The opinion of the court was delivered by: Scullin, Chief Judge.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 26, 1994 against
her former employer, Comprehensive Analytical Group, Inc.
("CAG"), and various CAG employees alleging that, because of her
gender, she was subjected to discriminatory treatment in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.*fn1 Plaintiff did not file any papers in
opposition to this motion.
Plaintiff began working for CAG on a part-time basis in 1991.
In 1992, she began full-time employment with the company, which
continued until she resigned from her position in April 1994.
See Transcript of the Deposition of Kimberly Allen Hanson,
sworn to Sept. 18, 2000 ("Allen Dep."), at 30. Plaintiff owned
twelve of CAG's 200 shares. See id. at 23-24. Plaintiffs
father, Richard Allen ("R.Allen"), also owned shares of CAG and
in 1993-1994, he served as the vice president of the company and
was on the board of directors. See id. at 24; Transcript of
the Deposition of Richard Allen, sworn to Sept. 21, 2000 ("R.
Allen Dep."), at 7.*fn2
Defendant Robert Boulware was the President of CAG and also
held shares in the company. See Complaint at ¶ 7. Defendant
James Sutton was the Director of Field Personnel for CAG, and
Defendant James Espiritu was the Assistant Laboratory Director.
Plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint on April 26, 1994. See
Defs' Exh. D. Plaintiff alleges that the discriminatory conduct
at issue occurred from 1992 through 1994 and contends that
during that period of time Defendants engaged in the following
allegedly discriminatory activities: (1) they refused to
compensate her for overtime or vacation, see Allen Dep. at 25;
(2) they docked her pay on holidays, see id.; (3) Espiritu
grabbed her feet, hair and hands on numerous occasions and
followed her, see id. at 25, 44, 46; (4) Boulware called her
names such as a "snot," a "spoiled brat," and a "little bitch,"
see id. at 25, 8687; (5) Sutton called her names such as a
"little bitch," "snot" and "brat," see id. at 26; (6) Jack
Ryan, a co-worker, referred to her as "missy," "cookie" and
"sweetie," see id. at 28-29; (7) Sutton and Boulware did not
respond to her complaints about Espiritu, see id. at 51-52,
54-56; (8) Boulware told Plaintiff that "women are inferior,"
see Complaint at ¶ 11; (9) they assigned her to perform menial
tasks which male employees were not required to perform, see
id. at ¶ 12:(10) a male employee who performed the same duties
as Plaintiff was provided with a larger salary, see id. at ¶
14; and (11) they did not permit Plaintiff to attend a training
course because she was a female, see id. at ¶ 24.
Defendants eventually moved to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint
for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In an Order dated July 26, 2000, the
Court denied Defendants' motion, re-opened discovery for a
period of sixty days and provided the parties with sixty days
after the close of discovery to file motions. Subsequent to the
issuance of that Order, a discovery dispute arose between the
parties. A conference was held in Chambers on October 10, 2000;
and the Court, once again, ordered that the discovery period be
re-opened until October 24, 2000 and further ordered that the
parties had sixty days after the discovery period closed to file
motions pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(b).
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment is warranted if, when viewing the evidence
submitted, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and affidavits, in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, the Court determines that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456,
112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Raskin v. Wyatt Co.,
125 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1997); Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance
Food Serv. Equip. ., 991 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1993). A genuine
issue of fact exists when the evidence is such that a
"reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Rovtar v. Union Bank of Switz., 852 F. Supp. 180, 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212
(1986)). Moreover, in determining whether such a fact question
exists, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon,
118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
Arguably, Defendants' motion for summary judgment may be
granted due to Plaintiffs failure to respond to the motion.
Rule 7.1(b)(3) of the Local Rules of the Northern District of
New York provides that "[f]ailure to file or serve any papers as
required by this Rule shall be deemed by the court as consent
to the granting or denial of the motion, as the case may be,
unless good cause is shown." However, the Second Circuit has
held that "[t]he fact that there has been no response to a
summary judgment motion does not, of course, mean that the
motion is to be granted automatically." Champion v. Artuz,
76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Deshaies v. United Tech.
Corp. — Carrier Corp., No. 96-CV-1486, 1998 WL 59460, *2
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1998). Therefore, the Court must review the
merits of Plaintiffs claims. Of course, since Plaintiff ...