For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any
due process violations in the present case. Accordingly, the defendants
are entitled to summary judgment.
The final argument made by defendants is that plaintiffs have failed to
support their promissory estoppel claim. Initially, defendants note that
the alleged "promises" were not promises at all. This first statement
which plaintiffs argue was a promise was the statement by Leo Glickman
that "he believed [Ostrom's application] would be granted." This
statement of belief was clearly not a promise, and certainly was not a
statement upon which plaintiffs could justifiably rely.
The second alleged promise was the inclusion of Ostrom's name on one of
the lists of candidates receiving matching funds. The defendants assert,
and the plaintiffs do not deny, that this was simply an administrative
error. Under New York law, promissory estoppel "is not available against
a local government unit for the purpose of ratifying an administrative
error." United States v. Schmitt, 999 F. Supp. 317, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998);
see also Sheer Pleasure Lingerie, Inc. v. Town of Colonie Planning
Board, 251 A.D.2d 859, 861, 674 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (3d Dept. 1998).
Moreover, the mere inclusion of Ostrom's name on one page of the Finance
Board's website cannot be seen as an unambiguous promise because the
plaintiffs could have discovered the error through any reasonable
diligence. See Parkview Associates v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274,
282, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176, 179, 519 N.E.2d 1372 (1988) (promissory estoppel
not available against government entity where "reasonable diligence by
good-faith inquirer" would have disclosed the true facts).
Significantly, plaintiffs have failed to contest these arguments in
their papers. Indeed, they have failed to defend their promissory
estoppel claims in any respect. As such, and in light of the above
authority plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim is also rejected.
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted in favor of the
defendant as to all of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for
summary judgment is denied as moot. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
close the case.