in a discriminatory manner, to Sergeant Michelle Grabley ("Grabley"),
who was in charge of the Women's Law Enforcement Association. On
April 10, 1995, Minott visited the offices of the EEOC prior to her
termination and spoke with an EEOC employee. Minott told Grabley
prior to her termination that she was going to file a charge with
the EEOC. She did not tell anyone else within the Port Authority.
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
motion for summary judgment may be granted when "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." The Second Circuit has repeatedly noted
that "as a general rule, all ambiguities and inferences to be drawn from
the underlying facts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing
the motion, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue for
trial should be resolved against the moving party." Brady v. Town of
Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n. 2 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1304 (2d Cir. 1995); Burrell v. City
Univ., 894 F. Supp. 750, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). If, when viewing the
evidence produced in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is
no genuine issue of material fact, then the entry of summary judgment is
appropriate. See Burrell, 894 F. Supp. at 758 (citing Binder v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Materiality is defined by the governing substantive law. "Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[T]he mere
existence of factual issues — where those issues are not material
to the claims before the court — will not suffice to defeat a
motion for summary judgment." Quarles v. General Motors Corp.,
758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985).
For a dispute to be genuine, there must be more than "metaphysical
doubt." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50
Additional considerations factor into a summary judgment motion in an
employment discrimination action. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential
Services, L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Montana v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1989); Meiri v.
Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Because writings directly
supporting a claim of intentional discrimination are rarely, if ever,
found among an employer's documents, a trial court must be particularly
cautious about granting summary judgment when the employer's intent is at
issue. Affidavits and depositions must be scrutinized for circumstantial
evidence which, if believed, would show discrimination. See Gallo, 22
F.3d at 1224. This does not suggest, however, that summary judgment is
never appropriate in an employment discrimination action. The Second
Circuit has made clear that the "impression that summary judgment is
unavailable to defendants in discrimination cases is unsupportable."
McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 38 F.3d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1994); see Meiri, 759 F.2d
Where no evidence exists or only conclusory allegations of
discrimination have been offered to suggest that an employer's motives
are improper, summary judgment may be appropriate. See Meiri, 759 F.2d at
998; see also Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir.
1994). After all, a party seeking to defeat a summary judgment motion
cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations or denials," but rather
must set forth "`concrete particulars'" showing that a trial is
needed. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Deloach, 708 F. Supp. 1371,
1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart
Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of facts cannot
overcome the motion. See Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir.
1995); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986). The
responding party "must show the existence of a disputed material fact in
light of the substantive law." Peer Int'l Corp. v. Luna Records, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 560, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In the absence of any disputed
material fact, summary judgment is appropriate.
II. The Legal Standards Governing Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race . . . [or]
sex . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (the "PDA") provides that the prohibition of sex-based employment
discrimination applies with equal force to discrimination on the basis of
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," and "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The analysis required for a pregnancy
discrimination claim is the same as the analysis used in other Title VII
sex discrimination suits. See Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc.,
33 F.3d 1308, 1312-12 (11th Cir. 1994).
The "ultimate issue" in any employment discrimination case is "whether
the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that the adverse employment
decision was motivated at least in part by an `impermissible reason.'"
Stratton v. Department for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir. 1997).
The basic framework for Title VII discrimination claims is the three-step
burden shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Under McDonnell, the plaintiff has the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful race
discrimination by showing that the plaintiff is: (1) a member of a
protected class, (2) who was qualified for her position, (3) who suffered
an adverse employment action, (4) under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; Austin v.
Ford Models, Inc., 149 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 1998); see also St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). The requirements for
establishing a prima facie case are not onerous. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at
506; Austin, 149 F.3d at 152.
If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for
the adverse employment decision. See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; Austin,
149 F.3d at 153; Woroski, 31 F.3d at 108. "This burden is one of
production, not persuasion." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
Once the employer articulates such a purpose, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
"employer's proffered reasons are shown to be a pretext for
discrimination." Austin, 149 F.3d at 153 (citations omitted). The
presumption of discrimination "drops out of the picture" once the
defendant meets its burden of production. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106
(quoting St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).
However, the trier of fact may consider the evidence establishing the
plaintiff's prima facie case "and inferences properly drawn
therefrom" in determining whether the defendant's explanation is
pretextual. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 255, n. 10). Indeed, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined
with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted
justification is false, may permit a jury to find intentional
discrimination. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct at 2108-09.
Title VII also provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . .
. because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful practice by this
subchapter. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). As the Second Circuit has
noted, "[t]he objective of this section is obviously to forbid an
employer from retaliating against an employee because of the latter's
opposition to an unlawful employment practice." Manoharan v. Columbia
Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988).
To establish a claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII, a plaintiff
need not prove that her discrimination claim was valid in the first
instance. See Sumner v. United States Postal Co., 899 F.2d 203, 208-09
(2d. Cir. 1990).
Title VII defines protected activities as (1) an employee's opposition
to any activity which is prohibited by Title VII, or (2) an employee's
participation in any Title VII investigation or proceeding. See Gilani v.
National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., No. 96 CV 8070, 1997 WL
473383, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1997) (citing Williams v. Boorstein,
663 F.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires a showing
that (1) the employee was engaged in an activity protected under Title
VII; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff's participation in the
protected activity; (3) there was an employment action that disadvantaged
the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
employee's protected activity and the adverse action taken by the
employer. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308; Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc.,
983 F.2d 1204, 1213 (2d Cir. 1993); Burrell, 894 F.
Supp. at 760. The requisite causal connection may be established
"indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely
followed in time by the adverse action." Manoharan, 842 F.2d at 593
(citing Davis v. State Univ. of New York, 802 F.2d 638,
642 (2d Cir. 1986)).
If a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308. If the defendant carries this
burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were
merely a pretext for retaliation. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308.
III. The Sex Discrimination Claim
A. There Are No Triable Issues Of Fact With Respect To Minott's
Unlawful Termination Claim
Minott easily satisfies the first three prongs of the McDonnell test.
First, she was a member of a protected class, namely, she is a woman and
she was pregnant. Second, she was qualified for her position, as
evidenced by her performance evaluations. Third, she suffered an adverse
employment action, namely, termination.
With respect to the fourth prong, that is, whether the circumstances
give rise to an inference of discrimination, Minott relies on what she
alleges was differential treatment of individuals who were
similarly-situated as to their absenteeism, but who were not female and
not pregnant. Specifically, she points to the fact that other members of
her recruit class had a greater number of total days absent prior to the
end of their probationary period and yet were not disciplined or
terminated on this basis.
Although as discussed below the evidence as to Minott's differential
is very weak, it will be assumed arguendo that Minott has met
the de minimis burden necessary to state a prima facie case. See Cronin
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995); Velasquez v.
Goldwater Mem'l Hosp., 88 F. Supp.2d 257, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also
Griffin v. Ambika Corp., 103 F. Supp.2d 297, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(assuming prima facie burden met and noting that Reeves decision
eliminates potential distinction between evidence used to meet prima
facie burden and evidence used to show pretext). The Port Authority has
articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory motivation behind Minott's
termination, namely, that she was fired based on her well-documented
absenteeism. Thus, the burden shifts back to Minott to demonstrate that
the proffered non-discriminatory reason was merely a pretext for
Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act do not protect a
pregnant employee from being discharged for absenteeism even if her
absence was due to pregnancy or complications of pregnancy, unless other
employees are not held to the same attendance standards. See Troupe v.
May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); Fisher v. Vassar
College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1448 (1995) reheard on banc on other grounds,
114 F.3d 1332, abrogated on other grounds by Reeves, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Reilly
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 93 Civ. 7317, 1996 WL 665620, at *8
(S.D.N Y Nov. 15, 1996).
Minott contends that a comparison between her absenteeism record and
Ashton, Dubiel, Fasano, and Way shows disparate treatment. However, in
the case of three of those officers the comparison is inapposite because
their absences were due primarily to work-related injuries which were
classified as exempt for purposes of absenteeism-related discipline.
Thus, these officers' absences were not being treated more leniently than
were Minott's absences. Rather, they were not subject to discipline under
a policy applicable to all officers, including Minott.
In the case of Officer Way, however, the absences were not
work-related. Way was absent on three occasions, including two occasions
with a nine-month period totaling 64 days. Thus, Way was absent on fewer
occasions than was Minott, but for a larger total number of days. Way was
not disciplined for his absences even though he could have been according
to the Stage I discipline provision, because he was absent on two
non-exempt occasions of absence in a consecutive nine-month period for
more than a total of 18 days.
Nonetheless, Minott's absence record was more severe than all of the
other officers in her class, including Way, because she was the only one
who failed to meet two of the absenteeism standards prior to the
conclusion of her probationary year. One of these standards is the Sick
Leave Policy under the Union Contract, according to which an officer who
is absent on five or more separate occasions in a period of twelve months
is classified as "Below Standard." Minott's absence record fell within
this category. The other standard is the Stage I discipline provision.
Although Way was treated more favorably than Minott, in that he could
have been but was not charged with Stage I discipline, he still only
failed to meet one standard rather than two.*fn2 Thus, Minott's record
was more severe than the records
of all the other members of her recruit class.
Minott also contends that her absences were treated differentially in
that her work-related injury absences were counted against her, while
those of the male officers were classified as exempt. However, Minott
fails to provide any information concerning her two work-related absences
from which a fact finder could determine whether or not the exemption
policy was applied in a non-uniform manner. The evidence does show that
on one occasion Minott had an absence that was initially classified as
exempt and then within weeks of her termination was reclassified as
non-exempt. However, although this timing is suspect, neither the
memorandum recommending her termination nor the materials upon which that
memorandum relies reference this absence.*fn3 Thus, the timing of the
reclassification of this absence as non-exempt does not support an
inference of discriminatory intent as to Minott's termination.
Finally, Minott points to a September, 1995 letter by the EEOC to the
Port Authority notifying it of the EEOC's determination that there was
reasonable cause to believe that the Port Authority was discriminating
against pregnant female employees in the administration of its sick leave
policy. That determination did not arise out of Minott's case, however,
nor did it involve the same disciplinary provisions applied to her
absenteeism. Rather, that determination was made in relation to charges
brought by the Women's Law Enforcement Association with respect to the
Port Authority's administration of its vacation forfeiture policy.
Although the matters dealt with in the EEOC complaint were
closely-related as to their subject, this is not sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Port Authority's
asserted reason for firing Minott was pretextual. In sum, drawing all
inferences in favor of Minott, Minott has failed to set forth sufficient
evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her termination
was motivated by discriminatory intent relating to her sex/pregnancy.
Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
B. Minott's Claims For Events Occurring Before November 1, 1994
A Title VII plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180
days of when she knew or had reason to know of the alleged unlawful
employment action or, if she has already filed a charge with the relevant
state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of that action.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703-04
(2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
80 F.3d 708, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1996). If a plaintiff fails to meet the
applicable statute of limitations her claim will not be actionable in
federal court. See Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 703-04. In this case, the
applicable time period is 180 days because neither the New York nor New
Jersey state anti-discrimination agencies have jurisdiction over the Port
Authority. See DeZaio v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
205 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (Port Authority employee subject to 180-day
EEOC filing rule because neither New York anti-discrimination law nor New
York State Division of Human Rights' jurisdiction extends to Port
Authority); King v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 106 F.3d 385 (3d
Cir. 1996), aff'g 909 F. Supp. 938, 945
(D.N.J. 1995) (New Jersey anti-discrimination law does not apply
to Port Authority).
There is a continuing-violation exception to the statute of limitations
which "extends the limitations period for all claims of discriminatory
acts committed under an ongoing policy of discrimination even if those
acts, standing alone, would have been barred by the state of limitations."
Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A continuing violation
may be found "where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory
policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of
discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for
so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice." Cornwell,
23 F.3d at 704.
Minott filed a charge with the New York office of the EEOC on May 1,
1995, so that the 180-day period began on November 1, 1994. Thus, only
events occurring after November 1, 1994 are actionable under Title VII,
absent application of the continuing-violation exception.
All of the alleged incidents of discrimination during Minott's training
at the Police Academy occurred before November 1, 1994. The continuing
violation exception does not apply to these events because she was not
subjected to an ongoing and consistent policy of adverse conduct by the
Port Authority during that time. On the contrary, she completed her
course of study at the Police Academy, was hired by the Port Authority,
and was assigned to a field command as a probationary police
officer.*fn4 Therefore, the only event for which she may bring a claim
of gender discrimination is her termination.
C. There Is No Triable Issue Of Fact With Respect
To Minott's Hostile Work Environment Claim Minott contends that she was
subjected to a hostile work environment based on her gender and race.
This contention is based on her allegations concerning certain comments
made to her or in her presence, the fact that she was told her pants were
not dark enough even though they were purchased at an authorized uniform
store, the fact that she and other women cadets were required to remove
their shirts in the common waiting room, which was not blocked to males,
to receive a vaccination, and the racially offensive joke which was left
in her mailbox.
An employer will be liable under Title VII for permitting a
discriminatory hostile work environment, that is, a "workplace [that is]
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . .
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal references omitted); see
Richardson v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426,
436 (2d. Cir. 1999). "The incidents must be more than episodic; they must
be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive."
Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997). Conduct
that is "merely offensive, unprofessional or childish is not
discriminatory conduct proscribed by Title VII." Cosgrove v. Federal Home
Loan Bank of N.Y., No. 90 Civ. 6455, 1999 WL 163218, at *20 (S.D.N Y
Mar. 23, 1999).
Factors to be considered when determining whether an environment is
hostile or abusive include: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
As with a Title VII claim alleging a discriminatory adverse employment
decision, a plaintiff in a hostile environment
case must demonstrate that there are circumstances giving rise
to an inference of discriminatory intent behind the abusive conduct.
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
With the exception of the racially offensive joke Minott found in her
mailbox, all of the allegedly comments and conduct occurred prior to
November 1, 1994. As explained above, these incidents are not actionable
because they do not fall within the continuing violation exception.
Moreover, even if they were actionable, they were not sufficiently severe
to rise to the level of a Title VII violation. With respect to the
racially offensive joke, the commanding officer at the Port Authority
promptly took appropriate corrective action by distributing a memorandum
to all staff condemning the act. Nor is there any evidence that
supervisory personnel were involved in distributing the joke. Therefore,
there is no triable issue of material fact with respect to Minott's
hostile work environment claim, and that claim will be dismissed.
D. There Is No Triable Issue Of Fact With Respect
To Minott's Retaliation Claim In order to make out a primafacie case of
retaliation, as explained above, Minott must show that: she was engaged
in a protected activity; her employer was aware of her activity; she was
subject to an adverse employment action; and there was a causal
connection between her protected activity and the adverse action. See
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308.
Protected activity includes participation in a Title VII investigation
and proceeding as well as opposition to an employment practice that is
unlawful under Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Sumner, 899 F.2d
at 208-09. Informal as well as formal complaints, including complaints to
management, constitute protected oppositional activity. See Sumner, 899
F.2d at 209.
Minott has not made a sufficient showing as to her retaliation claim.
First, although Minott did complain informally to her superiors while she
was at the Police Academy, she suffered no adverse employment action as a
result. On the contrary, she completed her training and was hired by the
Port Authority. Second, although Minott visited the offices of the EEOC
prior to her termination, on April 10, 1995, she had made no showing that
anyone involved in the decision to terminate her in April 1995 was aware
that she had taken any steps towards filing a complaint with the EEOC.
Minott herself says that the only person she told was the officer in
charge of the Women's Law Enforcement Association. Therefore, she has not
made a showing from which a reasonable jury could conclude that her
employer was aware of her activity and that there was a causal connection
between that activity and her termination.
IV. The Race Discrimination Claim
Minott has raised no triable issue of fact with respect to her race
discrimination claim. First, the comments by Verdino were made during her
Police Academy training and are therefore time-barred. In any event, they
do not rise to the level of a Title VII violation since they resulted in
no adverse employment action. The commanding officer at the Bus Terminal
responded to the circulation of the racially discriminatory joke by
issuing a memorandum condemning it. Nor is there any evidence that
supervisory personnel had anything to do with the distribution of the
joke. Therefore, this incident does not support a claim for racial
discrimination by the Port Authority, and that claim will be dismissed.
V. The ADA Claim
Minott alleges that the Port Authority violated the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of a person's
disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), by discriminating against her
on the basis her pregnancy. In her complaint to the EEOC, however, Minott
did not allege that she had suffered disability-related discrimination.
Although the Port Authority has not challenged Minott's ADA claim on this
basis, this discrepancy raises a question as to whether Minott has met
the condition precedent of filing a complaint with the EEOC with respect
to her ADA claim.
A district court may consider "those claims `reasonably related to the
allegations in the [plaintiff's EEOC] complaint.'" Gomes v. Avco Corp.,
964 F.2d 1330, 1334 (2d Cir. 1992) (modification in original), quoting
Kirkland v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 622 F.2d 1066, 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam). If the "scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be
expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination" would encompass the
claim, then that claim is reasonably related to the EEOC complaint. Id.;
see Shull v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8552, 1997 WL 289460, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1997).
Neither party has cited any authority regarding the question of whether
a plaintiff may bring an ADA suit based on the same events which were the
basis of a gender and race discrimination complaint filed with the EEOC.
However, assuming arguendo that this Court could consider Minott's ADA
claim, that claim must be dismissed as a matter of law because Minott has
not shown that she suffered from a disability within the meaning of the
Every court to consider the question of whether pregnancy in and of
itself is a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA has concluded that
it is not.*fn5 See Conley v. United Parcel Service, 88 F. Supp.2d 16,
19; Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc. and M.S.N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp.2d 305, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing cases). The reasoning of those courts is adopted
herein. Minott did suffer complications resulting from her pregnancy,
namely, a miscarriage. However, courts have held only in extremely rare
circumstances that complications arising from pregnancy constitute a
disability under the ADA. See Conley, 88 F. Supp.2d at 19 (citing cases).
Minott has made no showing as to why her miscarriage should be considered
a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See id. (miscarriage is not
per se disability under ADA). Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary
judgment is granted.
It is so ordered.