The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge:
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Defendants in this action, the City of New York and the Department of
Corrections, et. al. (collectively the "Department") brought a motion to
terminate the Consent Decrees and all supplemental orders entered in this
action and the six related cases that are encompassed herein*fn1 under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA" or "the Act"), Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, §§ 801-810 (Apr. 26, 1996).
This Court's order of December 9, 1999 prescribed separate hearings for
several groups of issues addressed by the Consent Decrees. The hearing on
environmental health and the provision of personal hygiene supplies was
held on May 8-10 and May 15-17, 2000 (the "May Hearings"). The May
Hearings are the subject of this Opinion and Order.
It is worth underscoring at the outset that the Decrees cover the
conditions of confinement for pre-trial detainees held on Rikers Island
and several county facilities. The conditions of confinement applicable
to convicted or sentenced prisoners are not an issue here.
At the May Hearings, this Court heard testimony from 18 present and
former detainees in the New York City jails.*fn5 In addition, 11
prisoners gave testimony concerning environmental health and personal
hygiene issues at an earlier hearing, held in February 2000.*fn6 The
plaintiffs also presented testimony from Robert W. Powitz, Ph.D., an
expert in the field of environmental health,*fn7 and called as an
adverse witness Tanya Rodriguez Barrows, unit chief for the Mental Health
Center on Rikers Island and an employee of St. Barnabas Hospital. The
defendants presented the testimony of the Department of Correction's
Director of Environmental Health, Patricia Feeney, who also testified as
an expert;*fn8 the Department of Correction's Assistant Commissioner for
Assets Management and Support Services, Vincent Cara; and the Department
of Design and Construction's Assistant Commissioner who serves the
Department of Corrections and the Police Department, Kuo Tsu.
addition, both parties presented documentary evidence, which included
additional deposition testimony from Commissioner Cara and Director
Feeney (Pl. Ex. 369 & 370) and deposition testimony of Roger Slattery,
defendants' Assistant Deputy Warden for Administration at AMKC, and
responsible for environmental health in the Mental Health Center (Pl.
The parties engaged in discovery in this case during the latter half of
1999 and through the first four months of 2000. A review of Director
Feeney's notes reveals that she conducted joint inspectional tours with
the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Powitz on the following days: November 22,
23, 24, 29 and 30, December 1, 2, 3, 17, 20, and 21, 1999 and March 15,
16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, and 30, 2000. Pl. Ex. 365-66. (These notes are
mis-dated March 23 at Pl. Ex. 366 E066715.) Common sense supports the
proposition that these visits were not unannounced.
The hearing was conducted on an expedited schedule because of the
statutory prescription of the PLRA that termination motions be ruled upon
"promptly." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1). Pending this and other hearings on
defendants' termination motion, the court by Memorandum and Order of
December 17, 1999, suspended the effect of the PLRA's "automatic stay"
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2). Following submissions by both
sides (on a timetable agreed upon by both sides and the Court), this
matter became subjudice on September 5, 2000.
The fourteen jails under review in this proceeding currently house over
10,000 prisoners. The facilities are the Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC), the
Adolescent Reception and Detention Center (ARDC), the George Motchan
Detention Center (GMDC), the James A. Thomas Center (JATC), the Rose M.
Singer Center (RMSC), the George R. Vierno Center (GRVC), the North
Infirmary Command (NIC), and the West Facility (West) on Rikers Island;
the Vernon C. Bain Center (VCBC), a "maritime facility" anchored off the
Bronx; the Manhattan Detention Center, (MDC), the Queens Detention Center
(QHD), the Brooklyn Detention Center (BKHD), and the Bronx Detention
Center (BXHD). (The latter three have also been known as the Queens,
Brooklyn and Bronx Houses of Detention.) The Correctional Institution for
Men (CIFM), referred to occasionally in testimony and documents, holds
sentenced misdemeanants and is not at issue in this proceeding.
Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court
makes written findings based on the record that
prospective relief remains necessary to correct a
current and ongoing violation of the Federal right,
extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and that the
prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least
intrusive means to correct the violation.
As this Court has observed previously, the PLRA authorizes courts to
"continue to define the scope of prisoners' constitutional rights, review
the factual record, apply the judicially determined constitutional
standards to the facts as they are found in the record and determine what
relief is necessary to remedy the constitutional violations." Benjamin
v. Kerik, 172 F.3 d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Benjamin v.
Jacobson, 935F. Supp. 332, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), the Supreme Court held
[prison] conditions . . . alone or in combination, may
deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of
life s necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and
unusual under the contemporary standard of decency
that we recognized in Gamble [Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976)]. But conditions that
cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To
the extent that such conditions are restrictive and
even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.
In this case, however, because the plaintiff class is compromised of
pre-trial detainees who have not been found guilty of any crime, they are
not subject to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 53 5-36
(1979). The Bell Court concluded that the conditions of a pre-trial
detention facility are properly reviewed under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. 441 U.S. at
537, n. 16.
In Kost v. Kozakiewicz, the Third Circuit had occasion to consider
claims of pretrial detainees alleging inadequate medical treatment and
Pretrial detainees . . . are entitled to at least as
much protection as convicted prisoners, so the
protections of the Eighth Amendment would seem to
establish a floor of sorts. It appears that no
determination has as yet been made regarding how much
more protection unconvicted prisoners should receive.
1 F.3d 176, 188, n. 10 (3d Cir. 1993); City of Revere v. Massachusetts
General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (the Due Process rights of a
pretrial detainee are "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner.")
To make out an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim,
"extreme deprivations are required." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992). To prevail in this litigation, plaintiffs' claims need not rise
to such a threshold. The Department of Corrections
may subject [the plaintiffs] to the restrictions and
conditions of the detention facility so long as those
conditions and restrictions do not amount to
punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.
Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be
punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may
be punished, although that punishment may not be
"cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment.
Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of
pretrial detention is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective, it does not,
without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if a
restriction or condition is not reasonably related to
a legitimate goal — if it is arbitrary or
purposeless — a court permissibly may infer that
the purpose of the governmental action is punishment
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees qua detainees. Courts must be mindful that
these inquiries spring from constitutional
requirements and that judicial answers to them must
reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how
best to operate a detention facility.
In Bell the Supreme Court explained that
Restraints that are reasonably related to the
institution's interest in maintaining jail security do
not, without more, constitute unconstitutional
punishment, even if they are discomforting and are
restrictions that the detainee would not have
experienced had he been released while awaiting
trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise
extent of the legitimate governmental interests that
may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in
addition to ensuring the detainees' presence at
trial, the effective management of the detention
facility once the individual is confined is a valid
objective that may justify imposition of conditions
and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any
inference that such restrictions are intended as
Bell 441 U.S. at 540 (footnote omitted).
In a footnote the Bell Court cautioned the judiciary to be wary of
second-guessing the reasoned decisions of prison administrators:
In determining whether restrictions or conditions are
reasonably related to the Governments interest in
maintaining security and order and operating the
institution in a manageable fashion, courts must heed
our warning that "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly
within the province and professional expertise of
corrections officials, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that
the officials have exaggerated their response to these
considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to
their expert judgment in such matters."
Bell 441 U.S. at 540, n. 23 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
The PLRA, which guides the review of the Consent Decrees in this
litigation serves to reinforce the notion that prison administrators, not
federal judges, are best suited to manage the conditions of confinement.
Defendants argue that the plaintiffs must show deliberate indifference
to prevail. The parties agree that deliberate indifference means that a
prison official "knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The parties also
agree that the Second Circuit has applied a standard of deliberate
indifference to pretrial detainees' constitutional challenges to jail
conditions in at least two cases: Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274 (2d
Cir. 1990) and Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1986). In Liscio,
the complaint alleged that a doctor and others "were deliberately
indifferent to [plaintiffs] serious medical needs while [he] was
undergoing drug and alcohol withdrawal as a pretrial detainee . . .
resulting in serious physical injury." 901 F.2d at 277. In Bass, the
Circuit was presented with a claim of "failure to protect  from
physical harm in violation of [plaintiffs] constitutional rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments" arising out of an instance of
inmate-on-inmate violence in a county correctional facility. The Bass
court observed that
The Supreme Court has recently made clear that the Due
Process Clause is "not implicated by a negligent act
of an official causing unintended loss of or injury
to life, liberty or property." Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662
in original). That case explicitly
did not consider whether something less than
intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross
negligence, is enough to trigger the protections of
the Due Process Clause. Id, 106 S.Ct. at 667 n. 3.
In the absence of further guidance, we must adhere
to our recently restated position that [a]n isolated
omission to act by a state prison guard does not
support a claim under section 1983 absent
circumstances indicating an evil intent, or
recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to
the consequences of his conduct for those under his
control and dependent upon him. Ayers v. Coughlin,
780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Williams
v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974)).
It is worth noting that in adhering to Ayers, the Bass decision relied
on a case that set forth standards applicable to convicted and sentenced
state prisoners, who are subject to punishment and protected under the
more stringent Eighth Amendment standards. The Bass court rejected the
appellant's second claim as well, i.e., that he was not afforded prompt
medical attention after an incident of violence. The Circuit there
applied the deliberate indifference standard set forth in Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) ("deliberate indifference to a prisoner's
serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.").
Both the Liscio and Bass decisions appear to have overlooked the
standard applicable to pretrial detainees set forth in Bell v. Wolfish,
i.e. those decisions did not even cite Bell nor examine whether the
condition challenged was "reasonably related to a legitimate goal."
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Neither party here mentions this oversight, nor
does either party take notice of a more recent decision by the Second
Circuit wherein the Circuit acknowledged that
It remains unsettled . . . whether a pretrial detainee
must meet the "deliberate indifference" standard of
Estelle or show "gross negligence" or "recklessness"
or prove conduct not amounting to intentional acts,
but that is more than simple negligence to state a
claim of a constitutional deprivation under the Due
Process Clause. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n. 3, 106
S.Ct. at 666 n. 3 (refusing to consider whether
"something less than intentional conduct, such as
recklessness or `gross negligence,' is enough to
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause");
cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct.
1197, 1204 n. 8, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (noting that
question remains unresolved).
Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 983 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
Mindful that the requisite standard under the Due Process Clause
remains unsettled, I find that the plaintiffs here have met the
"deliberate indifference" standard with respect to certain environmental
conditions in the Department's prisons. Under that standard, a plaintiff
to prevail must satisfy two requirements, consisting of an objective and
subjective component in order to find a prison official liable for
violating an inmate's right to humane conditions of confinement. The
objective component requires that the alleged deprivation be
"sufficiently serious." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). This
test is met, for instance, when, as in this case, a claim involves a
number of inhumane confinement conditions, and the court finds that, when
taken together, these conditions
satisfy even the stricter Eighth Amendment standards and that this occurs
when each would not do so alone, but only when they
have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such
as food, warmth, or exercise — for example, a
low cell temperature at night combined with a failure
to issue blankets. . . . Nothing so amorphous as
"overall conditions" can rise to the level of cruel
and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of
a single human need exists.
Wilson 501 U.S. at 304-05 (citations omitted).
The subjective component requires the jail official to have a
"sufficiently culpable state of mind." Wilson 501 U.S. at 297. In the
context of prison-condition claims, the required state of mind is one of
"`deliberate indifference' to inmate health and safety." 501 U.S. at
302-03. In other words, a prison official is liable only if he or she
"knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The Farmer Court noted that "even prison officials who had a
subjectively culpable state of mind when the lawsuit was filed could
prevent issuance of an injunction by proving, during the litigation, that
they were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable
risk of harm and that they would not revert to their obduracy upon
cessation of the litigation." 511 U.S. 847, n. 9. And of course, under the
Eighth Amendment standard, a district court must take into account
"prison officials" `current attitudes and conduct.'" Id. (quoting Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)).
In this case, the Consent Decrees have been in place for more than a
generation, and accordingly, the Department, qua Department cannot
demonstrate that it did not have actual knowledge of any conditions which
are unconstitutional from an objective standpoint. The deficiencies shown
at trial are largely the continuations of deficiencies that have been
known, obvious, and commented upon by the Office of Compliance
Consultants ("OCC")*fn9 and plaintiffs' counsel for years, (See App. 1,
Section T), and that have been the subject of further court orders
between the entry of the Consent Decrees and the present proceedings.
While past actions that have failed to cure or avert the harm at issue
may have appeared reasonable at the time, "patently ineffective gestures
purportedly directed towards remedying objectively unconstitutional
conditions do not prove a lack of deliberate indifference, they
demonstrate it." Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1319 (E.D.Cal.
1995), appeal dismissed, 101 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1996). In this case, the
Court must focus on any continuing and ongoing violations of plaintiffs'
constitutional right to adequate shelter and environmental health
conditions, and the defendants' good intentions, without more, cannot
constitute grounds to terminate the Consent Decrees.
A lack of adequate ventilation in a detention facility can contribute
to the transmission of air-borne diseases, a problem which, is magnified
for detainees who have compromised immune systems as a result of HIV
infection or suffer from asthma or other respiratory ailments. Dr.
Powitz, relying on information from New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation, testified that approximately 9,000 asthmatics passed through
the New York City jails in 1999. (Tr. 432-33.) inadequate ventilation
also undermines efforts to maintain minimum levels of sanitation within
the Department's facilities, providing an environment where mildew,
mold, rust, and bacteria can flourish.
In Hoptowit v. Spellman, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding of the
district court which concluded that the lack of adequate ventilation
violated the Eighth Amendment. 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985). The
Tenth Circuit has held that prison officials must provide "reasonably
adequate ventilation" to inmates. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). In Ramos, the record
indicated that the prison failed to meet the "minimal health and safety
needs of the prisoners", in part, because, "[i]nadequate ventilation,
especially in the cells and shower areas, results in excessive odors,
heat, and humidity with the effect of creating stagnant air as well as
excessive mold and fungus growth, thereby facilitating personal
discomfort along with health and sanitation problems." Id. at 569. This
court found that such conditions were "`grossly inadequate and
constitutionally impermissible.'" 639 F.2d at 570.
Ventilation involves two facets: supply of fresh air and exhaust of
impure air. Ventilation may be achieved through either active or passive
means. Active ventilation is commonly used in sealed buildings with few
apertures, and involves the use of mechanical air delivery and exhaust
systems. Passive ventilation relies on the exchange of air through open
The parties disputed how to measure whether a particular area within a
jail receives adequate ventilation. Director Feeney testified that the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") "would actually recommend that
you use carbon dioxide as an indicator to check for ventilation problems
and air-quality problems." (Tr. 795.) Director Feeney further testified
that according to the EPA and the American Society for Heating,
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), carbon dioxide
levels between 600 and 1000 parts per million are considered acceptable
and a level below 600 parts per million is considered excellent. (Tr.
Dr. Powitz did not measure the levels of carbon monoxide or carbon
dioxide present in the air at the Department's facilities. (Tr. 794.)
Instead, Dr. Powitz opined that air quality should be measured by whether
the ventilation system removes particulates, aldehydes, and odors from
the air. (Tr. 493.) The presence of environmental tobacco smoke,
condensate from showers and odors from the prison cells themselves were
also relevant to indoor air quality in Dr. Powitz's opinion. (Id.) When
asked how carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide
was relevant to air quality, Dr. Powitz stated
Carbon dioxide is [relevant] if under crowded
conditions we look at the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the absence of air movement and people.
Carbon monoxide comes from internal combustion sources
such as motors, some from environmental tobacco
Dr. Powitz testified that the consequences of inadequate ventilation in
the Department's facilities are myriad. As noted, poor ventilation can
exacerbate asthma and allergies, and allows molds, mildews and bacterial
shines to accumulate fester in shower rooms and restrooms where
moisture-laden air is not exchanged and refreshed. (Tr. 547-48.) Lack of
ventilation in chronically wet areas can also lead to "profound"
deterioration of surfaces including floors, walls, ceilings, and
windows. (Tr. 547.)
Dr. Powitz testified that he found the ventilation systems at OBCC,
VCBC, West Facility, and MDC to be operational, but explained that the
MDC system was not functional. (Tr. 746.) Plaintiffs contend that but for
BKHD,*fn10 QHD, VCBC, and West Facility, each of the ten remaining
institutions fails to pass constitutional muster. Problems with respect
to adequate ventilation in each of the ten remaining institutions
The ventilation situation in AMKC presents a mixed picture. Dr. Powitz
testified that "maintenance people told us that frilly 10 percent of the
windows were actually broken." (Tr. 549.) On November 22, 2000, there was
no ventilation in C-71, the mental health unit within AMKC because the
windows were "inoperable", and thus that area "was rather malodorous."
(Tr. 549, 552.) Further, lack of ventilation was also observed in the
dorm toilet areas, and in Upper 9 (a mental observation unit) and Lower
1, there was no ventilation at all. (Tr. 549.) Director Feeney noted the
following deficiencies with respect to 6 of 16 AMKC housing areas:
Mod 9 A: "Ventilation inoperable" (Pl. Ex. 365 at
E06547) Mod 6 B: "Exhaust registers were very dirty"
(Id. at E06547) Upper 9: "Ventilation was poor"
(shower area) (Id. at E06548) 5 Lower: "Ventilation
was not operable" (Id. at E06548) Lower 1 and Lower
3: "Ventilation was inoperable throughout both
Director Feeney's report of April 10, 2000 reflects that "Four exhaust
fans were installed in AMKC for Lower 1 and 3" and that "[t]he Supervisor
of Mechanics estimates that the wiring will be completed by the middle of
May  for these units." (Defendants' Exhibit ("Def. Ex.") F-1 at 6.)
Commissioner Cara testified that he was only aware of ventilation
problems in Lower I and 3, part of the Mental Health Center. (Pl. Ex. 370
According to Director Feeney's notes taken during tours of ARDC in
November of 1999:
Ventilation was inoperable throughout the entire
building. The Supervisor of Mechanics stated that a
ventilation project was underway in the facility and
more than 20% of the areas were restored. However,
ventilation was not provided in any area inspected and
the Supervisor of Mechanics was not able to inform
Dr. Powitz of the areas that were already restored.
Moreover, the exhaust registers in the Intake/New Admission areas were
noted as "dirty throughout." (Id. at E06557.) A minority of the
ventilation registers in the cells inspected were observed to be "dirty"
or "excessively dirty." ((Id. at E06556, E06561, E06566, E06567,
E06571, E06572.) However, at her deposition on April 13, 2000, Director
Feeney testified that 75% of the exhaust units at ARDC had been repaired
since November 1999. (Def. Ex. X-7 at 377.)
Additionally, Dr. Powitz testified that the beds in Modular 10 were
placed head-to-head, rather than six feet apart which is required to
minimize disease transmission. (Tr. 690.) Dr. Powitz explained that
droplets emanating from one person's mouth remain airborne for at least
three feet, but that most will not travel as many as six feet, which is
why the beds should be placed that far apart. (Tr. 690-91.)
Dr. Powitz testified that BXHD relies on an active ventilation system
as well as air from windows, which are located across a catwalk from the
prisoners and although barred, are inaccessible to the prisoners. (Tr.
557.) (Pl. Mem. at 17.) Further, Dr. Powitz explained that "many of the
window controls were either missing or broken and that [a] request had
been in for window replacement. (Tr. 557-58.) He found "very few windows
in any cellblock . . . that could be open for cross ventilation." (Tr.
558.) Defendants smoke tests of certain areas of BXHD indicated that
there was no exhaust in two of five cell areas tested on the fifth floor
and that there was non-detectable exhaust in two areas of the third
floor. (Def. Ex. F-b.) However, defendants point out that the carbon
dioxide levels of all of the areas tested at BXHD were below 600 parts
per million, and thus argue that air quality is excellent under prevailing
EPA and ASHRAE standards. (Def. Mem. at 21.)
On these facts, I find no current and ongoing violation with respect to
adequate ventilation at BXHD.
The notes taken by Dr. Powitz regarding his fall 1999 visit to GMDC
indicate that there were ventilation problems in almost every housing
area inspected. (Pl. Ex. 106 at P84-P 128.) Director Feeney's report
states that "numerous ventilation units were inoperable at the facility"
but that as of April 10, 2000, "sixty percent of the exhaust units were
repaired by service contracts." (Def. Ex. F-1 at 18.) Plaintiffs draw the
inference that forty percent of the ventilation thus remains inoperable
at GMDC. (Pl. Mem. at 17.) Commissioner Cara testified at his deposition
that he was unaware of the status of any efforts at GMDC with respect to
ventilation. (Pl. Ex. 370 at 356-357) ("I haven't been asked for
assistance on it so I don't know.")
The notes taken by Director Feeney during her fall 1999 inspection of
GRVC indicate that ventilation registers were inoperable in a significant
minority of cells surveyed. (See Pl. Ex. 365 at E06628 to E06644.)
Additionally, a minority of cell exhaust registers were dirty and a
minority were clogged with paper or otherwise rendered inoperable by
detainees. (See id.) Air flow readings taken by Dr. Powitz with a
velometer in a number of GRVC's buildings indicated that the ventilation
system was operable. (Def. Ex. F-1 at 24.)
Detainee witness Keith Todd testified that during the fall of 1999 in
GRVC's "5 Block", the heat was turned up in the cell housing area until
his throat and nose dried up. He indicated that there was a window in the
cell, but that "no air is circulating if you have the door closed. The
door was locked whenever it was lock in time, which included every day
from "quarter to eleven at night until about 8:30 the next morning."
(Pl. Ex. 16 at 135-136.)
Detainee witness Ralph White reported that he was housed in a cell area
in 6B, which was very hot and humid. He testified that "there is
ventilation but the only ventilation is the windows which the screens are
murky so there is no ventilation really coming in or going out. (Tr.
Detainee witness Blake Wingate was housed in GRVC in the summer of
1999. He described GRVC as "a new building and like this courtroom is air
conditioned GRVC is supposed to be air conditioned. But the officers turn
the air conditioner on in their bubble cube and they don't turn it on for
us[.]" (Tr. 334.) He went on to explain that there was no ventilation,
because "when the air is off, that is it. And GRVC — it was ...