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HARRIS v. NEW YORK

October 31, 2001

FLETCHER HARRIS, PETITIONER,
v.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Buchwald, District Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Petitioner Fletcher Harris, a former inmate of Sing Sing Correctional Facility and currently released on parole, has brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction following a trial by jury in the Supreme Court, New York County (Carruthers, J.). Petitioner was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, see NYPL § 165.50, and on July 7, 1997, he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of three to six years.*fn1 Having unsuccessfully sought to appeal his conviction in the state courts, petitioner now seeks habeas relief. For the reasons set forth below, his petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

The facts as set forth in the submissions of the parties are as follows. On January 9, 1997, Police Officers Steven Goetz ("Goetz") and Joseph Rivera ("Rivera") were on routine patrol in an unmarked car in the vicinity of Riverside Drive and West 143rd Street. On assignment to the Auto Larceny Unit, the officers were conducting random license plate checks with the purpose of finding stolen vehicles. When Goetz and Rivera entered the license plate number of the gray Nissan Pathfinder that was being driven by petitioner Harris, the computer revealed that the Pathfinder had been reported stolen. Along with a marked police car, Rivera and Goetz pulled the Pathfinder over, approached, and ordered Harris from the vehicle at gunpoint. There is some testimony that Goetz's gun was pointed at a barking pitbull sitting in the back seat and that it was difficult to remove Harris from the car because it was still running and was in drive. See Appeal Br. for Def. — Appellant, Attach. to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Appeal Br.") at 5-7. There are also conflicting versions of the degree of force used to remove Harris from the vehicle. See id. After Harris had exited the vehicle and had been handcuffed, he answered Goetz's questions about his name and address, responding that his name was Fletcher Harris and that he was homeless. Goetz then asked who owned the vehicle, to which petitioner replied that the car belonged to a friend of his whose name he did not know.*fn2 Miranda warnings had not yet been given.

The Supreme Court held a Huntley hearing*fn3 to determine whether Harris's statements to the police must be suppressed on the grounds that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the necessary Miranda warnings. The parties agreed that Harris was certainly in custody when Goetz questioned him, but the issue raised was whether Goetz's questions constituted interrogation. Goetz testified that he questioned appellant at the time of the arrest in order to clarify the situation and make sure he didn't arrest someone who didn't deserve to be arrested. See Appeal Br. at 8-9 (citing hearing record). He noted as well that computer information on stolen vehicles is not always accurate. See Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pet'r App. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Opp'n Mem.") at 7 (citing hearing record). The trial court ruled that given the circumstances, the officers' precautionary drawing of their weapons was justified and that the few questions posed by Goetz were meant only to clarify the situation and did not constitute interrogation.

At trial, Justice Carruthers denied defendant's motions to dismiss on the basis that the prosecution had failed to establish the element of knowledge for criminal possession of stolen property. This argument and much of the defense was premised on the testimony of the People's witnesses that the outward appearance of the car did not reveal that it had been stolen. Harris testified that he had acquired the car on January 8, 1997, from a Caucasian male, about 5'9" tall, who Harris met at a "crack house" and who appeared to be under the influence of crack cocaine. See Appeal Br. at 15-16. This man offered Harris the Pathfinder as collateral for a loan of $250.*fn4 See id. Harris testified that he inspected the license, registration, and insurance, saw that they all had matching names, and believed that the man before him was in fact the man whose name was on this documentation.*fn5 See id. He furthermore testified that the man had the keys to the car and that there was nothing about the vehicle that indicated it had been stolen. See id. Harris explained that after making arrangements to be in contact with this man, he drove away in the Pathfinder. See id. at 17.

The jury found the petitioner guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree. Petitioner appealed to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of evidence that petitioner knew that the car he was driving had been stolen; (2) the admission of incriminating statements in violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination; and (3) the trial judge's enhancement of the sentence based on what he believed to be petitioner's perjurious testimony at trial. On May 23, 2000, the Appellate Division affirmed Harris's conviction. People v. Fletcher Harris, 272 A.D.2d 225, 709 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1st Dept. 2000). The court held that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and that the credibility determinations of the jury ought not be disturbed. Id. at 515. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court had properly refused to suppress Harris's statement to the arresting officers because Harris was not subject to interrogation, but rather was questioned only to clarify the situation. Id. The court declined to review Harris's claim that the trial judge had impermissibly enhanced his sentence because Harris's failure to object at the proceeding resulted in petitioner's failure to preserve this claim.*fn6 Id. at 516. On November 20, 2000, the New York Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for leave to appeal. People v. Fletcher Harris, 95 N.Y.2d 935, 721 N.Y.S.2d 611, 744 N.E.2d 147 (2000).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Reading the statute based on its "plain" meaning, a state court decision is "contrary to" an established Federal law if the state court reaches a different result than would the Supreme Court when presented with facts that are "materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" or if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O'Connor, J. concurring); Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 320 (2nd Cir. 2000). A state court decision may also be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1), if the state court "unreasonably" applies the correct federal rule. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Clark, 214 F.3d at 320-321. However, the statute requires denial of all habeas petitions unless the federal court determines that the state court's application of the federal rule was "objectively unreasonable" and was not merely an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law. See Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1522; Clark, 214 F.3d at 320-321; Francis v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 108-109 (2nd Cir. 2000).

Having now described the standard of review employed on habeas review, we turn to petitioner's claims.

B. Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner's first claim for relief challenges the sufficiency of evidence produced at trial regarding petitioner's knowledge that he was in possession of a stolen vehicle. In the habeas context, the standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether "after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). Where the record supports conflicting inferences, the court "must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to ...


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