C. As to the Suppression of the Statements
Miranda warnings are required only if law enforcement agents
interrogate a person who is in custody. United States v.
Kirsh, 54 F.3d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966). "The test used in determining whether a defendant was in
custody is an objective one that (a) asks whether a reasonable
person would have understood herself to be subjected to
restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest,
and (b) focuses upon the presence or absence of affirmative
indications that the defendant was not free to leave." Kirsh,
54 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"An accused is in custody when, even `in the absence of an
actual arrest, law enforcement officials act or speak in a
manner that conveys the message that they would not permit the
accused to leave.'" Id. (citing Campaneria v. Reid,
891 F.2d 1014, 1021 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 949,
111 S.Ct. 1419, 113 L.Ed.2d 471 (1991). See also United States
v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that a
custodial setting is evidenced by "inherently coercive pressures
that tend to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak. . . .").
The defendant moves to suppress the statements that he
allegedly made during the two encounters with Marto on November
20, 2000. The affidavit and complaint in support of the arrest
warrant in this matter executed by Carmine G. Sabia (the "Sabia
Affidavit" or the "Affidavit") indicates that the defendant made
essentially three statements during his first encounter with
Marto: (1) I heard gunshots but had no involvement with them;
(2) I entered the Refuge without permission at the northern end
of the fire trail and was walking through the Refuge to observe
wildlife; and (3) I am not in possession of a firearm and do not
own a firearm of any kind.
The Affidavit further indicates that the defendant essentially
made three statements during his second encounter with Malto and
police officers from the Suffolk County Park: (1) I do not know
anything about the gunshots; (2) I was not involved in the
wounding of the deer; and (3) I saw several dead deer in the
vicinity where Malto discovered the wounded deer.
However, the Affidavit lacks certain critical facts required
to properly decide whether the defendant was in custody when he
made the alleged statements. In particular, the Affidavit does
not indicate either the duration of the two encounters or the
number of police officers present in the second encounter.
Further, the Affidavit does not address whether any of the
officers physically touched the defendant during the encounters.
Also, the Affidavit does not state whether the officers were in
uniform or possessed guns when they confronted the defendant.
Because there is insufficient evidence for the Court to decide
whether the defendant was in custody at the time that he made
the statements at issue, the Court directs that an evidentiary
hearing be held before United States Magistrate Judge William D.
Wall. The parties are directed to report to Judge Wall forthwith
to set a date for the hearing.
D. As to the Request for a Bill of Particulars
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a district court "may direct the filing of a bill of
particulars." Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(f). A bill of particulars enables
a defendant "to identify with sufficient particularity the
nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling [a]
defendant to prepare for trial,
to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy
should he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense."
United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted). Acquisition of evidentiary detail is not
the function of a bill of particular. United States v. Torres,
901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990). The decision to grant a motion
for a bill of particulars is within the sound discretion of the
district court. United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1148
(2d Cir. 1984).
Here, the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the
nature of the single charge pending against him, namely making a
false statement to an officer on November 20, 2000, thereby
enabling him to prepare a defense in this matter. Accordingly,
the motion for a bill of particulars is denied.
E. As to the Production of all Documents and Tangible
The defendant moves for the production of documents pursuant
to Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 16 provides that: