evidence and perjured testimony against them. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defendants engaged in this conspiracy in an attempt
to violate their constitutional right to be free from malicious
(a) Absolute Witness Immunity
Zwack, Cybulski, and Madden first argue that this claim should be
dismissed against them under the doctrine of absolute witness immunity
discussed above. Absolute witness immunity, however, does not extend to
allegations of extra judicial conspiracy between witnesses and the
prosecutor or other witnesses. See San Filipo, 737 F.2d 254; see also
Taylor v. Hansen, 731 F. Supp. 72 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (McCurn, J.).
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis is denied.
Defendant Ehring also seeks dismissal on immunity grounds. As discussed
above, although the allegations of conspiracy do not negate prosecutorial
immunity, in this case it is not clear that Ehring was acting within his
prosecutorial capacity when he engaged in the complained of conduct.
Thus, at this juncture, the Court cannot determine whether prosecutorial
immunity bars this claim.
(c) The Merits
In order to state a claim for of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983,
Plaintiffs must establish both that Defendants acted in a willful
manner, culminating in an agreement, understanding, or `meeting of the
minds' intended to deprive them of their constitutional rights and that
Plaintiffs constitutional rights were actually violated. See Birnbaum v.
Trussel, 371 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1996) ("If the appellees conspire to
and did in fact deprive [plaintiff] of this right, they violated Section
1983."); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996); Quinn v. City of Johnstown,
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1998) ("A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 conspiracy
claim must prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right.")
(citation omitted), aff'd, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1999); Harmer v. City of
Lockport, 2000 WL 210201, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2000) ("However, as
plaintiff fails to demonstrate that defendants violated his rights under
the United States Constitution, the conspiracy claims will therefore be
dismissed."); Duff v. Coughlin, 794 F. Supp. 521, 525 (S.D.N.Y., 1992)
(actual violation necessary for Section 1983 conspiracy claim); Rosenfeld
v. Sample, 1986 WL 13940, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1986), aff'd,
819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Here, this Court finds that the facts
alleged fail to assert any actual violation of Constitutional rights. The
plaintiff has therefore failed to assert adequately a violation of Section
1983 [based on a conspiracy]."). Assuming without deciding that the
record supports a finding that Defendants intended to deprive Plaintiffs
of their constitutional rights, agreed to do this, and took overt actions
in furtherance of their illicit agreements, Plaintiffs' claims must be
dismissed. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that
Defendants' actions deprived them of any constitutional rights and,
thus, their Section 1983 conspiracy claim must fail. See, e.g., Quinn,
1998 WL 187404, at *5 ("Insofar as the claim alleges a conspiracy to
violate Quinn's First Amendment rights, it fails because Quinn fails to
prove the underlying First Amendment violation. . . ."). Accordingly,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.
4. Remaining Claims
The Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs' federal claims on their
merits. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether the County
is liable pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), or whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Moreover, because there are no longer federal claims in this
case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Minzer v. Keegan,
218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000)
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
granted and the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED