The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kahn, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM — DECISION AND ORDER
Presently before the court is Plaintiff William R.
Nykorchuck's motion for reconsideration. For the following
reasons his motion is DENIED.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action on January 29, 1998
alleging, in part, that New York's award of a food supply
contract to defendant Sysco Corporation ("Sysco") violated a
variety of federal and state statutes, including the Sherman,
Clayton, and Perishable Agricultural Commodities Acts. On
November 20, 1999, this Court dismissed the complaint in its
entirety, holding, in relevant part, that Plaintiffs did not
have standing to bring their Sherman Act and Clayton Act claims
and that Plaintiffs had also failed to meet the statutory
prerequisites necessary to bring a claim under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act. Plaintiff William R. Nykorchuck
seeks reconsideration of that order based upon the fact that he
is the sole shareholder of W.R. Nykorchuck & Co., Inc., ("WRN"),
a food distribution business allegedly injured because of
Defendants action. Plaintiff alleges that his status as the sole
shareholder of WRN gives him standing to maintain an antitrust
action against Defendants.*fn1
A. Standard for Reconsideration
Generally, the prevailing rule in the Northern District
"recognizes only three possible grounds upon which motions for
reconsideration may be granted; they are (1) an intervening
change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence
not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or prevent
manifest injustice." In re C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship, 182 B.R. 1, 3
(N.D.N.Y. 1995). Plaintiff Nykorchuck's basis for this motion is
that this Court made a clear error of law or needs to correct a
manifest injustice because of significant errors contained in
the Court's earlier decision. Although this Court enjoys broad
discretion when making a determination to reconsider on this
ground, Von Ritter v. Heald, 876 F. Supp. 18, 19 (N.D.N.Y.
1995), it will not disregard the law of the case unless "the
Court has a `clear conviction of error' with respect to a point
of law on which its previous decision was predicated." Fogel v.
Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 1981).
B. Plaintiffs Shareholder Status
Plaintiffs primary argument in support of this Court's earlier
order is that as the sole shareholder of a corporation allegedly
injured because of the unlawful monopoly granted Sysco, he has
standing to bring the current claim. This Court disagrees. The
Second Circuit has long held that shareholders, even sole
shareholders, do not have standing to bring an antitrust action
in their individual capacity to rectify alleged violations that
cause corporate injury. See Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp.
Authority, 836 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1987); Rand v.
Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986);
Vincel v. White Motor Corp., 521 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir.
1975); Berman v. International Business Machines Corp., No. 90
CIV 4821, 1991 WL 183763, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1991). The
rationale underpinning this rule is that the antitrust laws are
not designed to allow recovery for anyone incidentally injured
by a violation of the antitrust laws. See Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 649, 89 S.Ct. 1871, 23 L.Ed.2d 599
When a corporation violates the antitrust laws, it is usually
that corporation's competitor that suffers a direct and legally
cognizable injury, even though shareholders of the injured
corporation often suffer economic injury. In essence, a
shareholder's claim is incidental to the injured corporation's
claim and not cognizable in court. See Weatherby v. RCA Corp.,
Nos. 85-CV-1615, 85-CV-1613 and 85-CV1614, 1986 WL 21336, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986). In accordance with this principle, the
shareholder's claim here is barred and the Court does not
conclude that it made a clear error of law when it dismissed
Plaintiff William R. Nykorchuck's antitrust claims.
Consequently, his motion for reconsideration on this ground is
C. Plaintiffs' Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
In this Court's initial opinion, Plaintiffs' Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act ("PACA") claim was dismissed
because of their "failure to meet the statutory prerequisites,
as explained in Defendants' brief." Schulz v. Pataki, No. 98
CV 150, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1999). Plaintiff
William R. Nykorchuck seeks reconsideration of that finding on
the ground that this Court misapprehended the nature of the
prerequisites of a claim under the PACA. The Court disagrees
Congress enacted the PACA in 1930 and amended it in 1984 "to
encourage fair trading practices in the marketing of perishable
commodities." Frio Ice, S.A. v. Sunfruit, Inc., 918 F.2d 154,
155-56 (11th Cir. 1990). To facilitate this goal, the PACA
prohibited produce dealers from, in part, mislabeling the
quantity of goods sold, rejecting or failing to deliver goods in
accordance with the terms of a contract, discarding perishable
goods without cause, and misleading buyers about the nature of
goods sold. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 499b. Any party aggrieved
by a produce dealer that fails to follow the statutory
obligations set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 499b is entitled to bring
suit in any court of competent jurisdiction and receive
appropriate damages. See 7 U.S.C. § 499e.
Moreover, under the PACA, produce dealers must make "full
payment promptly" for any produce they purchase. See
7 U.S.C. § 499b(4). To compel prompt payment, all produce dealers hold
producerelated assets they purchase in trust for the seller
until full payment is made. See 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c). If the
trust beneficiary does not receive payment from the trust, ...