Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Buy This Entire Record For
GAGE v. THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
May 29, 2002
JOAN GAGE AND KAREN JURUTKA, AS GUARDIANS OF THE PERSON AND PROPERTY OF WILLIAM J. OSIKA AND MADELINE OSIKA, PLAINTIFFS,
THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; AND ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, M.D., AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: David N. Hurd, United States District Judge.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose. Oral argument was heard
on October 26, 2001, in Albany, New York. Decision was reserved.
The facts relevant to a determination of the instant motion are stated
Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of two nursing home
patients, William and Madeline Osika. On the advice of counsel, plaintiffs
transferred $22,000 out of the Osikas' assets. Based on this transfer,
the state defendants imposed a penalty period of 1.545 months against the
Osikas, during which they were ineligible to receive long-term health
benefits under Medicaid. Pursuant to New York State Administrative
Directive No. 96 ADM-8 ("ADM-8"), this penalty was assessed from the
first day of the month following the month of the transfer. Plaintiffs
contend that calculating the penalty period from the month following the
transfer, as required by ADM-8, violates federal law.*fn1
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D) provides that, "The date specified
in this subparagraph is the first day of the month during or after which
assets have been transferred for less than fair market value and which
does not occur in any periods of ineligibility under this subsection."
(Emphasis added.) This language was adopted as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA `93"), 42 U.S.C. § 1396p.
Prior to 1993, the period of ineligibility commenced "with the month in
which such resources were transferred." Defendants contend that the
amendment granted states the option of selecting either month as the
beginning of the penalty period. Plaintiffs contend that the amendment
was intended only to clarify the date to be applied in the case of
multiple transfers of such resources.
As a result of defendants' adoption of the month following the transfer
as the start of the penalty period, plaintiffs contend that defendants
violated their rights to (1) due process because Congress' preempted the
field of Medicaid regulation and ADM-8 imposes a different penalty period
than that applicable under federal law; and (2) equal protection because
New York residents are treated differently than Medicaid recipients who
are residents of other states.
A. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "must accept the
allegations contained in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-movant; it should not dismiss the
complaint `unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which
would entitle [them] to relief.'" Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150
(2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see
also Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1995).
However, conclusory allegations
that merely state the general legal
conclusions necessary to prevail on the merits and are unsupported by
factual averments will not be accepted as true. See, e.g., Clapp v.
Greene, 743 F. Supp. 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Albert v. Carovano,
851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988).
Defendants raise several arguments in support of their motion to
dismiss. Each of ...
Buy This Entire Record For