II. Wrongful Termination Claim
Under Title VII, "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . . . to discharge any individual, . . .
becuse of such individual's race, color, . . . or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. To establish a prima facie
claim of wrongful termination under this statute, as well as
under New York State Executive Law § 296, a plaintiff must
show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the employment position; (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See McLee v.
Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); Viola v.
Philips Med. Sys., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)); Song v. Ives Labs., 957 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d
Cir. 1992) (New York State law). A plaintiff alleging such
discrimination must do more than recite conclusory assertions;
"[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss [a claim based on
discrimination], the plaintiff must specifically allege the
events claimed to constitute intentional discrimination as well
as circumstances giving rise to a plausible inference of 
discriminatory intent [based on national origin]." Yusuf v.
Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1994). Therefore,
"`a complaint consisting of nothing more than naked assertions,
and setting forth no facts upon which a court could find a
violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6).'" Id. at 713-14 (quoting Martin v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
In this action, Farrell does not allege any facts that would
connect her national origin with her termination such that the
Court could plausibly infer discriminatory intent. Notably, she
does not allege that her employer was aware of her national
origin. Moreover, Farrell does not allege that she was qualified
for the job. Thus, she has not pleaded a prima facie case of
wrongful termination based on discrimination.
III. Sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 Claims
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must
allege facts in support of the following elements: "(1) the
plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the
discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated
in the statute (i.e., make and enforce contracts, sue and be
sued, give evidence, etc.)."*fn5 Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993). To state
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts in
support of the following elements: that (1) the challenged
conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was
acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the
plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the
United States. See Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.
1999) (citing Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d
Cir. 1993)). "The four elements of a [42 U.S.C.] § 1985(3) claim
are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)
whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or
deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States." Id.
at 1087-88 (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049,
In bringing a §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985 claim against a
municipality, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality
implemented and adopted a "policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision" or established or acquiesced in a custom
that caused the unconstitutional activity. Barrett v. Harwood,
189 F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018,
56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)) (§ 1983 claim); see Jett v. Dallas Indep.
School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d
598 (1989) (§ 1981 claim); Philippeaux v. North Cen. Bronx
Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 640, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (§ 1985 claim).
Moreover, a civil rights complaint "must contain specific
allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of
constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than
broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to
state a claim under" §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985. Alfaro Motors, Inc.
v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal citations
omitted) (§ 1983 claim); see Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561,
572-73 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (as to a § 1981 claim, "[w]hile
the pleading standard is a liberal one, bald assertions and
conclusions of law will not suffice"); Boddie v. Schnieder,
105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (as to a § 1985 claim, "a complaint
containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations of
conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot
withstand a motion to dismiss").
With regard to her §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims, Farrell has
failed to allege any specific facts upon which the Court could
conclude that there was a connection between her national origin
and the termination of her employment. As noted above, her
national origin was mentioned only once in the complaint and was
not connected to any specific actions taken by CWA. In
particular, she has failed to allege that the CWA implemented and
adopted a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision or
established or acquiesced in a custom that caused any
unconstitutional activity. With regard to her § 1981 claim, she
has not alleged that CWA interfered with any of the activities
protected by the statute. With regard to her § 1983 claim, she
has failed to allege that she was deprived of any constitutional
right, and with regard to her § 1985 claim, she has failed to
allege the existence of a conspiracy, or that the defendant
furthered a conspiracy.
The district court must normally afford a pro se plaintiff an
opportunity to amend her complaint before dismissing it. See
Platsky v. Central Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.
1991) (district court should give pro se plaintiff the
opportunity to amend the complaint to "set out, with
particularity and specificity, the actual harms  suffered as a
result of the defendant['s] clearly defined acts" before
dismissing action). Therefore, the Court will grant Farrell an
opportunity to amend her complaint to add, if possible: (1)
sufficient facts to support the claims she has already raised in
the complaint, (2) the claims she has attempted to raise in her
memoranda, and (3) any other causes of action she may have in
relation to the termination of her employment.
Accordingly, the Court grants CWA's motion and dismisses the
complaint in its entirety, without prejudice to Farrell filing an
amended complaint on or before January 20, 2000.