The opinion of the court was delivered by: Munson, Senior District Judge.
MEMORANDUM — DECISION AND ORDER
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW") and IBEW
43 are labor unions. J.J. Barry is the International President of the
IBEW. Plaintiff is a member of Local 43 (Complaint ¶ ¶ 6, 7, 8,
22). Local 43 is the signer of a collective bargaining agreement with the
Finger Lakes N.Y. Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors
Association, Inc. ("Finger Lakes NECA") (Complaint ¶ 25). Electrical
contractors are bound by the conditions of the collective bargaining
agreement either by being a member of the Finger Lakes NECA or by signing
a letter of assent agreeing to be bound by the terms of the agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement recognizes Local 43 "as sole and
exclusive representative of all . . . employees performing work within
the jurisdiction of [Local 43] for the purposes of collective bargaining
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other
conditions of employment." (Defs.' Ex. A at § 2.06, p. 4). Under the
terms of collective bargaining agreement, Local 43 runs an exclusive
hiring hall that refers union members for employment with signatory
electrical contractors. (Complaint ¶ 24, Defs.' Ex. A at Article IV,
p. 17). Plaintiff has obtained employment through the Local 43 hiring
hall. (Complaint ¶ ¶ 24, 31, 34).
The collective bargaining agreement allegedly allows contractors to
request employees from Local 43's hiring hall who possess special
skills. The agreement purportedly also permits Local 43 members
classified as "foreman" to receive preferential consideration over
members who are not so classified. (Complaint ¶ 30). The complaint
asserts that the effect of these [two] provisions is to allow [Local 43]
and the electrical contractors . . . to undermine the fairness of the
referral procedure and to discriminate against members on the basis of
age. (Complaint ¶ 30).
Plaintiff claims that the defendants engaged in unlawful discriminatory
practices relating to his employment through patterns and practices of
failing, because of his age, to refer him for employment to positions for
which he was fully qualified, by permitting electrical contractors to
request younger workers in preference to older workers, to layoff older
workers before younger workers, by negotiation and administering a
collective bargaining agreement that enabled the union and electrical
contractors to discriminate on the basis of age, and by retaliating
against him for attempting to oppose these discriminatory practices.
(Complaint ¶ 3). Plaintiff further states that defendant Local 43 is
the agent of defendants IBEW and J.J. Barry and, therefore, liable for
any of its agent's acts. (Complaint ¶ 37).
On March 3, 1997, plaintiff filed a grievance against several
electrical contractors asserting that they were laying off employees
based on age. Plaintiff was represented by Local 43. After his grievance
was rejected, plaintiff maintains that Local 43 removed him from the
referral list for a period of time in retaliation for filing his
grievance. (Complaint ¶ ¶ 34, 35).
On November 17, 1997, plaintiff filed an age discrimination complaint
with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") naming Local
43, Finger Lakes NECA and fourteen electrical contractors as
respondents. The complaint was also filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") pursuant to a work sharing agreement
between the EEOC and the NYSDHR. An amended complaint filed on January
22, 1998, named Local 43, Finger Lakes NECA, and three electrical
contractors as respondents. Neither complaint named the IBEW or J.J.
Barry as a respondent. On May 4, 2000, plaintiff was issued a
right-to-sue letter by the EEOC. The right-to-sue letter adopted the
finding by the NYSDHR that there was no probable cause to believe that
Local 43 discriminated against plaintiff because of his age. (Defs.' Ex.
D). This action was commenced on July 28, 2000 when plaintiff filed a
complaint alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment
("ADA") 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., and New York Executive Law §
296 et seq. The complaint seeks doubled compensatory
damages, injunctive relief, costs and attorneys' fees.
 Currently before the court is a motion made by the International
defendants for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c). Plaintiff has entered opposition to this motion.
The court notes that plaintiff appears pro se and the court is required
to review pro se complaints more liberally than those prepared by an
attorney, and should be especially hesitant to dismiss for procedural
deficiencies where that failure is by a pro se litigant. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Spencer v.
Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
 A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(c) is analyzed under the same standard applicable to a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 816, 115 S.Ct. 73, 130 L.Ed.2d 28 (1994). Consequently, judgment
on the pleading is appropriate only if, after drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, it is apparent from the
pleadings that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D.N Y 1996). In
deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider the
factual allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true,
documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated by
reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or to documents
either in plaintiffs possession or of which plaintiff had knowledge and
relied on in bringing suit. Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc.,
987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993).
A finding that plaintiff has had notice of documents used by defendants
in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings is significant
since the problem that usually arises when a court reviews statements
extraneous to a complaint is the lack of notice to the plaintiff that
they may be considered. To meet this notice requirement, 12(c) motions
are often converted into summary judgment motions. However, when
plaintiff has actual notice of all the information in the movant's
papers, and has relied on these papers in framing the complaint the
necessity for turning the Rule 12(c) motion into one under Rule 56 is
In support of their motion, the International defendants have submitted
copies of the IBEW/NECA collective bargaining agreement (Exhibit A), the
charges file by plaintiff with the EEOC (Exhibits B and C), and the
right-to-sue letter issued to plaintiff by the EEOC. These defendants
maintain that plaintiff did not attach these documents to the complaint
even though he relied upon their content in instituting this lawsuit by
alleging that several paragraphs of the collective bargaining agreement
were used by the IBEW and Local 43 to discriminate against him because of
his age, (Complaint ¶ ¶ 25-30), and to establish jurisdictional
requisites to instituting this action, by alleging that he had filed a
charge with the EEOC, (Complaint ¶ ¶ 17-18), and was issued a
right-to-sue letter by the EEOC (Complaint ¶ 19).
Plaintiff does not deny that he had notice of these documents. Although
these documents were not attached to plaintiffs complaint, the court
finds that they are documents of which plaintiff had notice, and upon
which plaintiff relied upon in bringing this action. Therefore, they may
properly be considered by the court on a Rule 12(b) motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42,
47-48 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960, 112 S.Ct. 1561, 118
L.Ed.2d 208 (1992).
The International defendants contend that plaintiffs claim against it
must b dismissed because the IBEW was no named in a charge filed with the
the NYSDHR. In Vital v. Interfaith Medical Center, 168 F.3d 615, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Title VII or ADEA complainant
must first file a charge against a party with the EEOC or an authorized
state agency before the complainant can sue that part in federal court.
Id. at 619 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(1)). The object of this
requirement is "to notify the charged party of the alleged violation and
also [to] bring the party before the EEOC, making possible effectuation
of its primary goal of securing voluntary compliance with its mandates."
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130,
657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct.
1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134, (1982).
 The Circuit further held that because the administrative charges
are generally filed by parties not versed in the vagaries of Title VII or
the ADEA and its jurisdictional and pleading requirements, the courts
recognize an exception to the exhaustion rule which permits a Title VII
or ADEA action to proceed against an unnamed party "where there is clear
identity of interest between the unnamed defendant and the party named in
the administrative charge." Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 209 ...