challenge exists on the basis of the municipal law. Nor does the
practical effect of the statute and regulations serve to control conduct
outside New York State or New York City. This conclusion is further
validated when Resource's independent decision to accept the City's
contractual conditions is injected into the analysis. Resource simply
made a business decision that it was more lucrative for it to enter the
New York City market than to maintain its relationship with Plaintiffs in
Nassau and Suffolk counties. Far from controlling Resource's conduct
outside of New York City, Resource chose to reject the contract with
Plaintiffs in exchange for entry into the apparently lucrative New York
City trade waste market. It is apparent that had Resource simply rejected
the conditions in paragraph eight of the Licensing Order, there would be
As far at the third part of the Healy analysis, the Court is hard
pressed to see how the challenged actions would interact with the laws and
regulations of other States or municipalities in a way that would offend
the Commerce Clause. [T]he Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent
legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime
into the jurisdiction of another State." Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37, 109
S.Ct. 2491. Nothing similar to this prohibition has occurred here.
Plaintiffs cannot be granted relief under the Healy case.
Finally. Edgar MITE Corp., a plurality decision of the Supreme Court,
does not change the result. In MITE, an Illinois state securities law was
challenged as violative of the Commerce Clause. MITE, 457 U.S. at
626-27, 102 S.Ct. 2629. The Court succinctly divided its Commerce Clause
analysis into two prongs. First, the Court pointed out that "[a] state
statute must be upheld if it "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'" Id. at 640, 102
S.Ct. 2629 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. 844) (internal
ellipses omitted). Second, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause
"permits only incidental regulation of interstate commerce by the States;
direct regulation is prohibited." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in
Under either prong of this analysis, Plaintiffs cannot succeed. First,
there is no doubt that Local Law 42 is administered evenhandedly.
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to the contrary. Second, the goal
of the law and regulations is undoubtedly a legitimate public concern.
See SRI, 107 F.3d at 994 ("the law has a legitimate purpose . . . [of]
eradicating the vestiges of criminal control" of the carting industry).
Third, the effect of the law on interstate commerce, if any, is
negligible to the point of being meaningless. Moreover, assuming that a
burden on commerce existed, the burden is not "clearly excessive" in
relation to the impressive local benefits of the law. See id. at 989,
Plaintiffs also fail under the second prong of the MITE analysis. There
is no legitimate argument that the challenged law or regulations
"directly regulate" interstate commerce. Instead, the law regulates a
specific industry within New York City, and does so by insulating that
industry from the effects and influence of organized crime. There is no
violation of the Commerce Clause here, and Plaintiffs' reliance on MITE
Because the Plaintiff are not likely to succeed on the merits of the
Commerce Clause claim, injunctive relief is not available. Moreover,
because there are no genuine issues of material fact on the present
record regarding this claim, the City Defendants' motion for summary
judgment is granted.
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs' application for a
is DENIED. The City defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,
and all claims against the City Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice.
The parties are directed to contact Magistrate Judge Orenstein within
ten days of receipt of this Memorandum and Order to schedule a status
conference regarding the remaining claims in this matter.