requirements impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," and thus
do not raise freedom of speech concerns. Id. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612. Here,
the challenged provisions require only the disclosure of certain
information regarding a candidate's contributors, and do not implicate
the First Amendment's privilege of free speech.
The cases cited by plaintiff to the contrary are inapposite. Arkansas
Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp.2d 540
(W.D.Ark. 1998), addressed contribution limitations and disclosure
requirements applicable to independent expenditures, which by definition
are not connected to or authorized by a candidate or his campaign
committee. In that context, the district court ruled unconstitutional a
$500 limit on contributions to independent expenditure committees because
it was "too low to allow meaningful participation in the political
process" and a disclosure provision requiring individuals making
independent expenditures to identify themselves in any advertisements for
which they were responsible that discussed a candidate. Id. at 547-50. In
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett 3 F. Supp.2d 675
(E.D.N.C. 1998), aff.'d in part, rev'd in part, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir.
1999), the district court held that a statute barring any corporation
from making political contributions or expenditures was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it applied to non-profit
corporations that posed no threat to the integrity of the political
process. Neither case suggests that a provision requiring the disclosure
of a candidate's contributors burdens a candidate's First Amendment
freedom of speech.
3. Free Exercise of Religion
Plaintiffs Free Exercise argument is also deficient, and borders on the
frivolous. Plaintiff argues that the challenged campaign finance rules
somehow infringe on his contributors' First Amendment right to free
expression of religion, because plaintiff "will have to interrupt some or
most of the worshippers while they are praying in order to qualify for
matching funds." (Pl. Mem. at 2.)
The First Amendment prohibits the enactment of any law "prohibiting the
free exercise" of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I; accord Bronx Household
of Faith v. Community School Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 216 (2d Cir.
1997). To prevail on a Free Exercise claim, a plaintiff must show, at a
minimum, that "the law at issue discriminates against some or all
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. Hialeak, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993);
see also Genas v. State of New York Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
75 F.3d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1996).
The challenged law in this instance simply provides that candidates for
city offices cannot receive public matching funds for their campaigns if
they do not disclose and keep records of information regarding their
contributors. It is a neutral law of general applicability that does not
burden, even incidentally, a particular religious practice. The
disclosure provisions do not in any way compel the affirmation of any
religious belief, punish the expression of religious doctrines it
believes to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of
religious views or religious status, lend its power to one or the other
side in controversies over religious authority or dogma, or in any other
way violate the Free Exercise clause. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108
L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).
The only person who is interfering with the free exercise of religion
in this case is plaintiff himself; it is his preference, not the law's,
that he solicit individuals of a certain religious faith during their
time of worship. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to
state a claim for a violation of the Free Exercise clause.
B. Fourth Amendment Challenge
Plaintiffs purported Fourth Amendment "right to privacy" challenge also
fails as a matter of law. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) As no government
searches or seizures, pursuant to a warrant or otherwise, are involved in
this case, the Fourth Amendment is simply not applicable to plaintiffs
case.*fn7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), that a general
"right to personal privacy" exists under the Constitution based on
personal rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty;" such as activities relating to marriage,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.
This right has been construed to includes "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and "the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977).
In this case, the challenged statute and regulation require only that a
candidate for public office disclose the identities and residential
addresses of his contributors and the amounts that they donated. There is
simply no support for plaintiffs argument that the New York City campaign
finance law somehow infringes on a fundamental right to privacy of his to
not disclose "personal matters."
The cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable.*fn8 Without
exception, they pertain to laws requiring certain public officials to
disclose personal financial information to the public, such as their
investments and the sources and amounts of their income.*fn9 The instant
provision does not require the disclosure of any such personal
information. Therefore, plaintiff cannot state a claim for an
infringement on his right to privacy (or his contributors' rights for
II. Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
As the Court herein grants defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction is accordingly denied.
As the Court holds that as a matter of law Section 3-03(c)(4)(i) of
Title 52 of the Rules of the City of New York and Section 3-703(6) of
New York City's Administrative Code and Charter are not unconstitutional
on their face or as applied and that
plaintiff should not be exempted from the disclosure provisions,
plaintiffs Amended Complaint must be dismissed. Defendant's motion to
dismiss is granted and defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction is
denied. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close the case.