interpretation of [the] Agreement." The arbitrator is compensated
by the National Mediation Board.
(3) NYSDHR and EEOC Proceedings
Plaintiff filed a charge of age and disability discrimination
based on Metro-North's failure to promote him with the New York
State Division of Human Rights ("DHR") and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on September 16, 1998.
By letter dated December 2, 1998, Plaintiff's counsel requested
a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. By letter dated January 27,
1999, the United States Department of Justice notified Plaintiff
that the EEOC had determined that it would "not be able to
investigate and conciliate the charge within 180 days," and
granted Plaintiff's request for a right to sue, authorizing him
to file suit under the ADA within 90 days.
By letter dated February 5, 1999, Plaintiff's counsel requested
that the DHR dismiss the DHR charge in light of his request for a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The DHR granted Plaintiff's
request on the ground of administrative convenience.
(4) The Present Action
Plaintiff filed the present action on April 27, 1999. Plaintiff
claims that the MTA was motivated in whole or in part by his age
in failing to promote him to sergeant. Plaintiff also contends
that the Union ignored his complaints and grievances and refused
to insist that the MTA promote him because of his age, and, after
1991, because of his disability. He further asserts that the
Union Defendants agreed with Metro-North not to promote him
because of his age and disability.
Plaintiff brings claims under (1) the ADA; (2) the ADEA; (3)
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1981a; and (4) NYHRL § 296. Plaintiff also
seeks leave of court to amend his complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a) by adding disparate impact claims against the MTA.
Defendants raise a number of arguments. The MTA contends that
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
claims because (1) Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative
remedies; (2) Plaintiff's discrimination claims are preempted by
the federal Railway Labor Act; and (3) each of Plaintiff's claims
is untimely. The MTA further argues that the denial of training
on the Glock pistol does not amount to adverse employment action
and therefore does not support a discrimination claim.
The Union Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's claims are
untimely, and further assert that (1) Plaintiff has failed to
adduce evidence of age of disability discrimination by the Union
or Robert Novy individually; (2) Defendant Novy cannot be liable
as an individual under any of Plaintiff's claims; and (3) the
ADEA does not permit the recovery of money damages against a
labor organization such as the PBA.
For the reasons that follow, I agree with the MTA Defendants'
argument that Plaintiff's claims against them are preempted, and
grant summary judgment as to them. Summary judgment is also
granted to Defendant Robert Novy on Plaintiff's ADA and ADEA
claims against him individually. Summary judgment is denied,
however, as to the remaining claims against the Union Defendants,
in light of the triable issues surrounding the timeliness of
Plaintiff's claims against them. Finally, I deny as futile
Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if, based
on the record as a whole, a reasonable jury could find in favor
of the non-movant. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106
S.Ct. 2505. In making its determination, the court must resolve
all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-movant. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To defeat
summary judgment, the non-moving party must go beyond the
pleadings and "must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct.
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Moreover, where a case turns on the intent of the defendant, as
employment discrimination claims do, a "trial court must be
cautious about granting summary judgment." Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Services Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d
(1) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Metro-North argues first that this Court lacks jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's claims, because the EEOC issued Plaintiff a
right-to-sue letter before the expiration 180-day investigation
period provided under the ADA. Metro-North contends that a
discrimination plaintiff is barred from bringing an action in
federal court prior to the expiration of the 180-day period. I
reject this argument.
The ADA incorporates by reference the procedural requirements
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Title VII
provides in pertinent part:
If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is
dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred
and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . .
the Commission has not filed a civil action . . . or
the Commission has not entered into a conciliation
agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party,
the Commission . . . shall so notify the person
aggrieved and within 90 days after giving such notice
a civil action may be brought against the respondent
named in the charge. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).