v. City of Mt. Vernon, 984 F. Supp. 748, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Accordingly, unless this presumption is rebutted by plaintiff,
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct
in executing the warrants on December 9, 1997.
In order to overcome this presumption of objective
reasonableness, plaintiff must show that Inv. Kelly knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly made false statements or omitted
material facts from the affidavits upon which Poestenkill Town
Justice Hoffman relied in finding probable cause to issue and
amend the search warrants on December 9, 1997. Velardi v.
Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994); Lewis, 984 F. Supp. at
754. Plaintiff has offered no evidence of false statements or
omitted material facts in her opposition to the instant motion.
Instead, plaintiff seeks to infer from the scope of the initial
warrant that it was unreasonable for Inv. Kelly to seek a warrant
to search for the tool used to remove the VIN tag. In other
words, his underlying motive must have been to violate her
constitutional rights. Plaintiff's argument is misplaced.
Where, as here, a neutral and detached magistrate has found
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the
subjective motives of the police officers executing the warrant
are simply not relevant. In evaluating the reasonableness of
police conduct under the Fourth Amendment, the objective
circumstances must be viewed rather than an officer's subjective
motivation. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,
138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (subjective intent does
not make Fourth Amendment action unconstitutional "as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.");
Bradway v. Gonzales, 26 F.3d 313, 319 (2d Cir. 1994) ("In
evaluating the legitimacy of police conduct under the Fourth
Amendment, we look to objective circumstances rather than an
officer's subjective motivation."). Therefore, plaintiff's
attempt to overcome the presumption of objective reasonableness
based on Inv. Kelly's alleged subjective motivation is
Accordingly, because reasonable officers could disagree as to
the legality of the civil standby on December 6, 1997, and
because plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness of the December 9, 1997 searches and arrests which
flowed from the issuance of a warrant and an amended warrant by a
neutral magistrate, Tpr. Ogden and Inv. Kelly are entitled to
qualified immunity for their conduct in this case. Plaintiff's §
1983 claims must be dismissed.
B. Section 1985 Claims
Plaintiff's § 1985 claims must also be dismissed. Section 1985
does not provide a remedy for conspiracies that are not based on
"some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02, 91 S.Ct.
1790. See also New York State National Organization for Women,
886 F.2d at 1358; Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (5th
Cir. 1979); Tufano v. One Toms Point Lane Corp., 64 F. Supp.2d 119,
124 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Plaintiff has not, nor can she,
demonstrated that any such animus motivated the remaining
defendants in this case.
After careful consideration of the objections and submissions
of the parties, the relevant parts of the record, and the
applicable law, it is hereby
1. Defendants John J. Ogden, Jr. and Gary Kelly's motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED; and
2. The complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.