this district during the past few years have ranged from $200 to
$225 for partners" and "from $100 for junior associates to $200
for senior associates." Perdue v. CUNY, 13 F. Supp.2d 326,
345-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (collecting cases). When evaluating a
request for attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Court
must disallow hours which were not incurred solely in connection
with the remand motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Mattice v.
ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 837 F. Supp. 499, 500-01 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(reducing attorney fees by amount not attributable to remand
motion). The Court may also reduce redundant and overlapping
hours. See Perdue, 13 F. Supp.2d at 346.
"Where settlement is not possible, the fee applicant bears the
burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting
the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40
(1983). In order to be awarded attorney fees, a party must submit
to the court contemporaneous time records as a prerequisite for
recovering attorney fees, specifying "for each attorney, the
date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136,
1148 (2d Cir. 1983). "The actual original time sheets are not
necessary; submitting an affidavit and attaching a computer
printout of the pertinent contemporaneous time records is
acceptable." See Tri-Star Pictures v. Unger, 42 F. Supp.2d 296,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations omitted). When making a fee award,
the Court may evaluate the record to determine the appropriate
fee amount; it need not hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
See Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1995).
In this case, the Court has received a letter from Mr. Garcia,
the Greenidges's counsel, with a request for fees and a statement
of the hours he and his associate expended on the remand issue.
However, the Court has not received contemporaneous time sheets
or an adequate substitute to substantiate the fee request.
Therefore, at this time, the Court cannot make a final order as
to the amount of attorney fees Mundo must pay the Greenidges.
The Greenidges may supplement the record to provide the Court
with appropriate documentation to support their fee request. Upon
receipt of such documentation, unless the parties stipulate as is
hereinafter suggested, the Court will issue a final order as to
the amount of the fee award, which will be in the amount of
$6,731.25, if the documentation supplied is satisfactory. In
making this calculation, the Court will permit a billing rate of
$225.00 per hour for Mr. Garcia, a senior partner, and $150.00
per hour for his associate, who performed mid-level research in
connection with the remand matter. The Court will disallow hours
spent on the summary judgment motion, and will consider only the
35.75 hours by Mr. Garcia and 15.5 hours by his associate which
appear to have been spent solely on the remand matter. The Court
will reduce this number of hours by thirty-five percent because
the initial number was excessive as to the work required by a
remand motion, and will find 23.25 partner hours and 10 associate
hours to be reimbursable. See Mattice, 837 F. Supp. at 501
(allowing $2,085 in attorney fees for 13.9 hours work on
successful remand motion); The Children's Village v. Greenburgh
Eleven Teachers' Union Fed. of Teachers, Local 1532, 867 F. Supp. 245,
248 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (allowing $5,000 in attorney fees for
"A request for attorney fees should not result in a second
major litigation." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. It
is expected that this decision will avoid any further involvement
by the Court in this matter, and that one of the following
stipulations will be entered into: 1) a stipulation by the
parties agreeing to the anticipated sum herein, after plaintiffs'
counsel has satisfied defendant's counsel that
sufficient documentation exists; or 2) if there is no such
documentation, a stipulation by the plaintiff withdrawing his
attorney fee application. Any such stipulation shall be filed
with the Court by August 25, 1999.
For the reasons stated above, Mundo's motion is denied, and the
parties are ordered to proceed in accordance with this order.
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