either intentionally discriminated against plaintiff on the
basis of his race or otherwise took acts against plaintiff that deprived
him of a constitutionally protected right.
E. Plaintiffs Conspiracy and Fair Representation Claims
Plaintiff makes repeated and emphatic allegations that the Union
Defendants conspired with the City Defendants to deprive plaintiff of his
constitutional rights; alternatively, plaintiff contends that the Union
Defendants failed to prevent the City Defendants from depriving him of
his rights. As noted above, the primary basis for these claims is that
COBA settled the Seabrook lawsuit in which COBA had challenged the
constitutionality of Directive 2262's home confinement policy. See
Seabrook v. Jacobson, 95 Civ. 4194 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (HB); 09/29/99 El-Bey
Depo. at 10.
However, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 1986, the statutory basis for
these causes of action, plaintiff must demonstrate "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971). As already noted, plaintiff has demonstrated no such invidious
animus and hence these claims must fail
Moreover, even if plaintiff had demonstrated discriminatory animus, he
has shown no concert of action between the City Defendants and Union
Defendants.*fn13 For instance, as noted above, plaintiff knows of no
actions or communications between City and COBA officials regarding him.
See 09/29/99 El-Bey Depo. at 31-39, 42-44; 04/26/99 El-Bey Depo. at
70-79. Plaintiff did testify that Defendant Braxton (a COBA executive
board officer) and Defendant Skinner (a DOC official) communicated in
secret prior to a February 26, 1996 conference attended by Braxton,
Skinner and plaintiff. See 09/29/99 El-Bey Depo. at 76-81 As described
above, at the ensuing conference plaintiff says he was told that a
lawsuit brought by COBA challenging the home confinement policy — a
case plaintiff assumed was the Seabrook case — had been "lost" by
the union. See supra note
5. Granting plaintiff the best inference possible — that COBA and
DOC officials conspired to lie to plaintiff about the outcome of the
Seabrook action — that fact cannot save plaintiffs Section 1985 and
1986 claims. The Court cannot discern — and plaintiff has not
alleged — the constitutional injury that flows from such a lie. At
worst such misinformation made plaintiff believe that a federal court had
found the home confinement policy constitutional. Additionally, the res
judicata effects of the Seabrook Settlement preclude constitutional
challenges to the home confinement policy by COBA officers like
plaintiff; had defendants Braxton and Skinner never lied to plaintiff,
these effects would be unchanged.
As described above, plaintiff makes various other complaints regarding
the failure of the Union Defendants to prevent the City Defendants from
violating his constitutional rights. Despite plaintiffs protestations to
the contrary, these grievances amount to a claim that COBA breached its
duty of fair representation.*fn14 The Court cannot conceive of another
way to construe plaintiffs complaints that COBA failed to correct his
chronic absentee designation or to provide immediate relief from the
"fraudulently imposed involuntary medical separation leave of absence."
El-Bey II Compl. at 11, ¶ 47; see also El-Bey I Compl. at 15, ¶
66. Municipal unions such as COBA are excluded from the reach of this
cause of action by 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) and therefore state law — New
York law — would govern this claim by plaintiff. See McGovern v.
Local 456. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters. Chauffers. & Warehousemen & Helpers
of Am., AFL-CIO, 107 F. Supp.2d 311, 319 (S.D.N Y 2000) (Conner, J.).
Because the Court dismisses all of plaintiffs federal claims in El-Bey I
and El-Bey II, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to
address this particular state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c).
Accordingly, the Court denies without prejudice all of plaintiffs claims
that COBA, COBA officers, and COBA's counsel breached their respective
duties to plaintiff.
F. Plaintiffs Remaining State Law Claims
Finally, plaintiff alleges a series of state law causes of action
including fraud, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Again, since the Court has dismissed all of
plaintiffs federal causes of action in El-Bey I and El-Bey II, prudence
demands that the Court decline to invoke its supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiffs state law claims. Although the Court is "not required to
dismiss [plaintiffs] state claims . . ., dismissal of such claims is the
general rule." In re Porges, 44 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court
sees no reason to depart from the general rule in the instant cases.
Accordingly, plaintiffs state law claims are hereby dismissed without
prejudice to be being renewed in the proper state court.
F. Oualified Immunity
Lastly, plaintiffs claims against the various individual City
Defendants must fail because such defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. The numerous individual City employees plaintiff sues in El-Bey
I and El-Bey II are "shielded from personal liability insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Whether an official is entitled to
qualified immunity depends upon whether his actions were objectively
legally reasonable "in light of the legal rules that were "clearly
established' at the time [those actions were] taken." Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). Plaintiff has made no showing that
the actions of the various individual City Defendants taken against
plaintiff were legally unreasonable. Indeed, plaintiff offers only
conclusory allegations to support his contention that the individuals he
accuses knowingly took acts that violated his constitutional rights.
Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions for summary judgment in
El-Bey I and El-Bey II are granted and plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary judgment is denied. The parties are shall appear before the Court
for a Pre-Trial Conference on June 5, 2001 at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom
705, 40 Centre Street to address plaintiffs two (2) remaining cases
before the Court.
It Is SO ORDERED.