time records, that are not excessive or duplicative, and that
do not reflect work done only in connection with unrelated
claims on which plaintiffs did not succeed." Id. There is a
strong presumption that this lodestar figure represents a
reasonable fee. See id.; see also USFL, 887 F.2d at 413.
Once the lodestar figure has been calculated, the Court may
adjust the lodestar, taking into consideration several factors.
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-18 (5th Cir. 1974)). "[I]f the court excludes claimed hours
from the calculation of the lodestar figure or augments or
reduces that figure it must state its reasons for doing so as
specifically as possible." LeBlanc-Sternberg, 143 F.3d at 764
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Courts are empowered with broad discretion to independently
determine the reasonableness of an award for attorney's fees.
See Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881,
884 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944, 104 S.Ct.
1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474 (1984); McCann v. Coughlin,
698 F.2d 112, 131 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen a party seeks an award of
attorney fees . . . he must provide the court with
contemporaneous time sheets or other documentation which will
enable it to make an independent evaluation of the fee
request.") (emphasis added). Thus, ...