The opinion of the court was delivered by: McMAHON, District Judge.
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Joseph M. DeStefano ("Plaintiff" or "DeStefano"), the
Mayor of Middletown, New York, asserting standing as a taxpayer,
challenges the expenditure of funds by the State of New York (the
"State") to support the operations of the Middletown Alcohol
Crisis Center (the "MACC") by the Emergency Housing Group ("EHG")
on State-owned property in Middletown, New York. DeStefano
alleges that the expenditure of State funds violates the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution because MACC staff
members encourage clients to attend meetings of Alcoholics
Anonymous ("AA") held at the facility and because MACC provides
AA-related materials to its clients. Defendants contend both that
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit and that State
support for the MACC does not violate the Establishment Clause.
The case is before this Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and the State's and individual defendants' cross-motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, I find that
Plaintiff has standing to bring this Establishment Clause
challenge, but that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on the merits of the claim.
I. The Factual Allegations*fn1
The MACC is a non-medical, short-term, detoxification center.
See Stipulated Facts, at 3. The MACC can be analogized to an
emergency room at a conventional hospital. It serves persons "in
crisis" as opposed to those seeking outpatient treatment. See
id. Generally, persons are admitted into the MACC because they
are intoxicated at the time of admission. However, if a person is
not intoxicated, he can be admitted if he is voluntarily seeking
a safe, sober environment and feels that his sobriety is
threatened. See id. All MACC clients are there of their own
volition and sign an acknowledgment that they can leave at any
time. No one is compelled to stay at the MACC against his wishes.
See Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt., ¶ 6. No state employees or agencies
play any role in placing individuals at the MACC. In fact, there
is no state action whatsoever in the placement process.
Approximately 700 persons received treatment at the MACC in
1996, each for at least one night. The average stay lasts three
to five days. See Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact, at 6.
The MACC receives approximately $500,000 in State funds from
OASAS, through the Orange County Department of Mental Health to
EHG.*fn2 See Stipulated Facts, at 2. OASAS is a state agency
created pursuant to the New York State Mental Hygiene Law and is
responsible for, among other things, funding programs, monitoring
programs, and providing technical systems for programs that treat
alcohol and substance abuse. See id., at 4; see also N Y
Mental Hyg. Law §§ 19.07, 19.15, 21.09 (McKinney's 1996). OASAS
provides about $25 million on a yearly basis to alcohol and
substance abuse programs in the Mid-Hudson region alone. See
Stipulated Facts, at 4.
OASAS grants make up 95% of MACC's funding. State taxpayer
funds are used to pay the rent and utilities for the building
(Wallach Hall) in which the MACC is located. See id., at 2-3.
The rent and utilities for MACC's portion of Wallach Hall is
approximately $39,000 per year. See id., at 3. As the bulk of
MACC's money comes from OASAS, State funds are necessarily
expended for staff salaries as well.
AA meetings are conducted by a volunteer AA fellowship three
days a week in the day room at Wallach Hall. See Pl.'s Proposed
Facts, at 6-7. The AA meetings at Wallach Hall are open to the
general public, as well as to MACC clientele. The AA meetings are
posted as part of the MACC's daily schedule. MACC clients are
encouraged by MACC staff members to attend the sessions as a
proven and valuable resource in the long-term treatment of
alcoholism. See Defs.' Proposed Facts, at 23-24. However,
attendance at the AA meetings is not mandatory, and the meetings
are not supervised, conducted or paid for by the MACC,*fn4 EHG,
OASAS, or the State of New York. See id.
The MACC day room, located in Wallach Hall, is accessible 24
hours a day. AA literature, including the Big Book, Daily
Reflections, and pamphlets containing the Twelve Steps, is
available there. See Stipulated Facts, at 4; see also Pl.'s
Rule 56.1 Stmt., ¶ 15.
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiff originally pleaded state and federal claims, sounding
in the First Amendment and public nuisance law, against a number
of state, municipal, corporate and individual defendants. In a
series of Orders, The Hon. Barbara S. Jones declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed
DeStefano's suit as against several of the original defendants,
leaving only the State and the three individual state employees
(collectively, the "Defendants") before this Court. In March
1998, Plaintiff moved, and the Defendants cross-moved, for
summary judgment on Plaintiff's sole remaining claim: that the
State's financial support of the MACC violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because MACC staff members
encourage or coerce clients to involve themselves in AA and
Twelve Step-related activities — AA being a program which the
Second Circuit and the New York State Court of Appeals have held
constitutes religious exercise for Establishment Clause purposes.
See Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068,
1075 (2d Cir. 1996); Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 683,
649 N.Y.S.2d
903, 908, 673 N.E.2d 98 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054,
117 S.Ct. 681, 136 L.Ed.2d 607 (1997). The case was later
transferred to me with these motions still pending.
In his motion papers, Plaintiff originally pressed two
alternative, but overlapping, theories of liability. First, he
asserted that State funding of a program that offers its
participants access to AA — even on a voluntary basis — is per
se unconstitutional, government-supported, religious
indoctrination. In the alternative, he argued that State-funded
MACC counselors directly compel the unusually susceptible MACC
clients ("substance abuser[s] in crisis")*fn5 to accept theistic
Twelve Step doctrine and to participate in AA counseling, thus
violating the Establishment Clause.*fn6 Defendants denied using
coercion, but did not dispute that employees at MACC encourage
the patients there to participate in the Twelve Step methodology
of AA. Indeed, Defendants concede that "[MACC] clients are
`strongly' urged to attend AA programs as a very effective means
of treatment." Defs.' Motion Br., at 14.
After reviewing the motion papers, I concluded that the only
disputed issue of fact that needed to be resolved was whether the
State, through MACC, coerces its clients to participate in AA,
or whether clients have a reasonable, voluntary alternative to
religious activity. See 6/21/99 Order. I instructed the
parties, in accordance with this determination, to prepare for a
trial on August 2, 1999 to resolve the limited question of
coercion. See id. That trial proved unnecessary because
Plaintiff arrived on August 2, 1999 and offered — notwithstanding
his previous contrary submissions — to stipulate that the MACC
has not, and does not, compel its clients, psychologically or
otherwise, to participate in AA programs, Twelve Step counseling,
or any other religious activity of any kind. See Trial Tr., at
18-20. Rather, Plaintiff disavowed all allegations of coercion,
including those submitted in sworn statements to the Court,
labeling them elements of a "separate backup argument" he now
wishes to abandon. See Trial Tr., at 22. In so doing, Plaintiff
explicitly limited himself to asserting that State funding of a
facility like MACC (where Defendants concede that the clients —
all of whom are voluntarily present, none of whom is there at the
State's behest — are encouraged to participate in AA) is per se
unconstitutional. See Trial Tr., at 17.
1. Law of the Case Does Not Wholly Bar an Inquiry Into
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