On December 14 and 22, 1998, the Panel issued the final
On February 12, 1999, Petitioners wrote to the Panel,
complaining that the Panel had ruled without holding a hearing —
despite Petitioners' letter of October 20, 1998 — and requesting
that the Panel "reopen" the proceedings. On February 17, 1999,
the chairman of the Panel replied to Petitioners that he "never
received the faxes of October 9 and 20." The chairman also noted
that follow-up hard copies were not received, nor were copies
sent to the two other arbitrators on the Panel. Finally, the
chairman stated that the Panel was "functus officio and by its
own power . . . unable to reopen the record or modify the
On March 11, 1999, Petitioners moved this court to vacate or
modify the arbitration awards. Respondent, which had previously
filed a petition in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida to confirm the arbitration awards,
cross-moved to confirm the awards or to transfer the action to
the Southern District of Florida.
By this Court's order of July 21, 1999, Petitioners' motion to
vacate or modify the arbitration awards was denied, Respondent's
motion to transfer was denied and Respondent's motion to confirm
the arbitration awards was granted.
Petitioners filed the instant motion on August 12, 1999.
Opposition and reply papers were received through August 27,
1999, at which time the motion was deemed fully submitted.
I. The Standard for a Motion for Reconsideration
Petitioners have moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rule
59(e) and Local Rule 6.3. The standards governing those rules are
identical. See Candelaria v. Coughlin, 155 F.R.D. 486, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Morser v. AT&T Info. Systems, 715 F. Supp. 516,
517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
To prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e),
the movant must present "[factual] matters or controlling
decisions the court overlooked that might materially have
influenced its earlier decision." Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A.,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 460, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Morser,
715 F. Supp. at 517. Alternatively, the movant must demonstrate
"the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice." Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. American Marketing
Enterprises, Inc., 97 Civ. 3510(HB), 1999 WL 527989, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1999) (quoting Morales v. Quintiles
Transnational Corp., 25 F. Supp.2d 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
These criteria are strictly construed against the moving party so
as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been
considered fully by the court. See Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs.,
153 F.R.D. 60, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The motion is not a vehicle for "presenting the case under new
theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking
a `second bite at the apple.'" Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp.,
156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, the decision to grant or
deny a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion
of the district court. See Schaffer v. Soros, No. 92 Civ.
1233(LMM), 1994 WL 592891 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.31, 1994) (citing
McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983)).
II. Petitioners Have Not Presented Factual Matters
Materially Influencing the Court's Previous Decision
Petitioners contend that although this Court in its prior
opinion addressed the possibility that the arbitrators refused to
hold hearings, this Court overlooked Plaintiff's alternative
contention that the arbitrators "inadvertently neglected to hold